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ABSTRACT
ENACTING THE SEMANTIC WEB: ONTOLOGIAL ORDERINGS, NEGOTIATED STANDARDS, AND
HUMAN-MACHINE TRANSLATIONS
by
Matthew T. McCarthy
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. 2017
Under the Supervision of Professor Aneesh Aneesh
Artificial intelligence (AI) that is based upon semantic search has become one of the dominant
means for accessing information in recent years. This is particularly the case in mobile contexts,
as search based AI are embedded in each of the major mobile operating systems. The
implications are such that information is becoming less a matter of choosing between different
sets of results, and more of a presentation of a single answer, limiting both the availability of
and exposure to, alternate sources of information. Thus, it is essential to understand how that
information comes to be structured and how deterministic systems like search based AI come
to understand the indeterminate worlds they are tasked with interrogating. The semantic web,
one of the technologies underpinning these systems, creates machine-readable data from the
existing web of text and formalizes those machine-readable understandings in ontologies. This
study investigates the ways that those semantic assemblages structure, and thus define, the
world. In accordance with assemblage theory, it is necessary to study the interactions between
the components that make up such data assemblages. As yet, the social sciences have been
slow to systematically investigate data assemblages, the semantic web, and the components of
these important socio-technical systems. This study investigates one major ontology,
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Schema.org. It uses netnographic methods to study the construction and use of Schema.org to
determine how ontological states are declared and how human-machine translations occur in
those development and use processes. This study has two main findings that bear on the
relevant literature. First, I find that development and use of the ontology is a product of
negotiations with technical standards such that ontologists and users must work around, with,
and through the affordances and constraints of standards. Second, these groups adopt a
pragmatic and generalizable approach to data modeling and semantic markup that determines
ontological context in local and global ways. This first finding is significant in that past work has
largely focused on how people work around standards’ limitations, whereas this shows that
practitioners also strategically engage with standards to achieve their aims. Second, the
particular approach that these groups use in translating human knowledge to machines, differs
from the formalized and positivistic approaches described in past work. At a larger level, this
study fills a lacuna in the collective understanding of how data assemblages are constructed
and operate.
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“The computer takes our own superlative power over worlds as the condition of possibility for
the creation of worlds. Our intense investment in worlds — our acute fact finding, our scanning
and data mining, our spidering and extracting — is the precondition for how worlds are
revealed. The promise is not one of revealing something as it is, but in simulating a thing so
effectively that “what it is” becomes less and less necessary to speak about, not because it is
gone for good, but because we have perfected a language for it.”
- Alexander R. Galloway: The Interface Effect
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1. Introduction
More than once over the past year, the webmaster for Schema.org was approached
about using the project to help automate political and journalistic fact checking and reducing
the impact of fake news. The main concern being that fake news, and/or misleading claims,
might be damaging to one’s ability to inform oneself and to carry on as an engaged citizen, as
incorrect, improper, or incomplete information can lead to incorrect attributions and false
conclusions in the populous. Working though this conceptual morass is complicated.
Recognizing something as false, requires interpretation on the part of the reader, however, this
interpretation is seemingly not happening, or is not happening enough for this issue to gain
such prominence. Popular expressions of anxiety have contributed to a collective blame
shifting, placing the onus for filtering out fake news onto the owners of the platforms that
deliver it. In the United States, companies like Google and Facebook have begun applying a host
of technological fixes to the problem, allowing machines to algorithmically filter results. One
solution, employed by Google, implicates Schema.org and relies on an infrastructural shift in
the way that Web information is structured, represented, and recalled. This shift involves
converting news articles and their claims into machine-readable data to indicate to an artificial
intelligence (AI) or other computational agent, that a piece of content is analysis, background,
opinion, reportage, or review. Furthermore, this conversion can take up individual, or sets of
claims made to determine their truthfulness and to reference fact-checking entities whose job
it is to review such claims.
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How does a machine know what fake is, though? How does an AI know the difference
between a true claim and one that has been debunked? How does a computer know if content
is a sponsored advertisement, or content that is newsworthy, but sponsored? How can it
understand how a fact checked claim relates to the contexts in which the claim was originally
used or was reproduced? In sum, on what basis is a computer’s understanding of the world
built? Heather Ford and Mark Graham (2016) note a different, but similar, problem. They ask
what effects the mediation of Web information has on the representation of different places.
Specifically, they inquire about this just noted infrastructural shift in information recall and
presentation. They investigate the ways that the city of Jerusalem is represented by Wikipedia,
Wikidata, and Google, as well as the consequences of the way translations between those sites
occur. In this process of translating information between Wikipedia, Wikidata, and Google,
much definitional nuance is lost, as both Wikidata and Google obscure Jerusalem’s complex
historically grounded claims of ownership and importance and over-determine its political
status (Ford and Graham 2016).
In this work, they also show that the provenance of important statistical data describing
Jerusalem is obscured in different ways across these three domains. They argue that the
population statistics, particularly of Jerusalem, reflects a certain political position that obscures
the precise nature of the people who are doing the counting, and those who are counted. They
show that these important details of provenance are lost in the translations from Wikipedia.
Lastly, they also note that a user’s agency to make changes and their ability to interrogate
alternate information is limited as these translations occur. Where users have the ability to
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actively engage with information on Wikipedia, no such agency exists in Wikidata and Google1.
What causes this loss of nuance, obscured provenance, and reduction in a user’s ability to
change and interrogate information? How are these two problems of automated fake news
filtration and the problems of information retrieval and representation linked?
These stories orient us to one of three major changes in the way that information
currently exists on the Web. The change at the center them is one of infrastructure and its
relation to data. This first change reflects a new implementation of the means for representing,
interpreting, connecting, and retrieving data on the Web. It is an implementation where human
interpretation is one more additional level removed from the underlying data, with an
additional insertion point for computational agents to mediate information, one where
information is actually premediated. This change is one that affects the thing actually being
parsed in any search. Before I examine the new structural change introduced above, I will point
to the second major change, the way that information on the Web is accessed and retrieved.
While search is still the dominant means through which information is accessed on the
Internet, the nature of search has changed, and promises to change further. There is no novelty
in claiming that search based information retrieval is changing, as work has extensively covered
the effects of Web search, particularly as it pertains to Google and its marked shift from past
search forms (Halavais 2009; Introna and Nissenbaum 2000; Viadhyanathan 2012). However,
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On this last point, I disagree. This study examines exactly the ways in which information
seekers engage with the technologies underpinning Ford and Graham’s work. Such
development communities are open and participation driven. However, their analysis should
give cause to consider an important related issue about both the expertise required to
participate in a meaningful way, as well as the practical transparency the processes and
technologies involved in semantic search.
3

there is value is stating the nature of those changes, insofar as those changes coincide with a
change in interface. Just as the shift from the page to the screen prompted a movement to
rethink information access, the shift from the desktop to the mobile device should prompt
another (Galloway 2012).
Consider the following, the interface through which search takes place is now primarily
mobile. Between 52% - 71% of all Web traffic is mobile depending on source and country. Over
50% of Google search is now mobile, though Google offers no geo-demographic detail beyond
that (Chaffey 2016; Meller and Cohen 2015). One estimate by Hitwise reports that roughly 58%
of all Web search is mobile, though they too do not offer more detailed distinctions (Fetto
2016). Moreover, these rates have increased year over year. Perhaps most telling in these
regards, is that Google is switching its primary search index from desktop to mobile sites. This
last fact has major consequences for what information appears and what does not, as content
now faces increased competition for a newly constrained display space. All of this is to say that
mobile search is more prominent than desktop search and its interface is newly limiting.
The third major change is in the method of access. It is not just that search and Web
access shifted to a mobile interface, but mobile interfaces themselves are seeing a concurrent
shift. While search sites still draw traffic, search is now integrated as a fundamental feature of
mobile operating systems. Since 2011, these mobiles operating systems – Android, iOS, and
Windows Mobile – have had search based artificial intelligence systems embedded into their
platforms as an increasingly dominant means through which users interact with their devices.
This has the practical consequence of allowing mobile search to occur outside of a Web
browser, and instead promotes search through the mediating effects of predictive AI. While
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researches do not know the precise nature of the many algorithms that each major search
engine deploys, we do know that those search companies now rely on semantic data, rather
than “raw” text, for their search results. Search is now mobile, AI driven, and semantic.
As a preliminary concern, why does this matter? Indexical search already filters
information, and has done so algorithmically for decades. Adding to the issues covered in past
work, I point to at least three main reasons (Halavais 2009; Introna and Nissenbaum 2000;
Viadhyanathan 2012). First, as display space decreases, decisions about what to display and
what to omit take on a new heightened significance. Second, the presentation of results
matters. Rank order of results enrolls users and search companies in a trust relationship where
users trust that the search engine is displaying the correct and most relevant information to
their query. This has the effect of drawing users’ attention to the first few results, making highly
unlikely that they view lower ranked results, with results on later pages even less likely to
generate traffic (Jansen and Spink 2003; Jansen et al. 2000; Spink and Jansen 2004). This is
particularly salient when search results are viewed on a mobile page, as the first few options
are the only options immediately visible. Lastly, we do not know precisely how search
algorithms sort and present results or how recent AI systems augment search. Some general
knowledge exists about the processes, but exact details elude us, as they rest on a hidden
combination of technologies and algorithms whose implementation are often trade secrets and
differ depending on the company at hand. That is, they are notoriously black boxed. However,
one such technology has not yet shifted completely into the background: the semantic web.
Recently, search engines have been drawing on linked data technologies, creating and
enabling what is more conventionally referred to as the semantic web. The semantic web is an
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additional layer to the World Wide Web (WWW) where content is given machine-readable
context and meaning. Just as Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) provides standards for a
describing a logical section of a Web document, the semantic web provides a series of
standards for creating meaningful data and content from that Web content (Berners-Lee et al.
2001; Giri 2011; Halford et al. 2012; Legg 2013). This web of linked data converts an
unstructured web of textual information to a structured web of semantic data by providing the
definition of terms, properties, and the formal statements of relationships, all of which become
marked and interlinked by Web developers through recourse to semantic ontologies. For
example, a computational agent, such as a search based AI, would understand that Dune is a
creative work authored by Frank Herbert in 1965 and has the fictional characters, Paul Atreides,
Vladimir Harkonen, and Feyd-Rautha, among others. If the Web data was encoded correctly, an
agent could start at any point in that chain of relationships and divine the entire set of them, all
by dereferencing the parsed content through the ontology.
As search is now semantic and AI driven, it becomes increasingly important to
understand how machines arrive at their understandings of the world and the consequence of
those processes, even with the benign example above. Despite this importance, we as a public
and as scholars are not aware of the ways these technologies are developed, much less how
they declare the world. Ford and Graham (2016) provide an excellent example to show some of
the practical and theoretical consequences of the move to the semantic web, but only point to
a need for further research to understand how those processes occur and how their
information subjects are brought into being. So, it is an understanding of those declarations
that this study attempts to expose. Much like the laboratory studies from years past, this study
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opens Pandora’s black box before its contents become cemented and obscured (Knorr-Cetina
1999; Latour 1988; Latour and Woolgar 1986; Mol 2002). Thus, I am led to the following
empirical question, how are these semantic data assemblages enacted? Such a question is not
easy to answer, as it first involves unearthing the answers to a host of subsidiary questions.
First among them, investigates how ontological states are declared in the processes of
developing and using the semantic web. This question is primarily theoretical in that it attends
to the particular delimiting of meaning space. The second question asks, how are the
complexities of a flexible and non-deterministic world represented to a deterministic machine?
This question is primarily empirical, as it attends to the various interactions between actual
components of a given data assemblage.
These two overarching questions are both questions of ontologies. At first glance, they
appear as distinct interpretations of the term, but under closer analysis they converge to
describe the same underlying thing. This discussion is not driven by the classical questions of
what it is to be, but rather how one becomes. A Deleuzian ontology concerns itself not with
essences or the nature of a thing, but with capacities and how a thing is actualized as it enters
into webs of relationships (DeLanda 2006, 2011; Deleuze 1964[1995]; Deleuze and Guattari
1987; May 2005). A thing, or multiplicity for Deleuze, has no essential character but that which
is active in a given moment, as a part of a given assemblage. Thus, the question of what
something is, takes on less significance than how something becomes, as it requires an
understanding of the processes of connection. His approach to ontology rests on the
assumption that the ontological is unstable and cannot ever be known, only modeled through
its integration in an assemblage under the particular expressive logic of that assemblage. As
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such, we can equate the contexts of activation and integration with the ontological state of the
thing. So, the previous question on becoming can be reframed as a question of how the
assemblage is enacted, or called into being (Mol 2002; Woolgar and Lezaun 2013). Accordingly,
ontology is not fixed and it demands an understanding of its settlement, particularly as
ontologies in this paradigm are multiple (Deleuze 1964[1995]; Hoffman 2015; May 2005; Mol
2002; Woolgar and Lezaun 2013). In simpler and more directly relevant terms, how is ontology
declared by ontologies? The trick, as Deleuze would argue, is uncovering those enrollments and
activations in assemblages. This is the task that I will turn to, shortly.
The answer to my questions requires an understanding of the data assemblage
surrounding the semantic web. To understand a data assemblage, one needs to take stock of its
various components and examine the ways in which those components interact to continually
produce the assemblage. Broadly speaking, the semantic web is too large and dispersed a thing
for a focused empirical study, as it, like all assemblages, is composed of many other
assemblages. In this case, that means many other ontologies, users, consumers, technologies,
etc. In an effort to set empirical boundaries and to focus this study, I engage with one such
assemblage, Schema.org. As only one component of the larger semantic web, Schema.org is an
ontology development project spearheaded by Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Yandex that
attempts to create semantic data for the World Wide Web. Currently, it is among the largest
and most used semantic web ontologies, covering approximately 10% of existing Web content,
with major users including the Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Yandex search based ecosystems,
in addition to a substantial number of other large Web domains (Guha 2014; Nevile 2014).
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This study relies on the in-depth case study of the users, developers, vocabulary,
markup standards, and digital artifacts directly associated with the Schema.org project. As both
the objects of investigation and their impact on my research questions are diverse, multiple
methodological approaches drawn from recent work on digital technologies are employed. I
deploy netnographic, or digital ethnographic, methods across a number of digital sites that are
central to Schema.org’s development. Netnographic practice allows for a situated analysis of
community engagement available in online forums, providing a set of observational data similar
to, but more reliable than field notes and artifacts from traditional ethnographic methods
(Kozinets 2010; Springer 2015). Additionally, I use an object based analysis, similar to
multimodal discourse analysis, to interrogate the markup standards used by the project. This
approach allowed me to identify and interrogate the ways that discursive patterns help to
shape affordances and prohibitions, the ways of being and the constraints that might be placed
on being, the ways of doing and the constraints placed on practice, and the ways of
representing and the constraints on possible claims making through markup standards (Introna
2005, 2014; Introna and Hayes 2011; Kress and van Leewuen 2006; Lupton 2014; O’Halloran
2011).
The remainder of this work unfolds in the following way: first, in chapter two I provide a
detailed explanation of how the semantic web works in both theory and practice. In addition to
explaining its operation, I discuss the limited amount of work directly pertaining to the
semantic web. This work, like Ford and Graham’s (2016) study, offers us a set of critiques and
potential consequences in implementing a semantic web. However, it is not focused on the
processes of its development or use, and makes no reference to the various standards involved.
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The most notable of its consequences include the interrelated processes of ontological overdetermination and ontic occlusion (Ginsberg 2008; Knobel 2010). This section argues that
ontologies, as taxonomic orderings of the world, are fully determinate systems, and what can
be known and/or represented in them is bound completely by the terms set out in those
ontologies. That is, they permit a predetermined range of claims that can be made against
them. This is inadequate for representing the indeterminacy of natural language and the
environment of meaning in which it exists.
Chapter three establishes my theoretical assumptions and engages with the extant
literature relevant to data assemblages and their components. I expand on recent attempts to
study data assemblages by situating my research within an assemblage theoretical perspective
(Kitchin 2014a, 2014b; Kitchin and Lauriault 2014; Kitchin et al. 2015a, 2015b). An assemblage
based approach to my main questions requires resolving a number of smaller questions
relevant to literatures describing and explaining the various components of data assemblages.
The small, but growing, work on data assemblages encourages researchers to take these
various components as interrelated features of the larger assemblage, studying not what the
components do in isolation, but how they interact to produce the assemblage of which they are
a part. Among the ones drawn on in this chapter are, literatures on standards, infrastructures,
classification, and communities of practice. The existing work on standards argues that
standards play a central role in affording and constraining action and interpretation vis-à-vis
technologies, and in so doing, they help to bridge diverse communities of practice and
infrastructures as mechanisms for interoperability. However, the ways in which these
communities negotiate these limitations is under-studied. Relatedly, classification systems play

10

a similar role, enabling the storage and retrieval of information. Problematically, they can
render certain beings invisible when they are neglected by the system. Thus, what is included
and excluded, as well as how those decisions are made, take on a central importance.
Sociological research in these areas, particularly that which engages with science and
technology studies, situates these classification systems, infrastructures, and standards in
communities of practice that bring to bear a diverse set of knowledges, assumptions, and
techniques in their interactions with these components. So, this literature prompts
consideration of questions about how these communities of practice engage with, and
negotiate, the affordances and constraints of not only the standards involved, but also the
limitations of classification, and techniques of representation presented by those other
components.
Chapter four provides a detailed description of how one goes about studying hidden
infrastructure-like systems such as the semantic web. In this case and methodology chapter, I
provide further detail about Schema.org as a specific implementation of the semantic web. In
this chapter, I describe the case that guides my research. This part includes a description of
Schema.org, the major institutions attached to the project, the communities of practice that are
most closely involved in its development and its use, the vocabulary that constitutes the
project, and the primary markup standards implicated in its creation and use. The next segment
in this chapter describes the primary sites where my research occurred. This included
Schema.org’s GitHub repository, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) message boards, and
sources of documentation for the three markup standards supported by Schema.org.
Additionally, this chapter provides a detailed explanation of both the data collection process
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and the preparation for analysis. In this section, I also provide a detailed outline of the two
main methodological techniques used in this study as alluded to above. Lastly, I review the
limitations of my methodology and include a statement of researcher’s standpoint and bias that
such a study necessarily brings about. I also include a description of the ways that my research
changed as the investigation unfolded.
Answering my larger questions necessitates that I first attend to smaller questions.
Specifically, I need to uncover the ways in which the various components of the Schema.org
assemblage interact. Two central components are the communities of practice and the markup
standards that enable Schema.org to function as a semantic web ontology. Chapter five
explains the three markup standards supported by Schema.org and the way that they condition
its development and use. This chapter extends recent work that both locates standards at the
level of professional practice, and that investigates how blockages are negotiated and how the
restrictions created by standardization are relaxed while still permitting the interoperability
they are designed to enable. I show how the markup standards used with Schema.org are
deployed across the two primary fields of practice implicated in the project. In line with existing
work on standards and classification, I show the ways in which they set certain affordances and
constraints on the development and use of the Schema.org ontology, and thus the affordances
and constraints placed upon the enactment of the data assemblage. However, I also show the
ways that these standards work against the thing they are supposed to enable, and how the
communities of practice negotiate those restrictions, adding to recent work on this front
(Halpin 2016). Furthermore, I detail some of the unintended consequences of those
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negotiations and how they can serve to over-determine and occlude certain understandings of
the world.
As previously noted, the particular form that any given assemblage takes is dependent
on the interactions between the assemblage’s components. Thus, following from chapter five,
the study of semantic web ontologies must necessarily engage with the questions relating to
processes of creation and the interactions between other components. In chapter six, I am
concerned with the specific apparatuses that include, systems of thought, practices, and
communities (Kitchin 2014b:25). Within these apparatuses are the conceptual models,
rationalities, techniques, conventions, and the communities involved in applying those systems
of thinking and forms of practice. As such, this chapter examines the interactions between
those various elements of the Schema.org data assemblage. In this section I concentrate on the
two main communities of practice relevant to Schema.org, the ontologists charged with the
vocabulary’s creation and maintenance, and the Web developers who deploy the vocabulary to
convert their content into semantic data. Through this, I reveal the ways that Schema.org’s
ontologists adapt the Resource Description Framework (RDF) data model to their specific
needs. Additionally, I examine their underlying philosophical approach to modeling semantic
data, the problems they encounter in doing so, and the consequences of the ways in which they
negotiate those problems. I argue here that these approaches have the consequences of
creating indeterminacy surrounding a trade-off of semantic precision and coverage that cannot
be resolved. Furthermore, their approach creates a certain path dependency that helps
contribute to the over-determination and occlusion mentioned above.
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Finally, in chapter seven, I draw together the various threads developed throughout this
study, both to answer my motivating questions, as well as to outline my contribution to the
emerging literature on data studies and the semantic web. Here I argue that the combination of
negotiating the affordances and constraints of markup standards and the particular approach
to modeling semantic data, leads to a premediated Web environment (Aneesh 2017). The
representation of the world, and thus the version of it that becomes available, is being read
behind the scenes and being presented as already digested information. Returning to my initial
vignette and to Ford and Graham (2016), I expose and examine the processes and technologies
by which a computer can know the nature of a news source and claim, as well as how a city like
Jerusalem can be over-determined as simply the capital city of Israel, as opposed to a city of a
rich, but contested linage. Not only is this study a problematization of the means for
representing, but it is also a new provocation to the sociological study of information access.
This is not pass normative judgment on the semantic web or the way that its various
practitioners implement it, as they themselves recognize the imperfect nature of their work.
Instead, it is recognition that the information environment is being encoded, and that encoding
is rapidly being settled outside of visible Internet space.
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2. What is the Semantic Web?
This chapter serves as an orientation to the semantic web and the data model
underpinning it. As such, it begins to unravel the puzzle of its deployment and ossification. It
charts a description of the semantic web and outlines its essential differences from the World
Wide Web. Through a series of empirical examples, it provides an initial understanding of how a
machine can come to know something, how the system that permits that knowing ontologically
orders the world, and offers glimpses of potential consequences of such orderings.
Initially a proposal by Sir Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web, the
semantic web is an additional layer sitting on top of the existing Web where content is given
machine-readable context and meaning (Berners-Lee et al. 2001; Giri 2011; Halford et al. 2012;
Legg 2013). On the World Wide Web, information is essentially “raw” text, i.e., what we
experience is a web of textual documents that have been encoded for display and use through
a set of website development standards such as HTML and Extensible Markup Language (XML).
The meaning derived from this text is the sole result of processes of human interpretation.
While those sets of standards applied to the web of text are often machine-readable, they
supply no semantic content. Search algorithms and other computational agents are only able to
crawl the textual documents for simple instances of identified keywords of criteria, i.e. there is
nothing that identifies Barack Obama as the 44th President of the United States apart from the
co-occurrence of those discrete terms within a set of texts, and any attribution of the
presidency to Barack Obama is done by the user themselves based on their knowledge of U.S.
politics. So, while “Barack Obama” and “44th President of the United States” may appear in the
same text, the link between the two is never made by the computational agent. A Web search

15

for “Who is the 44th president of the United States?” would search for each of those terms and
present information in the form of a series of hyperlinks to the user via some relevancy
algorithm. Any determination of fact or interpretation of underlying meaning is left to the user,
despite the algorithm’s likelihood of presenting one set of results over another. That is, the
determination that Donald Trump is the current president, and not Barack Obama, is never
made by the computational agent in this case.
The current Web environment is much different than the one just described, however.
Search algorithms, and other capable computational agents, engage in semantic search. These
agents parse an additional layer of site markup that converts “raw” text into semantic data. The
technology that makes this “raw” textual information machine-readable – semantic data –
relies on providing a definition of terms, properties, types, and a formal statement of
relationships, all of which become marked and interlinked by Web developers. There are a
number of requirements for this to occur. First, there needs to be a schema, or set of schemas,
for describing types and how they relate to other things as well as the set of properties they
have and inherit. Next, there needs to be a semantic structure to determine how those
properties connect things to one another and to specific instances. Instances, things, and their
properties all need to be uniquely identifiable to a machine through the use of International
Resource Identifiers (IRIs)2. Lastly, the collection of statements needs to be represented in a

2

IRIs are a more general version of Universal Resource Identifiers (URIs) that draw on a Unicode
typeset and allow for international characters, where URIs draw on ASCII which do not. Both IRI
and URI are a more general type of identifier than something like a Universal Resource Locator
(URL), which only points to a resource’s location and not its name.
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formal set of relationships, called an ontology or vocabulary3. These ontologies define the rules
of representation and establish all permissible relationships, property attachments, and
instance values. That is, they construct the very existence of the world to a machine.

2.1 How Does It Order the World?
Crucial to understanding the development of these ontologies is the type of data model
used in their creation. The semantic web relies on a graph theoretic model called the Resource
Description Framework (RDF). The RDF conceptual model uses nodes to model subjects and
objects and edges or arcs to model properties and relations. Each of which is identified
specifically in the ontology

Figure 1. Graph Model of Presidential Succession in Terms

Figure 1. provides an example. This example shows a graph of recent presidential succession
3

Ontology and vocabulary can be, and are often, used interchangeably. In this study, I do use
the two terms interchangeably for the purposes of sentence structure and readability.
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and the set of spousal relationships. Within Figure 1., each node is a subject and/or object and
each edge or arc is a predicate or property4. An agent parsing this graph could begin at any
point and divine information about any other point in the graph. For example, one could ask
“Who is George W. Bush’s successor’s spouse?” and an agent could parse the graph and tell you
that it is “Michelle Obama”. Moreover, this very simple graph could be much more complex. In
this current case, the graph actually would include the entire expanded set of presidents,
spouses, presidential sitting dates, and where each identified president sits in the line of
presidential succession. A graph of this sort would also include an entire set of additional
subjects and relationships. If asked the name of the current President of the United States, the
agent could look at this graph and tell you that it was Donald Trump5. If drawing on the
expanded graph, you could also ask an agent “Who is Laura Bush’s spouse, when was he the
President, and who did he succeed?”. The agent would parse all the relevant property and
subject positions in the graph to provide “George W. Bush, 2000-2008, and William J. Clinton”.
This principle functionality is one of the technologies that underpin artificial intelligence
systems like Google Assistant, Siri, Cortana, Alexa, and Hound among others. It is so pervasive

4

The designation of subject or object or the determination of edge or arc depends on the way
that a relationship is framed and the ability for a relationship to be interpreted in reverse. For
example, Donald Trump is the successor of Barack Obama, in this example. This reads from right
to left as Donald Trump as the subject, Barack Obama as the object, and successor as a directed
arc. We could simply reframe the statement as Barack Obama hassuccessor Donald Trump.
Here Obama is the subject and Trump is the object, with hassuccessor being a directed
predicate. Modeling the inverse in graph theory is simple, but the actual application of inverse
properties relies on a markup standards supporting reverse parsing and/or the presence of
specified inverse properties in the ontology. In this case, if the Dbpedia vocabulary and the
chosen markup both permitted inverse interpretation, the arc would be an undirected edge.
5
This is exactly the approach Google’s Knowledge Graph takes.
18

that it is also embedded in smaller systems like Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and various calendar
applications, among others.

Figure 2. Graph Model of Presidential Succession in IRIs

However, Figure 1. is not how a computational agent views semantic data. These are
terms that ultimately have no meaning to an agent. They are just literal values. In other words,
this graph has no machine-readable context. Figure 2. shows the same graph as an agent would
see it6. Here we are identifying each node and edge with a unique IRI. In this particular case,
each IRI points to a specific location in the DBpedia7 database. We can ask the same questions
as before, but now the agent knows where and what to look at for each node and edge. We
have provided the agent and the graph the context from DBpedia. Returning to the original

6

Agents do not see graphs in this same visual sense, they parse markup that is embedded into
webpages, emails, application program interfaces (APIs), etc. Showing the graph form is simply
for clarification.
7
DBpedia is a semantic version of Wikipedia. It is both an ontology and a database, which is the
collection of applied semantic content to a domain or domains.
19

query, the agent would now know who Donald Trump was and what the President of the
United States is and how the two instances relate to one another. Furthermore, by providing
the context from DBpedia, the agent can abstract the entire context that DBpedia provides.
Meaning, it can see that Melania Trump has one son, and know who he is. In this actual case, it
would also know that Melania was born in the former Yugoslavia (now Slovenia), what the
capital city was, and that she was born under Tito’s regime8. This is all to say that by providing
the necessary context, any set of properties or objects that are connected to Melania Trump to
any degree, can be understood by an agent.

Figure 3. Graph Model Connection Multiple Databases

8

The relationship between the former Yugoslavia and the current Slovenia is over determined
and occluded in DBpedia. In Melania Trump’s page, there is no machine-readable designation
that permits an agent to understand that relationship. Furthermore, the capital city in this case
is Belgrade, not Ljubljana, the current capital of the country. This highlights a central ontological
problem with the semantic web.
20

This specific use of the RDF model is one application of the semantic web; however, it
only represents a closed system. All of the subjects, objects, and predicates in this graph have
only referenced DBpedia, and so a computational agent can only know what is contained in that
ontology/database. Much of the development of the semantic web, as well as its initial
imagining, rests on the principles of linked data. Linked data contextualizes those instances and
properties, by supplying more information on that data, providing a way for machines to more
easily understand information by both traversing class hierarchy paths and linking of bits of
meaningful data across domains and uses (Berners-Lee et al. 2001; Coyle 2008; Giri 2011;
Halford et al. 2012). As it actually happens, DBpedia is a linked database. Continuing with the
previous example, an agent only knows Melania Trump to the extent that DBpedia explains her
and her set of relationships. Furthermore, an agent only knows that specific version of Melania
Trump, not the many other and potentially different representations of her. That is, it cannot
understand that the Melania Trump of DBpedia is the same Melania Trump of a New York
Times article or an Us Weekly article. Linked data allows us to tell the agent that the various
instances of Melania Trump are referring to the same person. The semantic web community
developed a technique for marking this type of equivalency. The Web Ontology Language
(OWL) has a property – owl:sameAs9 – which publishers can use to tell a parser that one
instance is equivalent across actual use cases. Figure 3. shows a graph theoretic model of this
example10. In actual usage DBpedia does use owl:sameAs to link its database with the New York

9

Italics are used to represent language statements, class, types, and properties.
Figure 3. creates a third dimension to the graph model where each node has additional depth
in their sets of relationships. This new relationship has been separated from Figures 1. and 2.
for ease of interpretation.
10
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Times. This equivalency means that the whole set of relationships in which Melania Trump is
embedded in DBpedia is applicable to the Melania Trump instances found in the New York
Times. Furthermore, it means that the set of relationships in the New York Times are applied to
the set in DBpedia as well.
The interlinking does not stop between two ontologies, however. In this limited
example, the Melania Trump entry in DBpedia links not only to the New York Times but also to
Wikidata, marking exact equivalences between all three11. Practically, this means that all the
sets of relationships that each ontology carries for those applied to Melania Trump are
applicable across all vocabularies and use cases that are marked up in this way. The underlying
idea here is that ontologies do not need to be redundant. They can simply link to other
ontologies that already cover the content domains that they need, allowing ontology
developers to focus on just their area of expertise or interest. However, in actual practice,
ontologies are often redundant, built differently, with different approaches to the application
of the RDF model, and at different levels of complexity. That there are no universal ontologies,
fully agreed upon standards, and different philosophies regarding ontology depth and breadth
means that there will be practical issues in markup and epistemological issues in
representation. The problem of drawing on a number of different ontologies, or ontologies in
general, is that they can sometimes serve to occlude differences, and make equivalency
statements between instances that may or may not be valid (Halpin et al. 2010; Poirier 2015).
This problem is exacerbated when two or more linked ontologies treat an instance differently.

11

This interlinking across ontologies can be used to apply any number of ontologies to an
instance.
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2.2 What Are Its Consequences?
One often noted issue among the semantic web community stems directly from the use
of the owl:sameAs statement. Many developers and ontologists are reluctant to use
owl:sameAs because it has the necessary consequence that any statements about one instance
are true about the others. While the statement is helpful in delineating equivalencies across
Web domains when they are not textually referred to in the same ways, it obscures real
differences in aboutness, and identity (Halpin et al. 2010). For instance, Poirier (2015) notes
that in DBpedia, content about Caitlyn Jenner is owl:sameAs content about Bruce Jenner
despite the very important and relevant identity transformations and political problems that
exist in such a statement. The linked nature of the semantic web makes it so that any link to
existing data sets with owl:sameAs makes a statement about that instance applicable to both,
independent of the truth of the statement. This presents clear issues relating not only to
accurate representation but also classification. DBpedia makes a similar false equivalence
between Yugoslavia and Slovenia in the example above.
A second issue arises when there are contextual differences. Using owl:sameAs to link
instances may not be appropriate across use case contexts. Making such an equivalency erases
the distinctions that contexts add to identity and definition. For example, the identity a
developer is trying to cultivate for Bill Gates the father is not the same as Bill Gates the
philanthropist, or Bill Gates the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Microsoft. Here an IRI
does mark the same referent and the properties describing referent hold across contexts, but it
isn’t necessarily appropriate to re-use an IRI when it is out of context. In that case, the
properties linked to that IRI do not matter, as the ontology itself works to recreate context. This
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point will be discussed in more detail in Chapter six. A third issue is the confusion of identity,
representation, and properties of things. Properties of things, or that describe things, are not
the same as representations or identities of those things, though equivalency statements are
often made between the properties and the thing itself. Furthermore, representation is not the
same as identity. URIs – pictures, email addresses, social security numbers, etc. – can stand in
as signifiers of a person, referring to a representation of a person, but are not reducible to the
person itself and in no way addresses the complexities of their identity. The question of
representation is a very real problem confronting the semantic web. However, this question of
representation has long been debated in philosophy and will not be the focus of this work. The
aim here is to move past the intractable philosophical problems of possibility to the empirical
problem of actual practice.
Another major criticism of semantic web technologies comes from their treatment of
ontological indeterminacy. Ontological indeterminacy is “the inescapable fact that two or more
incompatible conceptual systems can often be applied to a domain of interest with equal
empirical adequacy.” (Ginsberg 2008:1). This can occur when two communities of practice
approach the same concept differently and hold different meanings for it. These terminological
boundary objects lose their indeterminacy when coded into ontologies. Ontologies, as
taxonomic orderings of the world, are fully determinate classification and representation
systems. What can be known and/or represented in them is bound completely by the terms set
out in the various ontologies that are drawn on. That is, it permits a predetermined range of
claims that can be made against it. Natural language, on the other hand, is not fully
determinate. Differences can occur in actual use, and disagreements may arise about the
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applicability to particular contexts (Ginsberg 2008; Waller 2016). The translation processes
involved in converting the indeterminacy found in natural language to the fully determinate
language of the semantic web results in a state of ontological over-determination. I adopt
Ginsberg’s (2008:7) definition that ontological over-determination applies to “situations in
which the use of a formally defined [semantic web] term ipso facto commits one to accepting
certain implications or consequences that one could refrain from accepting in natural language
while still using the term in the same way”.

Figure 4. Marriage Defined in Opposite Sex Ontology
Couple
HasMember: Person
HasMember: Two

MaleCouple

FemaleCouple

HasMember:
MalePerson

HasMember:
FemalePerson

OppositeSexCouple
HasMember:
MalePerson,
Femaleperson

MarriedCouple
HasProofOfMarriage:
TRUE

Source: Ginsberg (2008:8)
Ginsberg (2008) shows the practical effects of ontological over-determination as it
applies to two states and their acceptance/treatments of gay marriage. To say that homosexual
couples can marry is an ontologically indeterminate statement. At the time of the article’s
writing (2008) gay marriage was only legal in two states, but its very legality in those states
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means that the statement is both empirically true and false. The author compares two
ontological descriptions of couples and the ability to marry. In one ontology (Figure 4.) the class
“couple” has subtypes “male couple”, “female couple”, and “opposite-sex couple”. The subtype
“opposite-sex couple” has its own subtype “married couple” that is not a shared subtype of the
other two types of couples. This constructs the knowable world as one where marriage only
exists as a possibility for heterosexual couples. In programming logic, a decision is made based
on the evaluation of presence. Presence indicates the truth of a statement, where absence
marks falsity. Here, however, the ability to make a claim of marriage extends beyond simply an
evaluation of a binary true/false input and instead forecloses on any alternate possibilities by
eliminating the need for the binary decision rule. The realm of knowledge here is prealgocratic,
meaning that what can be represented and known is decided before an AI or computational
agent can even act. In this way, meaning spaces are premediated (Aneesh 2017).

Figure 5. Marriage Defined in Ontology Regardless of Sex
Couple
HasMember: Person
HasMember: Two

MarriedCouple
HasProofOfMarriage:
TRUE

OppositeSexCouple
HasMember:
MalePerson,
Femaleperson

SameSexCouple

FemaleCouple

MaleCouple

HasMember:
FemalePerson

HasMember:
MalePerson

Source: Ginsberg (2008:8)
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In the second ontology (Figure 5.), the class “couple” has the types “same sex couple”,
which itself contains “male couple” and “female couple”, “opposite-sex couple”, and “married
couple”. In this second ontology, marriage is independent of the couple’s sex determined
makeup. The problem arises when a married homosexual couple enters the state that is using
the first ontology. In this ontology, marriage is ontologically over-determined. Despite being
legally married, a computational agent in the state where gay marriage is illegal has no ability to
comprehend the couple’s marriage. The two ontologies are incompatible but not in
disagreement because, as Ginsberg (2008:10) argues, they “cannot be referring to the same
concept”. To an AI in the illegal state, gay marriage is not illegal, it simply does not exist. This
would result in the complete erasure of the married couple from any decision rule that used
marriage as a factor in that state, despite its legality in the state where the couple is a citizen.
This second ontology, as are all ontologies, is prealgocratic, only it is more flexible and
expressive in delimiting the boundaries it has constructed.
This example brings up a related, but distinct issue with ontologies, that of ontic
occlusion. While not used in the study of the semantic web, Knobel’s (2010:3) definition is
helpful here. He defines ontic occlusion as a:
mechanism by which representational differences exert control over discourse. That is
to say, one representation of an idea, situation, or event can take precedence and
occlude, or block, another representation. Thus, the elements of the occluded
representation do not enter into the discourse and are left without legitimate role in
shaping the narrative.
Returning to Ginsberg’s (2008) gay marriage example, in both ontologies marriage is a sub type
of couple, the only difference is based on the sex and implied sexuality of the couple involved.
This makes a number of statements about the world and the nature of sex, sexuality, and
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coupling. First, it creates a world where polygamy does not exist. While this might make sense
in many places like the United States, where polygamy is criminalized, it does not make sense
when considering the many countries where it is legal or recognized. Furthermore, even in
places where polygamy is criminalized, it still occludes the actual fact of its existence. Second, it
reinforces a binary view of sex and sexuality while reducing sexuality to a derivative of sex. It
does not begin to allow for a more complex and nuanced understanding of sex and sexuality
that might be more closely aligned with actual individuals involved. Here, the choice to
represent marriage in the couple form, between two men, two women, or a man and women,
is an act of ontic occlusion, rendering alternate states of being invisible. It thus becomes
essential to critically examine the process by which this pre-data text becomes semantic linked
data. To do so requires that we also examine the data assemblages that organize, and provide
the means for sharing and consuming that data.
Thus far, little work has engaged with this topic. While scholarly interest in the semantic
web has been growing in recent years, there are no systematic and empirical studies of its
development or the conditions of its use. Ford and Graham (2016) have convincingly shown
some of the consequences for our understanding of place and space in semantic
representations. They argue that semantic content obscures data provenance, topical nuance,
and the ability for users to interrogate content as information seeking agents. Waller (2016)
correctly argues that the semantic web is seeing a consolidation whereby a few major
ontologies are coming to represent the whole of the semantic content on the Web. Like Ford
and Graham’s (2016) work, the major sociological implication here is that people are being
placed in a new set of trust relationships with information providers, particularly given the
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recent shifts to mobile and semantically driven AI. The unstated consequence of their work is
that semantic web ontologies ontologically order the world for machine interpretation
(McCarthy 2017). Problematically, these authors engage only with the interpretive capacity of
individuals at the front end of these relationships. I echo their concerns and in principle, I agree
with their attributed causes, but their work neglects any discussion of how those causal
mechanisms work. Specifically, they do not provide any insight into how these ontologies are
developed or how they are actually deployed, let alone the interactions various additional
components contribute to these processes. This is the task undertaken here.
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3. Semantic Assemblages: Their Ontologies and Their Components
The semantic web is a data assemblage. It creates a specific type of data environment
for machine readability. In so doing it enacts a set of specific states of being with each
ontological state dependent on the boundaries set by the relevant semantic ontology. To
understand how ontological states are declared by these ontologies we need to examine how
the world is translated in a way that in amenable to machines. Thus far, literature is lacking in
this area. While work on translating tacit knowledge and expertise is helpful, the question
extends beyond the simple translation of knowledge between experts in a field. As semantic
web ontologies are themselves assemblages composed of various systems of thought,
standards, infrastructures, practices, and understandings of data, the literatures surrounding
each of those components can help to situate an understanding of this translation process and
thus an understanding of how semantic data assemblages are created and deployed to
construct worlds.
At the outset, I should state that this study is not making the argument that
representation is impossible. That argument has been debated by philosophers of language and
science for some time. I argue from the position which assumes that the problem of
representation is intractable. Instead, this is a study of interactions, of process, and of making,
or as recent work argues, empirical ontology (Coopmans et al. 2014; Sismondo 2015; Woolgar
and Lezuan 2013, 2015). In what follows I outline an assemblage based theory of ontology that
argues ontological states are dependent on their activations in assemblages. Rather than
engaging with the nature of being, it focuses its attention on those empirically activated
existences. Next, I examine the literature on data and data assemblages showing that data is a
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specific effect of the interactions between components of the data assemblage and that the
contexts of those interactions remain under studied.
Following that will be a discussion of work that examines knowledge representation
specifically as it pertains to knowledge engineering in expert systems and information
infrastructures. While this work details the production of knowledge and the transfer of
expertise between humans, as well as the interpretation of machine output by humans, it does
not attend to the translations from human to machine and the resulting machine to machine
communication that ontologies imply. Since this problem is not only just a process of
translation and explication, but also a problem of classification, the next section will examine
the ways that classification systems and standards serve as one way of creating terminological
states. Classification systems implicate standards in ways that are often imperfect. I extend
recent work on this matter arguing that these rough interactions with classification systems and
standards require that practitioners negotiate with them in multiple ways. Lastly, I return to the
discussion of ontology as it pertains to the empirical enactment of ontologies in practice.

3.1 An Assemblage Theory of Ontology
Derrida argues that the problems with ontology begin at the terminological level
(Derrida 1967[2016]). Any attempt to articulate a manner of essential ontology only ever
pushes that essence away, as those terms only serve to implicate the very things they are trying
to obscure or differentiate from, thus subverting the effort to make meaning inhere within an
object. Words are simply too slippery to refer to anything in such a positive way. Views such as
this reflects an abandonment of ontology all together, as attempts to establish some sort of
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fixity belie the impossibility of such projects. More directly, such deferments cannot be
modeled precisely, as terms cling to their overly determined subjects or objects and the
inherent meanings that their connections produce.
A similar problem exists at the level of relationships. Two things cannot be said to simply
relate in such and such a way, as that just relocates the identification of two things to their
relationship, reducing difference to positive identity. In this sense “things are different because
they fall into different categories. They are different precisely in not being identical or the
same.” (May 2005:77). While Deleuze focuses on the relations of identity, analogy, opposition,
and resemblance, for the semantic web we might focus on type, sameAs, action, or category.
They each require that we have not only the understanding of the terms of relating, but the
stability of the terms that are to be related. That is, our predicate determines the relationship
between our subject and our object where the subject is always the subject, and the object
always the object (Deleuze 1968).
While some distance themselves from the ontological project for reasons relating to its
impossibility, others embrace the ontological project from a different perspective. In the
continental tradition, thinkers have developed an ontology that attempts at an explanation to
account for what there is. Deleuze relates this approach to the quest for finding a solution to a
question. The problems of being, identity, and definition are problems that look for a particular
answer, they expect an answer of certain definite type which renders the problem posed in the
question obsolete. May (2005) calls this approach an ontology of discovery. Deleuzian ontology,
however, is an ontology of creation. Rather than declaring these problems of definition solved,
we accept that a definition is but one of many within a field of possibilities, whose limit is not
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knowable (Deleuze 1968; May 2005). This is creative in that the question acts as a prompt to
explore a particular expression or solution, not determine it. The assignation of meaning,
identity, distinction, etc. is a particular form of activation in this ontology. The form activated, is
the result of a set of individuation, or distinguishing, processes occurring in the field. For
Deleuze, the field is the plane of intensities, for Luhmann, the environment, for the Schema.org,
the Web (Deleuze 1968; Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Luhmann 2012).
This form of ontology does not to say that things have no existence apart from their
interpretations, in fact it obviates the need for such constructivist understandings. The question
of “what is?”, either essential or constructed, misses the point entirely. The answer to this
question demands an understanding of “how it is?”, but hides that fact just as all claims of
ontology hide their underlying instability (DeLanda 2006; Latour 2005; May 2005). Following
from this, a Deleuzian approach to ontology, is an approach which tries to understand
becoming, as opposed to being. It is an attempt to understand the activations and
distinguishing processes that express certain forms and not others, affording certain
interpretations while constraining others. This approach of multiple ontologies, like similar
approaches by Actor Network Theory, are about the processes of connection, interaction, and
assembly (DeLanda 2006; Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Latour 1987, 2005; May 2005).
Working backwards, uncovering how a given state is declared becomes a matter of
exploring the processes of connection and interaction between components of the semantic
data assemblage. We need to examine the ways in which those components specifically enact
and create contextual fields within which meanings, identities, definitions, and forms come to
take shape. However, assemblages are not composed of perfectly integrated parts. DeLanda
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(2006) calls the relations between these components “contingently obligatory” (DeLanda
2006:10). The actual fact of integration between the various components of any given
assemblage are only a matter of their empirical co-evolution. They exist together, but also
apart, changing both as co-related elements and as elements involved in many other sets of
relationships. As these relations are defined as relations of exteriority, they are not specifically
beholden to the particular forms called forth in any given web of connections. Given this, we
would expect to find a semantic data assemblage to be filled perturbations and inconsistencies.
So, to understand the declaration of contextual states through attempts at representing a nondeterministic world to deterministic machines, we need to also investigate how those
perturbations are negotiated and how the relations between those components push and pull
in service to and against the assemblage at large.

3.2 Data and Data Assemblages
Studies of data have taken center stage in many different areas in recent years. Work in
this area has primarily focused on big data, investigating its epistemology, biases in its model
construction, the unequal distribution of data and the skills to utilize it, and the consequences
of its use for privacy, identity, social sorting, and development, among other concerns
(Andrejevic 2013; Arora 2016; Barocas and Selbst 2016; Bowker 2013; boyd and Crawford 2012;
Cheney-Lippold 2011; Choudhury et al. 2014; Friedman and Nissenbaum 1996; Gillespie 2014;
Leonelli 2014; Noble 2013; Sweeny 2013; Vaidhnayathan 2011; Warf and Grimes 1997). While
this emerging interdisciplinary field is producing large volumes of valuable work on data and
their infrastructure, the focus thus far has been dominated by big data, its use in sorting
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algorithms, and its ethical implications. Missing from this growing body of scholarship are
studies that investigate alternate forms of data, their production, and their assemblages.
Echoing Seaver (2013), I argue that the components of algorithms, how they are constructed,
and how they are classified are an essential part of understanding code-based systems. He
argues that social scientists are operating with a flawed understanding of algorithmic systems.
Reverse engineering studies and algorithmic audit studies are premised on the existence of a
singular algorithm of study. Not only does he argue that algorithms are not singular, but also
that they are not stable or unified decision-making tools. For example, at any given moment,
any interaction with Bing’s recommendation engine could be drawing on a large number of
algorithms, and those algorithms are likely to be different for different users at different times.
Companies, such as Microsoft, often run experiments with various algorithms to optimize user
experience, a fact neglected by the experiments employed in audit studies. The transparency
and expertise allegedly required for critical analyses of algorithms overlook the fact that
algorithms are built by many people over periods of time who often are not even fully aware of
the range of inputs and decision rules that contextual “real world” deployment brings about.
Likewise, a sole focus on transparency of inputs obscures the potentially more important
variable of data and feature creation. This focus on the “what” and not the “how” is often the
concern of code studies. As Seaver argues while discussing Facebook’s EdgeRank algorithm,
If we are interested in talking about algorithms’ cultural effects, then it is not enough to
know that something called “affinity” is included. Our questions should be more
ambitious: What is affinity? How is it defined? What experiences do the engineers
producing affinity scores draw on as they attempt to formalize it? How might these
formalizations differ if we started from different assumptions and experiences?... We
need to examine the logic that guides the hands… choosing particular representations of
data, and translating ideas into code. (Seaver 2013:9)
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Here, the author argues that despite the publicly available knowledge of many of the
components used in EdgeRank, absent information about how those components are
calculated and the data involved are created, we know, and can learn, very little about the
EdgeRank algorithm. To this point, studies of data making practices in socio-technical systems
are lacking. While researchers engage in the process of data construction every time they do
research, there is a deficiency in sustained empirical analyses that capture the ways in which
data and their assemblages come to be. Moreover, the work that does either directly or
tangentially engage with data making often treat data as given, not something enacted (Mol
2002; Vis 2012).
Floridi (2012) argues that what it is to be data is dependent on the position one speaks
from. As Kitchin (2014b) summarizes, “from an epistemic position, data are a collection of facts,
from an informational position, data are information, from a computational position, data are
collections of binary elements that can be processed… form a diaphonic position data are
abstract elements” (Kitchin 2014b:4). This sentiment captures the uncertain nature of data, as
it relies on decision logics, perspective, context, and purpose among a great many other things.
The central feature of this argument is that much like code based systems, data are not neutral
or objective things (Friedman and Nissenbaum 1996). Gitelman and Jackson (2013:2) argue that
“data are always already ‘cooked’”. An understanding of data must move beyond a simplistic
understanding of them as “merely being the raw materials of information and knowledge”
(Kitchin 2014b:185). Data are wound up in webs of socio-material relationships; they are
subject to systems of thought, discourses of governmentality (Lyon 2007; Raley 2013), science
(Ribes and Jackson 2013), privacy (Nissenbaum 2004; Solove 2004), and economy (Brine and
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Poovey 2013; Gandy Jr. 1993; Mackenzie 2008), among others. Data do not exist in a vacuum as
they are both subject to the field-specific discourses in which they are a part, the practices of
users, and the specific forms of the standards and infrastructures that enable them (Bowker
2005). Any understanding of data must mind these contexts, systems of thought,
infrastructures, standards, classification schema, technologies, communities of practice and
institutions that are involved in their creation, collection, warehousing, and analysis. In other
words, the study of data must also be the study of the data assemblage.
These data assemblages are complex systems that are grounded in specific modes of
thinking, classification, infrastructures, standards, practices, institutions, policies, and
technologies. Tables 1. & 2. detail the elements of data assemblages, outlining the various ways
that different components “frame what is possible, desirable, and expected of data” (Kitchin
2014b:24). A consequence of this assemblage based approach to the study of data is that they
are not simply the result of stable forms of classification and recording, they are dependent on
the specific interrelations between and amongst elements of the data assemblage. While the
list of an assemblage’s components shows the various inputs into what makes data, work in this
emerging area argues that data and their assemblages actually co-constitute one another. That
is, while the assemblage produces data, the data act back upon the assemblage to modify its
form and function (Kitchin 2014b; Kitchin and Lauriault 2014; Ribes and Jackson 2013). A
consequence of this reflexivity is that the data and the assemblage are in a constant state of
potential flux; that data and the assemblage both, are purely contingent. The interactions
between components and the interpretations of the data produced open the possibility of all
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states of being, but not the necessity of any. The particular state and the way that it is
determined is the question to consider.

Table 1: The Apparatus and Elements of a Data Assemblage
Apparatus
Elements
Systems of thought
Modes of thinking, philosophies, theories,
models, ideologies, rationalities, etc.
Forms of knowledge

Finance

Research texts, manuals, magazines,
websites, experience, word of mouth, chat
forums, etc.
Business models, investment, venture
capital, grants, philanthropy, profit, etc.

Political economy

Policy, tax regimes, incentive instruments,
public and political opinion, etc.

Governmentalities and legalities

Data standards, file formats, system
requirements, protocols, regulations, laws,
licensing, intellectual property regimes,
ethical
considerations,
Paper/pens,
computers,etc.
digital devices,
sensors, scanners, databases, networks,
servers, buildings, etc.

Materialities and infrastructures

Practices

Techniques, ways of doing, learned
behaviors, scientific conventions, etc.

Organizations and institutions

Archives, corporations, consultants,
manufacturers, retailers, government
agencies, universities, conferences, clubs
and
societies,
committees
boards,
Of data
producers,
experts,and
curators,
communities
of practice,
etc. politicians,
managers, analysts,
scientists,

Subjectivities and communities

users, citizens, etc.
Places

Labs, offices, field sites, data centers, server
farms, business parks, etc., and their
agglomerations

Marketplace

For data, its derivatives (e.g., text, tables,
graphs, maps), analysts, analytic software,
interpretations, etc.

Source: Kitchin (2014b, pg. 25)
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Table 2: The Apparatus and Elements of Schema.org
Apparatus
Elements
Systems of thought
Graph theory, resource description
framework, entity property representation,
generalized application, pragmatic modeling
Forms of knowledge
Research texts, manuals, websites,
experience, W3C best practices, W3C
community forum, Schema.org
recommendation
andcompanies
use examples.
Finance
Financed
by sponsor
Political economy

Emerged in vacuum left from original
semantic web vision as a way to improve
search and content embedded in sponsor
applications.

Governmentalities and legalities

Microdata, RDF and its serializations, JSONLD, version control systems (Git),

Materialities and Infrastructure

Computers, databases, server farms, etc.

Practices

Bricolage, generalization, acontextual
mapping, ontology modifications, etc.

Organizations and institutions

W3C, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, Yandex,
independent contractors, major corporate
users
Schema.org ontologists, users, community
members, academic participants

Subjectivities and communities
Places

Marketplace

Virtual spaces via Skype, conference calls,
GitHub, Google docs, W3C message boards
and IRC chats
Collection of use cases

Source: adapted from Kitchin (2014b)
The dilemma of context is also a prominent critique in recent studies of coded systems
and big data. Work here argues that they enact a new brand of heightened technological
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positivism that constructs a particular epistemic viewpoint where there is only what appears in
the data. In this construction, not only do numbers simply speak for themselves, but there is
also nothing to be found outside of the numbers (Andrejevic 2014; Bowker 2014; boyd and
Crawford 2012; Floridi 2012; Kitchin 2014a; Leonelli 2014; Seaver 2015; Thatcher 2014). One of
the charges against this techno-positivism is that it strips away any context from problem
formulation, data collection, the algorithm, and the results. Thus, this removal of context
renders the entire data processing operation meaningless (boyd and Crawford 2012; Seaver
2015). Critics argue that this is especially the case with aggregated datasets or data processed
automatically through machine learning algorithms (Bowker 2013; Busch 2014; Mittelstadt and
Floridi 2016). Busch (2014:1734) calls this process “layering”. In short, layering involves the
process of factor reduction whereby, in our collective efforts to produce greater precision,
clarity, and objectivity, those aspects of things that are not amenable to numerical or statistical
analysis—that situate particular phenomena—are systematically downgraded or removed from
consideration” (Busch 2014:1735). Here the contexts of data collection, processing, analysis,
and any other ontological positions that are implied by those methods are made invisible in the
process of creating large datasets. That is, big data obscures the various ways that phenomena
and the resulting data are enacted (Mittelstadt and Floridi 2016).
Seaver (2015), however, counters this trend, arguing that debates about the big data
revolution stripping context from data miss the point entirely. He argues that context is exactly
the battleground. Context is imputed to the instance, by the community, practitioner, or
interpreter in every encounter. It is everywhere and always a matter of selection and
investigation. Big data work establishes a context in the particular selection and mobilization of
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data. This occurs in each stage of a problem solving such as target variable definition, data
collection and labeling, feature selection, and model interpretation. This is not to say that critics
of the big data revolution are incorrect or misguided in their critiques, but rather that social
science’s critiques of big data and algorithms are looking for a different type of context that big
data’s epistemological stance cannot ever satisfy. That is, data analysts and social scientists are
using two different types of context. In this literature those types are positivistic and
interpretive. In the positivistic set of contexts, “context is considered to be a stable container
for activity: one’s context can be described as an accumulation of data points such as location,
weather, the people nearby, or the time of day” (Seaver 2015:1105). This type of context is a
matter of pure construction from the data themselves. In the interpretive mode, context is
performative and built up in the process of interactions, not something that can be reduced to
a simple quantitative representation in a dataset. While it is clear that the two disciplinary
views of context are speaking past one another, the major takeaway for Seaver and this study is
that context is everywhere and at all times a matter of making decisions and statements about
the state of the world. This means that context “is a necessarily political project” and as a result
becomes a question of is creation (Seaver 2015:1106). So, while the development of semantic
ontologies purportedly strips away context from Web text, it actually only ever displaces the
creation of context. This ontological displacement, occurs at the level of the ontology as it sets
the boundaries within which the world can be spoken of. This construction and its effects have
not yet been investigated.
As mentioned, the role that context plays in the semantic web is complicated.
Ontologists develop their ontologies to be acontextual and able to be applied across dissimilar
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use cases. However, as I will show in later chapters, context plays a central role in their
development. Likewise, the actual use of ontologies by Web developers never occurs outside of
a specified context. Waller (2016), drawing on Heidegger (1973) and Lakoff (1987) shows that
the definitions of concepts and their attachments to properties always necessarily rely on social
context. Indeed, as Bakhtin (1981) argues, all claims are inextricably embedded in specific
contexts. As we will see, this dilemma of context will create problems for creating and applying
semantic data, as there is no way to establish or reconcile differences in the intention of
development and intended application.
In her study of research use of the Twitter data, Vis (2012) takes a step to understand
and critically evaluate the process of data making through an analysis of the application
programming interfaces (APIs), researcher questions, data selection practices, and the
computer programs they use. The author argues that APIs can expose or occlude certain types
of data depending on access, sentiments echoed by work on the “big data divide” (Andrejevic
2014; boyd and Crawford 2012; McCarthy 2016; Mittelstadt and Floridi 2015). Additionally, this
work finds that APIs often present data where data provenance is left in question. In this
particular example, the Twitter API often displays imputed data that has its provenance hidden
since it was imputed prior to its availability through the API. Relatedly, Ford and Graham (2016)
find similar issues with geopolitical information in semantic search applications. In their earlier
mentioned study of semantic representations of the city of Jerusalem, they show that
representations of the city, its history, and entanglements with global politics are blunted, and
the sources of the underlying data are obscured. Obscured data provenance is significant
because, our concerns when studying the sociology of information should not just be about
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which components are included or not, but where they came from, and how those components
were created in the first place (Seaver 2013). A clear picture of data’s provenance is essential to
those aims. For example, Twitter location data are created from processes of investigation and
imputation. While they may be accurate, they also may not be. In the large majority of cases,
location data are imputed. These imputations may be based on neglected profiles, poor
secondary data, or overly broad, thus inaccurate, location predictions. Regardless of the
particular reason, the data are used and are applicable in analyses and decision making.
In addition to data’s unknown origin, how they were developed is a central concern. Vis
(2012) shows that researcher data making is a complex process of decision making. She argues,
Decisions about what to collect (what is in, what is out), from which API data is
collected, for which period, including which metadata, including an awareness of how
this collected data is itself created by APIs, are important stages in the data making
process. (Vis 2012:no page).
Here the author highlights just a few of the many decisions that researchers need to make in
the process of constructing their datasets. Moreover, these decisions are made in the context
of specific systems of thought, theoretical debates, and from specific ontological and
epistemological positions (Boellstorff 2013). As Gitelman and Jackson (2013) argue, to think
about data, we need to understand how researchers envisage their objects of research. Data in
many cases are modeled. Here I do not mean used in modeling techniques, though that is
certainly a common use of data. Instead, I mean to say that data are modeled as a part of their
creation in a process of establishing their ontological state. These data producing models have a
co-constitutive relationship to the data they model. They are created based on the disciplinary
understanding of the world, itself an interpretation of sets of data and used to produce new
data through transformation.
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Superficially, data would seem to occupy a first order position in the knowledge of one’s
object of study. This orientation suggests that data is the necessary condition for conceiving of
one’s subject. However, data’s real relationship to a discipline inverts that perspective. How
one understands their object of study has a mutually constituting relationship to the data the
one creates and mobilizes toward that understanding (Brine and Poovey 2013; Gitelman and
Jackson 2013). In their analysis of Irving Fisher’s contributions to data-driven economic theory,
Brine and Poovey (2013) show the ways in which the understanding of economics comes to
influence the understanding of data. Their analysis of Fisher’s Appreciation and Interest shows
that economist’s understanding of value and financial modeling contributed to the
transformation and creation of data to better fit the calculations and theory at hand. The
process of transformation for theory matching is indicative of the distance between data and
what they allegedly represent. Their works suggest that the particular understanding of
economic theory has a role in conditioning the data mobilized in support of that economic
theory.
Edwards (2010) remarks on a similar process with regards to the use of climate data.
Discussing the infrastructure involved in climate data, Edwards argues that what we know as
climate data has already undergone filtration, interpretation, and modeling by computer
systems. Amassing the large stores of climate data is not a matter of collection. Since the
existing climate infrastructure was developed over extended periods of time with shifting aims,
the measurements produced by the available instruments were diverse, scattered across the
globe in less than systematic ways, uncalibrated, and not always relevant to the new tasks of
measuring global climate. This existing set of measurements were processed to become data by
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climate scientists. In effect, the newly emerging understandings of global climate helped
produce the very data used in the empirical study of global climates. Scientists first had to
integrate, normalize, and convert the disparate sources of existing data to reflect the
preexisting models. So instead of drawing on available sets of climate specific data, climate
science was a matter of using computer models to transform disparate forms and locational
measurements into representative, homogenous, and global climate datasets (Edwards 2010).
Indeed, data production as a function of the modeling and interpretation of existing
forms of data is commonplace. These same processes occur in options pricing models, credit
scoring, risk evaluation, debt rating, and many other practices (Krippner 2011). This work does a
good job establishing that data are often managed and pre-processed before they become or
are considered as “data”. This implication has three main consequences. First, as has already
been established, data are dependent. They are dependent on how a focus of investigation is
conceived, the instruments used in measurement, the practices of experts, and the
technologies involved in the collection, management, and use. Second, what counts as data, is a
matter of specific perspective. What the work from Brine and Poovey (2013) as well as Edwards
(2010) clearly indicates is that existing data is not always sufficient for the task at hand.
Moreover, as Stanley (2013) echoes, data may be insufficient for the task which can exclude it
from being considered data at all. That is, data, like technology, establishes a standing reserve
of possibility which allows it to be understood as data or not. The specific contextual
relationship that the data have to the set of interpretations to be applied to it, mark its
ontological status as data. Vis (2012) argues similarly that big data analyses and the choice of
data based on difficulty, convenience, or technical ability can serve to exclude certain types of
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potentially very relevant and important data from analyses. She uses the analysis of images as
an example. Until recently, and now only in limited ways, techniques used to analyze big data
were insufficient for analyzing images. While images were an important potential source of
data, they were not included as data due to the inability for automated analysis. Third, what
follows is that data assemblages are enacted. The specific set of technologies, practices, and
orientations brought to bear on data call them into being as data of specific types and allow
them to declare certain things and not others. Tools and practices both create and display data
in certain ways and not others. Moreover, the complexity of these tools, their actual
programming, and the decisions built into them are not transparent or standardized.
What the above make clear is that data depend on a wide range of inputs. They are the
product of many different people, framings, and goals. Work has only recently begun to
investigate these data assemblages and their outcomes. Indeed, researchers in this area have
highlighted the need for more work that engages in the sustained empirical investigation of
data infrastructures, standards, modeling, and creation practices (Kitchin 2014b; Kitchin and
Lauriault 2014; Kitchin et al. 2015a, 2015b). This work calls attention to the diverse forms of
data and data assemblages, as well as the need to investigate the components of these
assemblages and their interactions. For all the recent work on data assemblages, there is still a
dearth of work that investigates how a data assemblage’s components interact as part of its
expression. This study seeks to fill that gap by investigating how specifically the interactions
between components not only enact the semantic data assemblage, but the particular state of
being it engenders.
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3.3 Information Infrastructures and Expert Systems
Related to the set of tools and practices are the infrastructures that come to bear on
data. Data infrastructures are “the institutional, physical, and digital means for storing, sharing,
and consuming data across networked technologies.” (Kitchin 2014b:32). There are a wide
range of types and examples of data infrastructures including data holding systems, archives,
catalogs and directories, repositories, and cyber-infrastructures. Of significant note, however,
are studies that show the particular effects of the way infrastructure, and cyber-infrastructures
in particular, are designed, maintained, and developed.
Data infrastructures are technologies for interoperability between various communities
of practice. These boundary objects are approached with sometimes divergent interpretations
of purpose, form, and function specific to those communities (Bowker and Star 1999). The use
of agreed upon standards in these infrastructures can reduce this tension, allowing for smooth
interoperability. However, mobilizing the set of standards on offer is not always as simple or
predictable as an infrastructure’s background operation would suggest. In information
infrastructures, particularly in scientific e-infrastructure, these tensions, or “data friction”, can
result in the breakdown and failure of work processes and the underlying infrastructure
(Edwards et al. 2011). In their study of two distributed environmental science projects, Edwards
and colleagues (2011), show that standards, rather than being stable, predictable, and uniform
means for enabling interoperability are often mobilized in ad hoc ways. Scientific practice is
often messy and encounters novel situations that defy the sort readily handled by the existing
configurations of the infrastructure and its standards. This work shows that standards,
particularly metadata standards, can be mobilized in creative and unpredictable ways to suit
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the task at hand and navigate the contradictory pressures required of standardization and
flexibility (Hanseth et al. 1996). However, those mobilizations can come with the unintended
consequences of affecting the form of data, its availability, and sharing.
In addition to the use specific characteristics and contexts, the development of
information infrastructures has substantial effects on the form and content of their related
data. Infrastructures are long duree systems, meaning that the focus on development needs to
be cognizant of long-term problems, needs, and possibilities. However, the developers of these
infrastructures are not always in agreement about the challenges and direction that the
infrastructure is, or will be, facing. The tensions surrounding the goals, purposes, and
motivations of participants affect the design, development, and implementation of these
infrastructures (Ribes and Finholt 2009). These effects have far-reaching consequences. The
specific infrastructural states and practices affect the possible ways that data can be stored,
which affect the type of data that will be stored, which affect the type of data to be collected.
Much like classification standards, information infrastructures have a jussive power over the
data and their possible uses. They define and implicitly impute values to what is stored and
what counts as data (Bowker 2005). Moreover, the data stored in these infrastructures, their
uses, and their users, shape one another in different ways. Users of the Social Science Data
Archive (SSDA) adjusted its data collection efforts to respond to the increasing scholarly
demand for different forms of data, while at the same time, old and new audiences for SSDA
data engaged in new types of analyses and new research partnerships with different
governmental and institutional participants, as well as altering their outlook on their field (Ribes
and Finholt 2009; Shankar et al. 2016). All of this is to say that the specific form information
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infrastructures take and the specific decisions made by the developers of those infrastructures
have a significant bearing on the types, amount, and uses of data connected to those systems
as well as the range of possibilities that those infrastructures, and their data, engender.
Work in the social sciences that investigates ontologies as cyber infrastructure is limited
but growing. One early study by Ribes and Bowker (2009) offers some initial inroads to
understanding their development. In their study of the geoscience network (GEON) ontology,
they examine the processes of translation between domain experts and ontology developers.
This work shows the problems that occur between two different expert groups who share no
domain knowledge and have different epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina 1999). While the
geoscience community held a great deal of geological subject matter expertise, they had little
computer science expertise. The reverse can be said of the ontologists charged with converting
geoscience domain knowledge into a format able to be represented in a linked data ontology.
Thus, the fundamental problem that Ribes and Bowker identify is one of “reapprehension”, or
how domain experts approach their knowledge bases in new ways (Ribes and Bowker
2009:200). Much domain specific knowledge is tacit and held by the communities of experts in
those domains. As such, a great deal of that knowledge is taken for granted and rests in the
background of practice (Ribes and Bowker 2009; Schutz and Luckmann 1973, 1989).
Domain expertise is such that experts spend their time deploying information and
interrogating its quality, but little time thinking about the underlying organization of their
background knowledge in its own right. As Ribes and Bowker put it, “the term reapprehension
is intended to emphasize how they come to see data and knowledge anew as a question of
informational order, and then seek to act on its organization as information.” (Ribes and
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Bowker 2009:215). In the GEON project, the interactions between domain experts forced both
sets of experts to approach their tacit knowledge bases in new ways, not only to render them
explicit, but also enable communication across disciplinary boundaries. In their case, this
involved community discussions to triangulate and establish a community wide consensus
about the best ways that their tacit knowledges could be translated as faithful representations
of expertise.
As instrumental in understating the self-reflection involved in translating knowledge as
this work may be, there are some causes for concern, however. While the translation between
experts and ontologists is a necessary step in trying to represent specific forms of knowledge in
machine-readable ways, it obscures the fact that this process is inherently political, as
knowledge engineers, experts, ontologists, as so forth, are all engaging in processes of selection
and modification as they grasp at bits of meaningful information, while pushing away those bits
that are seemingly unimportant. Furthermore, even small subsets of the disciplinary knowledge
are far too complex to represent and so those representations tend to over-determine
concepts. While they recognize the many contested meanings both across and within
disciplinary boundaries, there is little recognition of the difficulty or problems of trying to
capture that disagreement in such determinate systems. In essence, they do not provide an
understanding of how the translation between humans and machines is performed, which
prohibits understanding the crux of ontologies, which is the translation from machine to
machine.
We can look to past research on expert and formal systems to engage with these
omissions. This work points to a similar problem regarding the translation of expert knowledge
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across domains called the knowledge acquisition bottleneck (Collins 1990; Forsythe 1993). This
concept defines a problem where knowledge engineers attempt to extract knowledge from
domain experts. This process is time consuming and fraught with complications, as much of
that domain knowledge is not amenable to modeling in computer systems. For Collins (1990,
2010) the problem is one of socio-cultural understanding. Collins (1990) stresses that
deterministic systems, such as AI, can only approach the forms of expertise and knowledge that
most closely resemble the formalisms of computers (Berg 1997). That is, formalization is only
ever possible where society itself has been constructed to resemble the processes of machines.
While rule based knowledge – tacit, heuristic, or otherwise – can often be modeled here, they
have trouble grasping many other forms of tacit and socio-cultural knowledge, which includes
the ability to understand, use, and interrogate those knowledges, a point echoed by Ager
(2003). Collins argues that the success of an expert system vis-à-vis knowledge acquisition rests
on the availability for interpretation since all knowledge cannot easily be transferred through
the system. Forsythe (1993) agrees here, noting that certain domains are more amenable for
knowledge extraction and modeling than others. However, there is some reason for skepticism,
as it obscures the fact that ambiguity exists at all levels of language, regardless of domain.
Problematically for the semantic web, a consumer’s interpretive capacity is often stripped away
as data provenance is obscured (Ford and Graham 2016). Furthermore, while I agree with both
Collins (1990, 2010) and Agre (1995, 2003) that agents must always make sense of
communication in every instance, as interpretation is situated activity, this does not deal with
the fact that situated context is the thing to be negotiated.
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Forsythe (1993) echoes Collins and Agre, but argues that the problem of representation
is also a problem of the approach to knowledge that the engineers have. She argues that
engineers approach knowledge and the acquisition problem in two ways. First, they are like
Star’s (1994) naïve formalists, only viewing knowledge as something codified and formalized.
She argues that knowledge engineers do not consider tacit of socio-cultural knowledge as
knowledge. Rather, knowledge, in their view, is something that is able to be made explicit in
texts, as something to be extracted or transferred. The second understanding is in the way they
evaluate knowledge. Here, she argues that engineers evaluate knowledge introspectively, not
through seeking empirical evidence. These understandings of knowledge lead her to argue that
knowledge modeling in expert systems is a matter of deletion, noting that a “notion of
straightforward transfer completely obscures their own role in the selection and interpretation
of what goes into a knowledge base.” (Forsythe 1993:463). Furthermore, she argues that while
sometimes these knowledge engineers are aware of what they are doing, this selection process
is bracketed from direct consciousness. Elsewhere, Agre (1995) argues that knowledge
engineers viewed the formalization process as creating a sort of precision that the original
knowledge and language lacked where “the vagueness and ambiguity of ordinary language are
repaired through mathematical definition” (Agre 1995:no page) accordingly these engineers did
not care much about the bias and semantic inaccuracy that resulted.
These authors deal well with the problems of translation between experts, and the
intractability of converting certain types of knowledge in a machine-readable way. However,
the actual processes of translating that knowledge for computer specific consumption is not
well covered. While past work investigates the specific natures of certain type of knowledge,
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the orientation to experts, and the approaches to knowledge that engineers have, they lack any
discussion of the interactions with other important components of technical systems. That is,
they do not examine the data modeling approaches, methods for classification, or the
standards used in creating machine-readable data. It is my contention that only an assemblage
based approach that explores those interactions between components can truly help us
understand how human-machine translation occurs and how specific representations of the
world become codified in technical systems.

3.4 Classification and Standards
Semantic web ontologies, like all classification systems, are more than just assigned tags
to existing phenomena. They are more than just reflections of some alleged underlying reality.
Ontologies and all classification systems are socially constructed systems that play a role in
constituting the realities that they purportedly represent (Bowker and Star 1999; Westbrook
and Saperstein 2015; Zerubavel 1996). Our attention, then, must be directed to ways those
systems are constructed, the realities they construct, and the consequences of the
institutionalized classification schemes used in these systems. In this case specifically, we must
look at the construction, output, and consequences of semantic web ontologies.
In sociology, studies of classification systems have been primarily in organizational, neoinstitutional, and cognitive domains. Organizational studies of categories have directed their
focus on the various ways category construction and adoption mark similarities and differences
between companies and their products (Zhao 2008, Zuckerman 1999, 2000). Neo-institutional
work on classification has primarily focused on the contests surrounding institutionalized
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meanings of categories and the institutional isomorphism that arises from shared
understandings of institutional fields (DiMaggio 1987, DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 1991). Lastly,
cognitive sociology has investigated the ways in which people draw on, and construct,
categories in “shaping how we perceive and organize our realities” (Brekhus 2007:450). While
approaching the topic of classification systems from two different vantages, cultural cognition
and neo-institutional approaches in particular share an outlook that classification systems
provide the social substrate from which actors can meaningfully engage with the world through
a set a stable and shared interpretive schemas and rules (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Meyer
and Rowan 1977; Zhao 2008).
Recent work in survey design research questions how best to structure a given
classification system, showing a degree of self-awareness in the problematic way that
classification systems may be built. This recent work criticizes the running first order
assumption that surveys and/or classification systems can more or less accurately and without
fundamental faults, represent the world, rather than constitute it. As such, within this work,
there has been very little critical attention to the construction identities as a consequence of
the classificatory sorting that happens when categories are chosen and/or ignored (Westbrook
and Saperstein 2015).
In their study of large social survey designs, Westbrook and Saperstein (2015) being to
fill this void by showing that surveys create serious political problems where they represent sex
and gender. In their work, they find that surveys largely limit sex and gender choices to two
normative dichotomous states foreclosing on other possibilities. While steps have been taken
to expand the range of representations, particularly in popular culture, work still remains
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(Oremus 2014; Westbrook and Saperstein 2015). In addition to the limitations presented by
overly broad classificatory categories, surveys also tend to conflate sex and gender, obscuring
the significant conceptual differences between the two things. This form of reduction in
classification systems leads interpreters to ignore both the between and within-category
differences to the effect of not only valorizing the choices on offer but also overcoding diversity
in categorical distinctions (Zerubavel 1996). For Deleuze, this represents the failings of
continental ontology as it asserts positive identity at the expense of difference (Deleuze 1964;
May 2005). In the process of reducing the anxiety surrounding ambiguous categories, the realm
of possible states and interpretations is foreclosed. The political issues potentially involved in
binary classification systems are not new. Neither are the implications of exclusion and
inclusion of categories or conflating ontological states with one another, as category
boundaries are rarely neatly drawn or equally valued (Lakoff 1987; Wittgenstein 2009). We
have long seen the effects these classification issues have had on subjectivity, legitimate forms
of knowing, and world building, particularly as they have been described in post-structuralist,
feminist, and post-colonial theories (Bowker and Star 1999; Derrida 1967[2016]; Haraway 1991;
Spivak 1999).
Many scholars have theorized the consequences of classification. Foucault, in the
preface to The Order of Things, writes while referring to the oddities of animal classification in a
Chinese encyclopedia, “In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one
great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of
another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that.”
(Foucault 1973[1995]: xv). Here, Foucault is making a critique on the analogous Western system
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of classification and its supposed objectivity. Rather than capturing any real connection to the
world, classification systems are only ever specific versions and attached to specific cultural
contexts. Where a classification system exists, an alternative might always be found. For his
part, these classification schemes are the discursive regimes that order our interpretations of
phenomena and act to construct our subjectivities (Foucault 1973[1994], 1977[1995]; Haraway
1991). The ontological, or state of being, in this view is only ever historical contingency in
disguise.
In debt to Foucaultian archeology, Hacking (1986, 1999) developed an analytical
framework for studying the act of “making up people”. In this framework, he examines the way
in which scientific classifications create new ways of thinking about people that reflexively act
back upon the very people classified. Lauriault (2012) draws out five features in this process,
classification, people, institutions, knowledge, and experts. In this “looping effect”, people are
classified and made to fit into modified or altogether new categories and they then come to
interpret those categories differently, often self-identifying with those categories. As these
categories gain familiarity and internalized acceptance, they begin a process of
institutionalization. Once institutionalized, they often go through refinements, and
reproductions as groups of experts enact those classification systems, beginning the process
again. While Hacking (1986, 1999) uses the looping effect to describe the classification of
people, and Lauriault (2012), the classification of space, this framework can apply to the study
of semantic data, specifically at the point where the loop turns back upon itself.
No doubt inspired by this work, contemporary studies of big data echo Hacking’s
findings. These scholars argue that modern data analytic practices can have major ramifications
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for a data subject’s self-determination (Cheney-Lippold 2011; Gillespie 2014). As categories are
inferred from data streams and applied to people, algorithms are being used to automatically
determine individual and group level traits and characteristics. These classifications, however,
are simultaneously being recreated and their meanings are being newly re-determined. The
products of those algorithms create the new conditions in which those same algorithms
operate. As Cheney-Lippold argues, “We are effectively losing control in defining who we are
online, or more specifically we are losing ownership over the meaning of the categories that
constitute our identities.” (Cheney-Lippold 2011:178).
The implication of their thought is the act of classification is not an act of naming, it is an
act of creation that constitutes the very thing that it names. While this may seem overly
constructivist, it bears more similarity to the a Deleuzian perspective as well as those aligned
with Gibsonian affordances (Introna 2007; Lauriault 2012; Parchoma 2012). Hacking explains
thusly, “Who we are is not only what we did do, and will do but also what we might have done
and may do. Making up people changes the space of possibilities for personhood… our
possibilities, although inexhaustible, are also bounded.” (Hacking 1986:114). The importance of
this sentiment is that essence and existence are artifacts of contextual interpretation, that
classification classifies and creates, but not completely and not immutably. The space for
interpretation here is bounded by the particular activations that make up people.
Other work in the area has directed its focus on classification systems’ their taken-forgrantedness and their embedding in standards and infrastructures (Bowker and Star 1996,
1999). This line of work investigates classification systems along four primary themes. First,
classification systems are ubiquitous and pervade all aspects of our lives. Moreover, these all-
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pervasive classification systems are not discrete, they are interwoven with one another.
However, that they are ubiquitous and interwoven, does not mean that they are intertwined in
a completely fluid or stable way. As classification systems vary by internal logics, divergent
perspectives, and applied context, some components may be antithetical to one another
despite other shared similarities. This last complication has major significance for semantic web
ontologies, as their ability to supply semantic content and to function as part of a web of linked
data relies on the smooth interoperability and a shared set of perspectives on a given topic.
The second theme is that classification systems have materiality. While investigations in
this area tend to focus how classification systems are embedded into built environments and
offer certain affordances to material structures, the central insight is that classification systems
do actual work in the world and are not just virtual. While this study recognizes the various
server farms, companies, personal and organizational resources, etc. that materially comprise
the semantic web, it does not investigate its material aspects in this way. While these concerns
are valid in their own right, a focus on this aspect of the semantic web draws attention away
from my central questions.
A third thematic approach is that classification systems order the past in indeterminate
ways. This orientation to classification systems seeks to uncover the ways that seemingly
universal and natural orderings of the world come to be constructed and how alternate
perspectives are made invisible. This is particularly important to my investigation into how
semantic web ontologies declare ontological states. Attention drawn to the particular orderings
of classification systems serve only to obscure the what is left aside, or ontologically over-
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determined and occluded. The last major strand of this research involves unpacking the politics
of classifying. As Bowker and Star (1996:4) note:
There are two aspects of these politics: arriving at categories and standards, and, in the
process, deciding what will be visible within the system (and of course what will thus
then be invisible). The negotiated nature of standards and classifications follows from
indeterminacy and multiplicity that whatever appears as universal or, indeed, standard,
is the result of negotiations or conflict.
Much like code-based systems, all classification schemes are constructed by and for someone.
Someone or some people must decide the nature of the categories, what the decisions rule of
inclusion in a category will be, and the way that the classification will be applied in a
standardized way. The crucial question then is to understand what that seemingly invisible code
is, how the system is developed, how categorical incoherence is negotiated, what
consequences emerge from inclusion/exclusion criteria, and what is rendered invisible (Epstein
2007).
These analyses ultimately understand categorization systems as fields for the exercise of
power and politics (Bowker and Star 1996, 1999; Epstein 2007). A major focus of this work is on
the development and deployment of standards, particularly classification standards. As
standards often rest in the background, their power and the outcomes they enable are not
always obvious. The jussive power that standards hold has inspired a large body of research
into questions about who benefits from them, how they are implemented, what happens when
they come into conflict, and what outcomes they promote, among others (Timmermans and
Epstein 2010). The particular investment in a standard can have a transformative effect on the
environment it is applied to (Becker 1992). Standards do work that shapes the world (Bowker
and Star 1999; Star and Lampland 2009). Thus, the particular form, application, and underlying
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decision logics in which a given standard is utilized are likely to have differing effects depending
on the niche that they are being applied to (Epstein 2007). For this study, this is particularly
relevant as it pertains to classification standards and their deployment. Scott (1998) reminds us
that not only are the particular configurations of classification standards central to shaping
outcomes, but those standards and outcomes privilege a particular point of view. The
development of a standardized system of permanent last names, cadastral surveys, taxation,
and agricultural metrics shaped the way that individuals related to larger institutional bodies as
the subject of a state. Moreover, we see that the application of a classification standard does
not necessarily bear any resemblance to an actual given ontological state, but does serve to
create it when applied.
The form a classification system takes depends on the particular schema mobilized in its
construction and the particular form of institutional or cultural logic adopted in the field
(Douglas 1986). Zhao (2008) investigates the two different wine classification systems used for
Californian and French wines. He notes that Californian wines adopt a system based on the type
of grape, wine making process, and location in the state, with a horizontal form of classification
where inputs are not explicitly more valuable than others. French wines, on the other hand, use
a system based on a wine’s terroir. In this system, a wine is explicitly ranked in a hierarchy. The
significance of this work is that “under diverse classificatory schemes and structures based on
distinct institutional logics, similar categories may have different significances in consumers’
valuation of wines across these two industries” (Zhao 2008:169). While this study does not
adopt a neo-institutional framework, it does take this essential argument to be important. The
particular schemas and rationales used to develop a classification system have inevitable
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effects on the uses and interpretations of artifacts that draw on that classification system. For
the present case, the particular schema and decision-making affect not only what and how
semantic data can be represented, or which domain actors can mobilize a given classification
scheme, but also how those ontologies can interact.
Bowker and Star (1999) refer to the things, where an instance does not fit the delimited
borders of one category or meaning set, as boundary objects. Elsewhere, Zuckerman (1999)
notes that when products are affiliated with diverse categories, they are structurally
incoherent, meaning that they break with the structural organization of the classification
system that holds categories as mutually exclusive, even if that represents a near impossibility
(Bowker and Star 1999). Zhao (2008) argues that a boundary object’s coherence is a function of
the importance and specificity of the categories the object is transgressing. Where a boundary
is subject to greater contests of significance, or more firmly established inclusion/exclusion
criteria, a boundary object is less likely to occupy a transgressing role. The existence of these
boundary objects depends, in large part, on the particular decision logics and classification
schema at hand.
In practice, we know that classification systems are often not mono-schematic. That is,
they are often integrations and compromises between multiple schemas and multiple social
worlds. This is particularly the case where large-scale technical systems are being developed
and the very development depends on coordinating multiple communities of experts (Bower
and Star 1996, 1999). As Timmermans and Epstein (2010:84) argue, “standards transform by
coordinating disparate elements, but the outcomes that standards achieve depend on the
specific standards and the circumstances under which they are made to work.”. This argument
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is inspired by a number of studies into the workings and deployment of standards. First, these
specific circumstances are relative to specific social worlds. While standards bridge
communities, there are specific sets of users and communities of practice that surround any
individual standard, and the adoption, and mobilization of a standard is impacted by the
specific target, user, or institution involved. For instance, research has shown that the specific
standards applied to different bodies for biomedical research and insurance classification
depends on the specific body in question (Epstein 2007, 2009; Lengwiler 2009). In other work,
researchers found that the type of metadata standards, the opinions about them, and the
future-oriented outlook on their success used in scientific research varied based on the specific
scientific community interacting with those standards (Edwards 2011 et al.; Millerand and
Bowker 2009). In these cases, holding favorable opinions and successful outlooks depended on
one’s proximity to the standard’s creation and the level of knowledge one had of the intricacies
of the standard. Their findings suggest that the way one interacts with a standard is contingent
on one's location in the social world surrounding the standard.
In addition to standards being relevant to specific users and communities, they are
partially dependent on the specific technological infrastructure of which they are a part.
Millerand and Bowker’s (2009) work shows that the successful implementation of a metadata
standard for classifying ecological research depended on tools used to implement the standard,
the standards compatibility with existing infrastructure and work practice, and the data storage
and management techniques and technologies in use. This is in line with Bowker’s (2005) earlier
work that suggests that way we understand information depends on the “memory practices”
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that we utilize, including the technical means for storing, the practices of labeling, and other
components of recording information.
As standards are embedded in larger sets of relationships, interactions with them are
not always smooth and they do not always work to enable interoperability. Like Latour’s (1987)
useless facts, standards sometime get in the way. While Bowker and Star (1999) argue that
standards tend to have stabilizing effects, they are in actuality often disruptive things to be
negotiated. Some work has noted these negotiations where practitioners work around the
limitations presented by tools (Berg 1997; Whooley 2010). Using electronic medical records as
an example, Berg (1997) shows how nurses work around the limitations of software. Nurses in a
medical ward were tasked with recording patient conditions in computerized software.
Problematically, though, when a patient is unstable or when only incidental changes occur,
frequent updates can either be too cumbersome or unnecessary. Additionally, poorly designed
records systems require can sometimes inhibit efficient work practices. Berg’s nurses often
times write patient conditions on paper, to be entered later, or use a second terminal to work
around limited information visible in a given screen. Likewise, Whooley (2010) shows that
psychiatrists often attempt to assert their professional autonomy in diagnosing mental illness
by creating workarounds to standardized diagnosis typologies like the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). He argues that working around the DSM involves drawing
on alternate diagnosis typologies, manipulating illness codes on formal documents, and
negotiating the extent of diagnoses with patients. Koehne et al. (2013) have similar findings in
their study of diagnoses of borderline personality disorder in adolescents. Halpin (2016) builds
on this work, but disagrees arguing that psychiatric professionals work within the boundaries of
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the DSM, as opposed to around it. He argues that even though, professionals negotiate DSM
diagnoses, they still do so in line with the DSM. They deploy the manual strategically in
different ways depending on the professional and institutional context, noting that its influence
is felt across research, clinical, and institutional domains. The major difference is that the way
the DSM is used to enact diagnoses depends on that setting.
While much past work has located standards within communities of practice, work still
remains to explain the way that standards’ affordances and constraints are negotiated
(Sandholtz 2012). These omissions beg researchers to situate standards’ use in practice and
question how these blockages are negotiated and how the restrictions created by
standardization are relaxed while still enabling the interoperability they are designed for. While
scholars have been exploring the tensions between organizational level practices and the
homogenizing effects of standards for some time, work that both locates standards at the level
of professional communities and that investigates the negotiations of barriers is only just
begging to emerge (Epstein 2007, 2010; Halpin 2016; Heimer 2001; Whooley 2010, 2014;
Whooley and Horwitz 2013). As two different components of the semantic web data
assemblage, addressing this gap through developing an understanding of how communities of
practice negotiate with the limitations and affordances of standards is paramount.

3.5 Empirical Ontology in Practice
What is lost in Hacking’s (1986, 1999) looping model, but implicit in an assemblage
model is that contextual interpretation is cultural. The specific “epistemic cultures” (KnorrCetina 1999) that bear on a given assemblage impact each point in the loop. Knorr-Cetina
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(1999) studies the ways that scientific cultures come to act on various disciplines – high energy
particle physics and molecular biology – to create a disunity in the scientific community. Her
goal isn’t to show how knowledge is created differently, as much as it is to show how disciplines
themselves are enacted differently and how the focus of research is enacted differently based
on the practices of scientists in those disciplines. Much as there are many different epistemic
cultures, there are many different ways of approaching interpretive schema and classifying
phenomena (Friese 2010).
Practice theory views practice as not only activity but also the knowledges and
capabilities that enable it. Furthermore, all activity and the knowledges, capabilities, and
meanings behind practices are more or less organized in a field, which can be demarcated and
subdivided ad infinitum. This type of thinking holds that “the social is a field of embodied,
materially interwoven practices centrally organized around shared practical understandings” of
the world (Schatzki 2001:12). Practices structure and are structured by social location (Bourdieu
1977), discursive regimes (Foucault 1977[1995]), embodied experiences, technology (Latour
2005; Law 2010), and the immediate physical environment, among other things (Goffman
1959). Accordingly, determinism has little place in practice theoretical accounts, as practice,
while durable and habitual, is emergent and unfolds as community members interact with the
various conditions of their practice.
Practice’s durability is often a major concern of social theorists, as Knorr-Cetina
(2001:184) notes “conceptions of practice emphasize the habitual and rule-governed features
of practice… agreeing that practices should be seen as recurrent processes governed by
specifiable schemata of preferences and prescriptions.”. This view of practice, she argues, is ill
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equipped to explain the sphere of activity implicated in non-routine problems and the
relationship to objects that are entirely open-ended, that generate new lines of questioning,
new forms of interaction, and new possibilities of being. In her analysis of knowledge work, she
shows that practice moves between rule-bound, habitual procedures and emergent intra-active
interpretation. Her theory of objectual practice argues that objects of inquiry, or what she
terms “knowledge objects” (Knorr- Cetina 2001:185) only ever become partial objects, as they
are first simulated and represented and then subject to evaluation, correction, and
improvement. They never completely shift into the background of habitual practice. These
objects and the relations in which they are implicated are never complete; they are always
emerging and transforming based on the intra-actions between objects and the individual(s)
engaging with them. Investigation and interaction with them produce greater levels of
complexity rather than a reduction in it (Knorr-Cetina 2001). “The signifying force of partial
objects resides in the pointers they provide to possible further explorations. In this sense these
objects are meaning-producing and practice generating; they provide for the… extension of
practice.” (Knorr-Cetina 2001:192). Knorr-Cetina taps into Deleuzian notions of molarity and
molecularity here (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). As one attempts to tame and manage
complexity, features always evade attempts to be fully understood. The complexity of things is
inimical to our development of classificatory schema to apprehend those things. Here, capture
and escape are inextricably related (McCarthy 2017).
The concept of informatic practice borrows from Knorr-Cetina’s theory of objectual
practice as French (2014) conceives of information, its relationships, and objects as never
complete. In his study of Big Data processing in the Canadian health industry, he aims to dispel
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the hyperbolic discourse around data surveillance. Advancing the concept of informatic
practice, or “the assumption that information has a material basis in the spatio-temporal milieu
of everyday life.” (French 2014:230), he details the ways that patient data is collected and
coded and embedded in material practice. An understanding of immaterial information
requires attention to that mundane performance of routinized work – filling out forms,
categorization, filing, and communicating effectively. For French (2014) and others
(Albrechtslund and Lauritsen 2013), practice contains human error and deviations from
expected performance. This material breakdown contributes to an immaterial breakdown
where data does not accurately represent the thing intended. This study adapts and improves
this line of thinking in at least two distinct ways. First, it makes semantic ontologies the target
of objectual and informatic practice. In doing so it focuses attention on the practices of
interaction and construction as opposed to strictly the practices of deployment as does French
(2014). Second, it extends Bowker’s (2005) work on cataloging and memory practices by
examining the data assemblage as a necessary and inseparable component of data creation and
gathering.
In recent years, many science and technology studies scholars have shifted their focus
on the ways in which phenomena are brought into being, or enacted. (Coopmans et al. 2014;
Mol 2002; Woolgar and Lezaun 2013, 2015). This “turn to ontology” (Coopmans et al. 2014:2)
reflects the philosophical move away from terminology that posits any stable and concrete
entities of representation, and the framing of objects of investigation as independent of the
investigations themselves. As many scholars argue, the object and its means for investigation
co-constitute one another (Barad 2007; Introna 2005, 2007; Kitchin 2014b; Kitchin and Dodge
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2011; Latour 2005; MacCormick 2013; Mackenzie 2005; Manovich 2013). Barad (2007:818)
notes, “The primary ontological units are not ‘things’ but phenomena – dynamic topological
reconfigurings / entanglements / relationalities / (re)articulations. And the primary semantic
units are… material-discursive practices through which boundaries are constituted.”. In other
words, in this intra-actional approach, subjects, objects, and discourses have no ontological
priority; they are one another’s common history. Observers, instruments, and objects of
investigation do not exist as such independently of their entanglements. Moreover, these intraactions exude a certain potentiality of being, affording and proscribing certain outcomes.
Introna (2007) shows that the intra-actions of the plagiarism detection phenomenon enable
and constrain certain uses, forms, and meanings of technology as well as the identities and
practices related to plagiarism detection. The intra-actions involved in the use of word
processing, electronic scholarly databases, Wikimedia, Turnitin detection software, the
commodification of education, fairness, and intellectual property rights all combine to reconstitute what it is to plagiarize, to write, to instruct, and to detect plagiarism.
The shift in focus from the epistemological concerns of representation to the ontological
concerns of enactment means that concern is no longer simply on how well science
understands its object, but how it assists in creating it. Similar to work on assemblages, studies
of enactment investigate the ways that phenomena are called into being through practice
(informatic or otherwise), engagement, social interactions, and artifacts (Coopmans et al 2014;
French 2014; Knorr-Cetina 2001; Law and Lien 2012; Mol 2002; Moser 2008; Sismondo 2015;
Woolgar and Lezaun 2013, 2015). Objects can, and must, be understood as manipulated,
created, destroyed, and made meaningful through these practices. Mol (2002), shows the
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various ways that atherosclerosis comes to be enacted in different ways through different
practices, arguing that the enactment of the disease is contingent upon the various practices
engaged in any intra-action. Variations in practice lead to the enactment of multiple realities for
a given disease, such that the meaning of atherosclerosis depends on the practical engagement
with the whole of the wider actor assemblage. For instance, atherosclerosis as pain in the leg is
enacted through the practice of a patient consultation whereas the disease is differently
enacted as arterial blockage through post-mortem or post-amputation investigations in
pathology departments. In this case, the creation of the objects of investigation is inseparable
from the investigation itself. Reference and representation refer only to the reality as
constituted.
Similarly, Alač (2013) shows how results of fMRI scans acquire meaning through
enactment. The fMRI visual output acts as an intermediary between an embodied individual
and knowledge of that individual. Often times lab technicians are unable to see the physical
patient and must rely solely on the output from the scans. So too, secondary research has no
ability to see a patient and must interpret brain signals as representations of a given patient. In
these scans, patient motion creates brain scan nonalignment and thus interpretive problems in
the visuals for technicians and researchers. One task of these practitioners is to spot those
nonalignments and decipher their origin. Of course, this is problematic given that the observer
is never actually able to see the patient or their alleged movement. They rely on data from
scans that display “hints” that an informed practitioner can decode as specific types of
movement. Through the specific intra-action between instrument, researcher, and the
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mobilization of specific cultural knowledge those hints allow the practitioner to enact
movements in any given nonaligned scan.
Drawing on this “turn”, Kallinikos et al. (2013:357) argue that digital objects have
something of an “ambivalent ontology”. Like Knorr-Cetina’s (2001) knowledge objects, digital
objects – semantic web ontologies – are incomplete and always changing. For the semantic web
the issues is not so much about representation, because while practically very important, we
know that “real” representation is not possible. Following Woolgar and Lezuan (2013) I do not
begin by assuming that there is a picture of the world that ontologists are getting right or
wrong, but rather stipulate that they are engaged in the “practices of depiction” (Woolgar and
Lezuan 2013:324), but only in so far as those practices are bound up in a larger assemblage. As
Latour (1987) once argued, to understand the ready-made, we first need to understand the
making. To “get the most efficient machine” we first need to “decide on what efficiency should
be” (Latour 1987:9). The interactions between components of the semantic web are not as
simple as the black box implies. They are a set of negotiations with the affordances and
constrains standards, design philosophies, other people and the existing state of the ontology.
This new Janus-faced project needs to decide how meaning is to be made and how translation
is to occur before simply making the translations.

3.6 Conclusion
The problem of translating between humans and machines posed by semantic web is
bigger than just the translation between different sets of experts or making knowledge explicit.
Instead, it is a problem of creating a distinct world of understandings and meanings among an
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entire fluid universe of them. It is a process where decisions about representation are made
and codified. It is a process by which the affordances and constraints of information
infrastructures, standards, and classification systems are negotiated by communities of
practice. Lastly, it is a process of co-creation between data and their assemblages. Where
science studies research once investigated the use of machines to translate the natural world
for human consumption, I now invert that relationship and investigate the way that humans
translate the world for machine consumption (Knorr-Cetina 1999; Latour 1987; Vertesi 2015). In
so doing, I make contributions to re-emerging work on AI and ontologies, negotiations with
standards, and data studies. Furthermore, I answer Woolgar and Lezuan’s (2013, 2015) call to
open new provocations for empirical ontology.
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4. Researching Schema.org and the Semantic Web
How does one unpack the semantic web’s black box? As code based systems tend to be,
its operations are hidden within complicated computer languages, behind the walls of trade
secrets, and embedded within other larger technological systems. Similar to other information
infrastructures, these features make the semantic web more or less invisible and taken for
granted. Much of this is by design, as ontologists purposefully work to make the semantic web
as seamless and simple to use as possible, so that it can be the substrate of larger more visible
technologies. Research on information infrastructures argues that such features – size,
ubiquity, embeddedness, and community specialization – work to render these systems
invisible, but has provided a number of means to expose them, such as ethnographic
observation, examining systemic breakdown, and specialized techniques like infrastructural
inversion (Bowker and Star 1999; Bowker et al. 2010; Edwards 2010; Ribes and Finholt 2009;
Star 1999).
My research problem confronts two main methodological quandaries. First, what case is
large enough to draw significant insights from, but exposed enough that it has not completely
disappeared into the Web’s architecture, and thus permits investigation? As I explain below,
Schema.org is such a case. Second, following from my chosen case, what methodological
approaches will allow for an examination of a system whose work processes are dispersed,
natively digital, and will fit with an assemblage based approach to answering my chosen
research questions? This chosen methodologies will by necessity attend not only to the
communities of practice, but the standards they encounter, the systems of thought they bring
to bear on their work, and the ontologies they interact with, among other things.
72

The ensuing chapter resolves these two quandaries though a justification and
explanation of my case, as well as the methodologies deployed to answer my research
questions. This dissertation relies on the in-depth case study of the users, developers,
vocabulary, code standards, and digital artifacts directly associated with the Schema.org
project. As both the objects of investigation and their impact on my research questions are
diverse, multiple methodological approaches drawn from recent work on digital technologies
are employed. This chapter is divided into five parts. In the first part, I will describe the case
that guides my research. This section will involve a description of Schema.org, the major
institutions involved with the project, the communities of practice that are most closely
involved in its development and its use, the vocabulary that constitutes the project, and the
primary code standards implicated in its creation and use. The second section will describe the
primary sites in which my research occurred. The third section will describe both the data
collection processes and the preparations for analysis. The fourth section of this chapter will
discuss the two main methodological techniques used in this study. The fifth and final section of
this chapter will describe the limitations of my methodology and include a statement of my
standpoint as a researcher and the biases that such a standpoint and approach may bring
about.

4.1 Schema.org
I selected Schema.org as my case to study the processes involved in constructing data
assemblages for a few main reasons. First, the project is unique in that it represents a nearly
even participation between industry competitors. The four major search engines, Google,
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Microsoft (Bing), Yahoo12, and Yandex that are involved with the project all contribute freely
and openly to Schema.org’s development despite being competitors in search, and in the cases
of Google and Microsoft, competitors in search based artificial intelligence, a major use of
semantic web technology and structured data. This collaboration is significant because it
represents not only a consolidation of semantic web ontologies, but also a strong symbolic
statement in favor of Schema.org being the “best” ontology. My research indicates that this
statement of support makes this particular case the de facto semantic web standard in eyes of
users and industry experts alike.
The second reason for selecting Schema.org is that it is a public and transparent13
process. Anyone who has the desire or motivation to contribute to the project’s development is
welcome to participate. In practice, participation is rather limited as there is a substantial
amount of expertise, experience, and knowledge required to contribute at a high and
productive level, or to be regarded amongst the core developers as competent. Nevertheless,
there are many contributions by less central community members. These contributions occur in
the development of both the core and extended ontologies across both of the two primary
work sites. The community of developers places a high degree of importance on transparency
in how decisions are made. This is evident in both the community facing, everyday discussion,
and the more selective steering group discussions, which are published in various formats.

12

At the time of writing Yahoo is in the process of being broken up. This included the sale of
many parts of its core Internet business to Verizon, the resignation of its CEO, Marissa Mayer,
and other major forms of restructuring. It is uncertain, at this point, what will become of
Yahoo’s remaining businesses, Verizon’s commitment to search, or either company’s
involvement in Schema.org.
13
This assumes that one is both aware of the project and how to navigate the work sites.
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Moreover, all of this work and discussion regarding development and use happens in public14.
All discussion is cataloged on either the World Wide Web Consortium or GitHub’s websites.
These features make Schema.org an ideal case for study because there is a precise and detailed
record of exactly what discussion happened, when they happened, the results of those
discussions, and the underlying rationale behind the community’s decisions.
The third reason for selecting Schema.org is that it is a wide-ranging and general
ontology. Self-described as a set of schemas, the project aims to cover diverse content
domains, rather than specialize in a single or a few more limited domains. This means that
Schama.org is more directly trying to represent the known Internet, rather than explicitly
limiting itself to niche areas, as is most often the case with semantic web ontologies. This
directly suits the interests of the sponsor companies, particularly Google and Microsoft, and has
consequences discussed later. Lastly, Schema.org is one of the semantic backbones behind
Google, Microsoft, and Apple’s search based artificial intelligence systems. While these systems
are all varied and have additional proprietary knowledge bases, one of their major functions is
to serve as an intelligent interface between users and search. While the specific implications of
this interfaced layer are beyond the scope of this study, investigating how those AI systems
come to understand what they are parsing is of direct relevance, and of high sociological
importance.
As mentioned above, Schema.org is a semantic web ontology developed in collaboration
between four sponsor companies – Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, Yandex – independent

14

Excepting the conference calls between steering group members. This is a limitation that I
address later in this chapter.
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contributors, and the W3C. The central stated aim of this project is “to create, maintain, and
promote schemas for structured data on the Internet, on webpages, in email messages, and
beyond.” (Schema.org 2017a). Schema.org is an open source and peer produced project that is
attempting to create a single unified place for webmasters to go to learn about and apply
semantic markup to their web domains. The project is particularly focused on defining content
domains and types that are of value to search engines and the sponsor companies’ search
based properties.
Unlike most other semantic web ontologies, Schema.org is continuously developed,
extended, and modified. As Schema.org is an effort to bolster search and search based artificial
intelligence, it takes a general approach to content coverage. While there are other broad form
ontologies, Schema.org is among the largest and most used, covering over 10% of existing web
content, as it is employed on over 10 million websites and integrated into many applications
including, but not limited to, the New York Times, The Guardian, IMDB, Monster.com, Pinterest,
LinkedIn, Yelp, Zillow, and the Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Yandex search based ecosystems
(Guha 2014). As of writing, Schema.org has 258 contributors from private industry, non-profit
standards groups, academia, and independent origins. Currently, the core vocabulary contains
583 types, 846 properties, and 114 enumeration values. The core vocabulary covers a wide
range of content including, but not limited to: creative works, events, people, places, products,
organizations, and actions. In addition to the core vocabulary, Schema.org also has three15
distinct hosted extensions – automotive, bibliographic, and health-life science – one fully
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There are actually five hosted extensions, but two of those extensions are tools for the
development process and not extensions for website developers to use for content markup
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developed and mapped external extension – GS1 – and one extension in the process of being
mapped and considered as an extension – Wikidata16. Within these hosted extensions there are
an additional 114 types, 217 properties, and 153 enumeration values. In addition to those
operational extensions, there are a number of other Schema.org community groups that are
working on extensions to the core ontology. These include such content domains as,
educational courses, archival information, tourism, finance, sports, legislation, and meat17. In
addition to creating semantics for simple Web content, Schema.org is also beginning to branch
out into semantically linked relational databases, the Internet of Things, and civic participation,
though these aspects of the project are in early stages of development.
Schema.org is organized into two primary groups. The first is a steering group comprised
of paid employees of the sponsor companies, a few independent contractors, and a
representative of the W3C. The steering group oversees the development of the project, as well
as the approval and implementation of new proposals. The second, community group, is a
group open to any interested persons, who’s role “is to propose, discuss, prepare and review
changes to Schema.org, for final review and publication by the steering group.” (Schema.org
2017b). One member of the steering group chairs the community group, and all members of
the steering group participate in and monitor the developments and discussion in community
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There is an ongoing process of mapping Schema.org and Wikidata to one another. Currently,
there are debates occurring within the two communities to consider Wikidata as an official
extension of Schema.org. Thus far there is no resolution on the proposal and the individuals
involved are unsure whether or not to consider it an external or hosted extension.
17
Of note is that many community members report being involved in creating their own
external extensions. The details about these extensions are not readily available and their
development is not recorded or publicized for scrutiny. These external extensions, much like
the GS1, happen outside of the purview of the broader Schema.org community.
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group. Apart from the paid employees of the sponsor organizations, contribution to Schema.org
is voluntary. However, many of the frequent contributors are consultants who are paid to
implement semantic markup for their clients, and so while their contributions are formally
voluntary, they are often in service to their paid professional work.
While all large Web-scale technical projects like Schema.org rely heavily on a vast array
of standards and protocols, it would be counterproductive, and potentially impossible to
explore the full range of them in this study. Discussions of many of these and other protocols,
standards, and their effects are discussed in detail elsewhere (Abbate 2000; Coyle 2008;
DeNardis 2009; Galloway 2004, 2006). However, there are standards that are of central
importance to the development and use of Schema.org that I will discuss in detail. These
markup standards all apply the RDF data model, or something that approximates it to varying
degrees of sophistication, and enable the Schema.org ontology to be applied to Web content.
Thus, they are central to the process of enacting semantic data. Schema.org supports the use of
three markup standards in particular, Microdata, the Resource Description Framework for
attributes (RDFa), and Javascript Object Notation for Linked Data (JSON-LD). This marks a point
of departure from other semantic web ontologies, as most do not actively specify a preferred
standard or set of them.

4.2 Research Sites and Sources
My research took place in three primary sites, the W3C community message boards,
Schema.org’s GitHub repository, and Schema.org’s own website. In addition to those three
sites, I conducted additional research on the three markup standards which included the W3C
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specifications pages for Microdata, RDFa, and JSON-LD. While not research sites, per se, these
documents were instrumental in understanding not only how the project is implemented, but
the affordances and constraints presented by these technical standards. Below, I will describe
each site and its operation in additional detail.
The W3C message boards are the public discussion forum for the Schema.org project.
They are publicly accessible from the both the W3C’s website and Schema.org’s main page. The
message boards are similar to an email list server, recording each post and response in a
threaded fashion. The message boards are used for the proposal, discussion, and debate of “all
updates, changes, and improvements to Schema.org” (Brickley 2016). However, in practice, the
message boards also include large amounts of questions and answers from confused or
uncertain Web developers who are trying to apply the Schema.org vocabulary. Additionally, the
detail and sophistication of the discussion and debate that happens on the W3C message
boards is far less active and detailed than the what happens on GitHub. Often times the
discussion and debates on the message boards are simply a springboard for inclusion on the
project’s GitHub site. The community group chair18 is responsible for managing the workflow
between the W3C message boards and GitHub, but in practice, other steering group members
and core contributors do the same.
My main site of research for this project occurred on GitHub. GitHub is a platform for
coordinating software development projects amongst multiple people, that draws on the
distributed version control system, Git. It allows for distributed and non-linear work and is
particularly useful for hosting and developing open source and peer-produced code systems.

18

Also a steering group member in Google’s employ
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Like many professional disciplines, code work on GitHub has its own specialized jargon that will
be important to have as a reference going forward. Such a reference is available in the
appendix. Among the platform's many features, there were some that were particularly
important to this project. These features included, housing project documents and the master
repository, project Wikis, labeled issue tracking, feature and pull requests, commit histories,
and workflow documentation.
GitHub is the site of most of the work on Schema.org. While many proposals originate
from the W3C message boards, many bypass that forum and are proposed directly on GitHub.
Moreover, all actionable work, regardless of where it is proposed happens and is discussed on
GitHub. Each work item commit and discussion is logged, linked to other related issues, and
tagged with metadata on the GitHub page. The type of participant on GitHub displays a higher
degree of understanding and sophistication regarding semantic web standards, ontology
development, and markup. Communication and work here are generally from a smaller core
group of a few dozen community members.
While GitHub houses the complete documentation for Schema.org, the project's own
website (Schema.org) contains much of that information in a more easily digestible form.
Likewise, GitHub contains the actual vocabulary, but this file is designed for machine
consumption, which does not lend itself to human investigation. Schema.org’s website contains
the entire vocabulary in an accessible and interlinked form. This allowed me to traverse type,
class, property, enumeration connections with relative ease. With this I could see the full range
of properties, expected values, and instructions relating to any given markup. Additionally, the
project’s website has an unpublished mirror of itself (pending.schema.org) that allows one to
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view pending changes before they are actually added to the vocabulary. Both sites also contain
a detailed chronological list of additions and modifications to the ontology along with links to
the specific issues on the GitHub issue tracker. Lastly, the site contains a number of helpful
resources for Web developers on using and understanding markup and the Schema.org
workflow.
My final data for investigation came from the specification sheets for the three markup
standards supported by the project. While not all three standards are all W3C
recommendations, the W3C contains the specification sheets and best use practices in their
Web domain. These specification sheets define the basic terminology for each standard,
provide a detailed overview of their syntax and data models, instructions for use, how the
syntax is interpreted by computational agents, their general affordances and constraints, and
their relationships to other markup standards. Problematically, they suffer from a high degree
of technicality and as general standards and specification documents, they do not refer
specifically to their use with Schema.org19.

4.3 Data Collection and Preparation
Data collection took place at two different junctures. The initial collection stage began in
September 2015 and took place over the course of two weeks. During this time, I manually
scraped all posts organized monthly, by subject, in threaded form, from the W3C message
boards. The W3C message board data dates as far back as April 2015 when all community group
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In the JSON-LD development community group, there is substantial overlap between the
developers for the syntax and the core community members of Schema.org. This has had the
effect of making JSON-LD align well with Schema.org’s needs.
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work on the Schema.org project shifted to their servers. Scraping the posts in threaded form
allowed for the best way to keep track of posts and their direct responses. However, since the
message boards are a continuously operating work platform, there were many instances where
a response to a thread happened in a different month than the thread originated in. This was
particularly the case near the beginning and end of months. Where applicable, those responses
were added to the original discussion. This left me with a series of documents that tracked the
history of all discussions on the community boards in order. In total this accounted for 278
distinct messages across 66 subjects. The initial phase of data collection from GitHub was
similar to that of the W3C message boards. Schema.org’s GitHub page allows one to view all
issues, regardless of metadata tags, in both open and closed statuses. Much like the W3C data, I
manually scraped all content from each thread, then organized them by subject and issue
number. GitHub extended further back in time than the data from the W3C, with coverage
beginning in April 2014. In total this accounted for 345 distinct issues. The W3C markup
specifications were also scraped into their own separate documents. Data from Schema.org’s
website was referenced in situ to preserve the benefits offered by the digital objects embedded
in both the ontology and the history of releases.
Following data collection, all textual data was stored in both an encrypted portable flash
drive and on Dedoose’s servers. Once uploaded to Dedoose, I added metadata tags to capture
the source, the number of participants, and the length of discussion. During this process, I also
added the metadata tags that were originally included in the GitHub data but were lost when
the data was first scraped. These tags designate the type of issue are assigned by the steering
group members. They include administrative, extension tracking, for Steering Group attention,
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guidelines documents and examples, standards and organizations, vocabulary, rough, small,
exact, and large proposals, and tricky problems among others. Next, I marked each issue by its
status as open or closed.
To capture the ongoing work on the project, as well as the improvements, changes, and
new releases since my initial collection phase, I completed the second phase of data collection
in July 2016. The process of collection was similar to the initial phase, except for the added
complication of there being additions to the already collected material. For the W3C data, this
was not an issue because the message board’s platform allows sorting by date. While GitHub
also allows sorting by modification date, it forced me to append each original issue that had
recorded changes from the initial data collection phase. This meant that many of my originally
captured issues were closed or merged with other issues. Fortunately, GitHub readily provides
that information so making the amendments was relatively simple. This second phase of data
collection brought my data totals to 682 W3C messages across 164 subjects and 971 distinct
GitHub issues.
While both platforms are publicly open, contributors are primarily Web developers
looking to apply Schema.org to their sites or prominent community members contributing to
the day-to-day development and operation of the project. Nearly all participation is from
Western collaborators, the vast majority coming from people located in the United States,
England, and Germany. There is substantial variation in the length of issue threads and message
board chains, as well as in how detailed those data are. They range from zero to forty-two
responses, averaging six responses per issue, with each response at a paragraph or more in
length and often including lengthy examples of existing or proposed Web markup.
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Code and Web markup were not scraped and uploaded to Dedoose but were included in
the analysis. On GitHub the specific changes to a code are highlighted in the code itself, most of
which is too large to be manageable in Dedoose, while the important data for my analyses are
just these highlighted segments, removing them from the context of the larger code set
removes potentially important information. Additionally, this particular way that code is
formatted and presented is important to preserve because the specific formatting and
characters used to display and organize scripts serve important purposes in programming
languages. Copying these bits of information to a text document compromises that formatting
and at times the characters involved. Fortunately, all of this information is preserved in the
correct form on GitHub.

4.4 Analytic Approach
This study adopted two main methodological techniques. The first followed the
netnographic approach developed by Kozinets (2010) on conducting digital ethnographies of
online communities. The second methodological technique was a variation on multimodal
critical discourse analysis. The first was used to investigate the development and use of
Schema.org, and the second was used in combination with the first to understand the
affordances and constraints imposed by the three markup standards.
Ethnography has a long history in the study of science and technological systems.
Ethnographic laboratory research emerging from the field of science and technology studies
(STS) have shown the central roles of communities of practice, technological artifacts, and their
intra-actions in the production of scientific facts (Knorr-Cetina 1999; Latour and Woolgar 1986;
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Latour 1987; Mol 2002; Traweek 1988). Additionally, similar methods have been used to study
the development of expert systems by early AI researchers (Forsythe 1993a, 1993b; Suchman
1987). These studies have been instrumental in showing the ways that the seemingly black
boxed inner workings of scientific, medical, and computer science communities come to
produce their objects in active and dynamic ways (Knorr-Cetina 2001; Mol 2002). Moreover, the
ethnographies that have come out of the STS field, in particular, have given us license to
interrogate the intra-actions between human and non-human actors with the same levels of
priority while assuming the same levels of potential agency. While research setting and cultural
artifacts have always been a central component of ethnographic research, the affordancebased perspectives that are both explicitly and implicitly adopted in contemporary
ethnographies provide a stable footing for understanding the ways that communities of
practice interact with technologies in varied, changing, and emergent ways. Ways that are
inseparably connected to the socio-material contexts in which those intra-actions occur. This
form of agentive realism reflects an ontological and epistemological commitment to take the
two as unsettled and incomplete achievements (Barad 2007; Mol 2002).
Now old discussions of digitally mediated interactions enabled by ubiquitous computing
and the increasing role that digital media play in community creation, have coincided with
digitally oriented forms of ethnography. Often termed, digital ethnography, virtual
ethnography, or cyber-ethnography, these methodological approaches mirror the grounded
concerns of lived experience, interactions, gestures, and situated action of traditional
ethnographies. Research in this area has studied the construction of identity in online
communities, digital interactions as extensions of face-to-face interactions, impression
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management in social media, and the construction of publics in discussion forums among other
aims and digital contexts (Boellstorff 2010; Hine 2000; Markham 1998; Springer 2015; Turkle
1995).
While many of these digitally inspired ethnographies view the digital as only one
component of the total social experience, this study orients differently. Natively digital artifacts,
like software and code systems, require a focus that is also natively digital, particularly in the
present case where the boundaries of practice are coterminous with the boundaries of the
digital (Rogers 2013). These types of digital technologies and their interfaces reconfigure social
interactions and “this reorganization changes how empirical knowledge is produced and
transmitted among users in a digital environment. It also restructures how we as ethnographers
observe, analyze, and categorize empirical knowledge.” (Hsu 2014:1). Thus, to study a natively
digital site, such as GitHub, one must adopt a methodology that is sensitive to these
reconfigurations that mark distinctions between online communities and communities online
(Kozinets 2010). While this study recognizes the false dichotomy of material/immaterial that
often underpins sensationalized studies of digitality, this study follows Hsu (2014) and focuses
on the digital as a pragmatic decision for the sake of methodological and analytic lucidity.
However, this comes with the acknowledgement that work occurs only through the benefit of a
wide-ranging set of material artifacts and practices.
Kozinets (2010:60) defines the practice of netnography as, “research based in online
fieldwork. It uses computer-mediated communications as a source of data to arrive at
ethnographic understanding and representation of a cultural or communal phenomenon.”
Netnographic practice allows for a situated analysis of community engagement available in
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online forums. While I abstained from participation to avoid being disruptive, netnographic
research, like traditional ethnographic methods, necessarily includes a range of techniques
including archival and documentary analysis, the tracing of event timelines and narratives, and
in-depth case study all as deployed here. Springer (2015) argues that this provides a set of
observational data similar to, but more reliable than field notes and artifacts from traditional
ethnographic methods. It additionally provided an increase potential for researcher reflexivity,
as I was able to easily revisit data in its original pre-coded form (Springer 2015).
As netnography is a necessarily diverse set of methods, my approach to the data was
also diverse. The first stage in my research process was to familiarize myself with the
community and their sets of practice. This involved the daily monitoring of both primary
research sites to situate myself in the day to day operation and development of the project.
This occurred in two ways. First, I constructed a running set of field notes that described the
situation on the ground in its own terms. This involved a simple summary of what happened
and why based on the information directly available. Given my interest in the specific ways this
system is brought into being, I was focused on how new developments were proposed, who
proposed them, why they proposed them, as well as the process and results of the debates that
surrounded any given issue. Of crucial importance was uncover the rationales behind both the
initial proposals and proposed solutions.
Once familiar with the process, I was able to look back at older data and make sense of
the issues, discussions, and resolutions of the past. By systematically following the thread of
debates, proposed and acted upon solutions, commits, and interactions between the
assemblage’s components I was able to construct a working history of the project from the
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perspective of work practice, rather than project releases, and one that contained multiple
timelines based on specific concurrent issues. However, having the timeline of actual releases
at hand was helpful in determining the types of issues that make it to the release stage, and the
types of issues that get stuck in production for whatever reasons. This allowed me to uncover
patterns in work priority, coverage areas, treatment of certain forms of proposals, rationales
for decisions, and the power dynamics of the immediate community. Importantly, it also
allowed for reoccurring issues to emerge in the data in a more meaningful way. The
construction of a narrative timeline allowed these problem areas to emerge through
reoccurrence over time and also through tracking issue assignments and mergers.
In addition to the common ethnographic practices surrounding field notes, I engaged in
a more formal textual analysis that followed the approaches of Berg (2004) and Strauss and
Corbin (1990). Continuing from my desire to approach the case in a grounded manner, I began
this coding process by establishing codes derived from the language of the actors themselves.
This had the benefit of providing a view towards the meanings that actors gave to their actions.
At this stage, I had read all of the data so I was able to look for the linkages between data points
(threads, issues, commits, etc.). As a step in the data analysis process, I allowed in vivo codes
and categories, as well as previously undefined narratives and codes that relate to my research
project, but were unspecified, to emerge from the data. Much of these codes related to
efficiency, pragmatics, and coherence across the applied data model. Next, I established
grounded categories where I placed this material into context with the narrative and action
specific conditions of the texts – e.g. limiting complexity because of across standard variations
or intentional ambiguity to account for missing coverage. In this stage, a number of unexpected
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categories and themes emerged. Notably, these included the tendency to opt for simplicity
over semantic accuracy and decoupling the context of creation from the contexts of use.
The second stage of the research involved revisiting selected data in light of sociological
constructs drawn guided by the themes of my research and the concerns of the relevant
literature. Here I reconstructed my “field notes” in a way the a drew out the ontological issues
of over-determination and occlusion, as well as other issues of position taking, representation,
and negotiating affordances of the technological environment. Much of this portion of the
research involved a close critical reading of the ontology and the markup standards used by
Schema.org. This study takes the view that the ontology and the relevant markup standards are
forms of computer language based digital objects. Kallinikos et al. (2013) offer a useful
definition of the concept. Digital objects, they argue, are editable, interactive, reprogrammable,
and distributed digital cultural artifacts. As cultural artifacts, they contain the implicit
assumptions, norms, and values that exist in the immediate cultural landscapes from which
they emerge (Lupton 2014). As language-based standards they contain the ability to shape the
means for representation, everyday practice, and our interactions with them (Busch 2011;
Fiormonte et al. 2015). As mentioned earlier, however, these digital objects are not
deterministic, nor are the entirely within the realm of free play. Like all cultural artifacts,
standards contain certain affordances and constraints that shift and reshape as contexts
change. Additionally, as cultural artifacts, they can be interpreted as texts.
To analyze these digital objects, I adopted an approach frequently used to study
affordances of technological artifacts (Introna 2005, 2014; Introna and Hayes 2011; Lupton
2014). This approach has similarities to multimodal discourse analysis (MDA), a recent
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methodological technique that allows the researcher to investigate meaning in objects beyond
the simple confines of language. It takes other objects like images, symbols, actions, audio, and
I argue code based markup standards as semiotic resources (O’Halloran 2011). MDA has been
applied in a number of different areas to articulate the meaning potential in visual design (Kress
and van Leewuen 2006), artwork (O’Toole 1994), mathematics (O’Halloran 2005), and televised
news (O’Halloran 2011) among other areas. The specific approach of MDA is a similar approach
to the approach used in other forms of discourse analysis that assume:
that discourse, subjectivity, and practice are densely interwoven, and that discourse is
primary to subjectivity/practice through its constituting or framing powers. This means
that dominant and widespread discourse shapes both how to talk about a subject
matter and the meaning that we develop about it… It is not the details of the account
and its context as much as a perceived general tendency that is deemed significant to
use (Alvesson and Karreman 2000:1138)
This approach allows a researcher to identify and interrogate the ways that broad discursive
patterns help to shape affordances and prohibitions, the ways of being and the constraints that
might be placed on being, the ways of doing and the constraints placed on practice, and the
ways of representing and the constraints on possible claims making. The constant conversation
that I had between the data in my field notes and the affordances of the ontology and
standards allowed me to understand specifically, how certain forms can and cannot be
represented, how representations can serve to over-determine or occlude others, and how the
ability to make semantic data as a practice is enabled and constrained by the particular forms of
the standard and ontology drawn on in a given context.
As a part of this second stage of research, the textual analysis involved coding texts
based on constructs and questions guided by themes relevant to my research questions. Given
my primary focuses the interactions between components and human-machine translations, I
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reread the data in light of these focal points. Here I identified statements that dealt directly
with negotiations with markup standards, divergent interpretations of semantics and their
application by developers and users, design best practices, and decision making and rationales.
These additionally included issues surrounding conflict, consensus, and proper classification,
which itself was broken down into instances where false equivalencies were made and
recognized, where properties, representations, and identities were conflated, and when
instances evaded proper classification within the ontology. This phase also included coding of
the actors and components involved in the assemblage. Here I coded actors by reported
country, affiliation, and role. Additionally, I coded actors’ stated involvements with other
ontologies.
The final stage of the formal coding process involved drawing connections between
codes from both stages of the coding process. In this phase, I modified and collapsed codes
where appropriate and the placed them into more direct conversation with the study’s
research questions and the contexts they implied. This allowed me to draw connections
between themes that may have initially been treated separately and apply coded information
directly to the study’s focal interests. For example, that usability and practicality took
precedence over accuracy in representation and classification when divergent interpretations
of semantics and their application occurred between participants.

4.5 Researcher Reflections and Limitations
Such and undertaking has ethical implications that must be considered and dealt with
accordingly. This research was conducted in full consideration of the American Sociological
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Association’s (ASA) code of ethics and complied with all Internal Review Board (IRB)
prescriptions. This document follows all ASA recommendations for professional competence,
integrity, professional and scientific responsibility, respect for people’s dignity, and social
responsibility. As such, I undertook only the activities in which I was professionally competent.
My multiple statements of research were clear and honest in intention, and despite the at
times, critical nature of this study, I do not seek to endanger my research subject’s professional
well-being. Throughout the research process, appropriate measures to protect research
subject’s confidentiality and anonymity, despite the public nature of the two primary research
sites that were used. Additionally, all research subjects were informed of their right to be
omitted from the research, in accordance with ASA and IRB guidelines (American Sociological
Association 2008).
This study is about the process of constructing and enacting data as well as the creation
of ontological states through human-machine translations. As such, the irony of conducting
qualitative research and making specific enactments of data to solve my questions is not lost on
me. The same biases, rationales, and patterns of interactions that I attribute to my case as an
ostensibly clairvoyant outside body can be alleged to this very investigation with equal
legitimacy. As I claim that Schema.org’s ontologists are enacting a particular ontology, I am
doing precisely the same thing. This illusion of purity could be said of all social science research
particularly when that research is engaged with knowledge work (Latour 1991).
To mitigate the bias introduced by my personal choices of questions, case, and methods,
I am left with only a few possible options. The first of which was to follow the strategies of the
researchers before me. My interest in this study follows from an established body of research,
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drawing on theories, concepts, and approaches that have withstood the scrutiny of peerreview. This work has shown that researcher reflexivity is key to undertaking ethical and valid
social research. The second way I mitigated my own personal biases was to allow the data to
speak in their own terms. In this sense, I attempted to ground my research in the site and
community where it occurred, drawing on their language, and their understandings of what
they were doing before adding my own. Of course, this strategy is not fool-proof and still
involves interpretations and assignations of cause and rationale on the part of the researcher.
To address this nagging concern, my third strategy was to allow the data to speak for itself as
much as possible throughout this document and my analysis. To do so, context will be supplied
by both description and data where possible. While I interpret the data, and draw conclusions
from it, I have tried to make those interpretations and conclusions follow logically from the
data I present.
The relative lack of social science research on the semantic web and on data enactments
suggests that a grounded empirical analysis is needed. However, as a case study, this research
only investigates one semantic web ontology and one main form of data, despite its various
enactments. While the case under investigation is among the largest and most used example
available, this has the potential consequence of limiting some generalizability. However, I
address the specific features of Schema.org that make it unique and contribute to its specific
importance as a case for research and increasingly representative of the semantic web in
general. Additionally, this analysis is not a comparative analysis on the enactment of other
types of data, which are part of other data assemblages, so will necessarily have different
enactments. However, this concern is marginal to this study as it represents one small step in
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the emerging study of data. One contention of this and other work (Kitchin 2014b, 2014c;
Kitchin et al. 2015a, 2015b) is that disparate types of data and their assemblages need to be
studied in their own right.
Additional limitations are presented by the data available to this study. While the data
used contain all of the public discussion on how to best alter and apply the ontology, it does not
contain any backchannel communications either in person or via email. The data indicates that
there are occasional back-channel discussions between a few community members on certain
issues. Most of the time those discussions are disclosed to the group with a summary of the
results, but the actual content of the discussion is lost. This may be fine for continued work on
the project from the perspective of a developer, but from an analytic perspective, there could
be information important to my findings, for or against. Additionally, since the data are entirely
textual and interviews were not performed for this study, there is no possibility for follow up or
clarification questions that are not in the text. The effects of these limitations seem negligible,
however, since all modifications are public and the data of primary interest are the discussions
and debates about the ontology’s coverage.
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5. Negotiated Standards
In Art Worlds, Howard Becker (1982) famously, shows the ways in which material
standards constrain the production and display of artwork. Among other things, he shows that
building standards impact the size of artwork as well as how and where it can be displayed.
Likewise, Klose (2009) explains how the adoption of the Twenty Food Equivalent Unit for
shipping containers has helped to not only shape the course of globalization but also the way
we now think about organization and modularity. Furthermore, we know that classification
standards work to afford certain ways of knowing a thing while constraining others (Bowker
and Star 1999, Epstein 2007, Scott 1998). This work shows that while standards often exist to
reduce user friction and to make things interoperable, they do so at the expense of competing
understandings and states. The investment in, and deployment of, a specific set of standards
helps to set the boundaries of practice and its results as those communities must work within
the affordances set by those standards.
We also know that the creation of standards and the process of adopting them is
fraught with conflict. Much time, money, and effort go into creating and adopting ascendant
standards, and for creators and early adopters, there may be substantial costs associated with
switching between them. Work has shown that the standard that prevails is not always the
most technically proficient, capable, or compatible standard, as a wide variety of external
forces affect their adoption and use, as was the case with Betamax and VHS (Genschel 1997;
Yasunori and Imai 1993). Additionally, standards development and deployment does not
happen evenly across contexts, as certain actors and domains are either not exposed to, or
reticent to adopt standards (Noble 1984).
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More recently, work has examined cases where standards do not work (Bowker and Star
1999; Epstein 2007, 2010; Heimer 2001; Whooley 2010, 2014; Whooley and Horwitz 2013).
Even when accounting for a standard, or set of standards’, propensity to afford and constrain,
or their bumpy and contested development and adoption, the accepted standards do not
always work as supposed or desired. In these cases, a standard, or set of standards, actually
may work to inhibit practice and its smooth operation, or to constrain results in ways that work
against the standard’s supposed function. While Bowker and Star (1999) argue that standards
tend to stabilize systems, rather than just tending towards stabilization, they acknowledge that
effects can be varied as standards are artifacts to be negotiated. While work in neoinstitutionalism repeatedly show that decoupling is the most common outcome when
standards conflict with practice, this work lacks due attention to when decoupling is not
possible (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Sandholtz 2012; Thévenot 2009; Zbaracki 1998). These
omissions beg researchers to situate standards’ use in practice and question how these
blockages are negotiated and how the restrictions created by standardization are relaxed while
still enabling the interoperability they are designed for. While scholars have been exploring the
tensions between organizational level practices and standards’ homogenizing effects for some
time, work that both locates standards at the level of professional communities and that
investigates the negotiations of barriers is only just begging to emerge (Epstein 2007, 2010;
Halpin 2016; Heimer 2001; Whooley 2010, 2014; Whooley and Horwitz 2013).
The following section engages with these omissions. Below I will show how the markup
standards described in previous chapters are deployed across the two primary fields of practice
implicated in Schema.org. In line with existing work on standards and classification, I will show
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the ways in which they set certain affordances and constraints on the development and use of
the Schema.org ontology and thus the affordances and constraints placed upon the enactment
of the data assemblage. I will also show the ways that these standards work against the thing
they are supposed to enable, and how the communities of practice negotiate those restrictions.
I echo recent work, showing that practitioners work around those limitations, but also extend
that work arguing that most often, practitioners work with and through the standards in their
negotiations (Berg 1999; Epstein 2007, 2010; Heimer 2001; Whooley 2010, 2014; Whooley and
Horwitz 2013). Furthermore, I will detail some of the unintended consequences of those
negotiations and how they can lead differential enactments, or ontological states.
Specifically, I will examine the three markup standards adopted by Schema.org and its
users. Each standard plays a major role in shaping the way that the Schema.org ontology is
developed and applied in actual use. Importantly, each standard conditions that development
and use in subtle but different ways that constrain and enable the enactment of the
assemblage and the way that information can be encoded for machine readability. This chapter
details those affordances and constraints in both the general semantic web and Schema.org
specific contexts. These markup standards are built on different computer languages with each
containing different grammatical structures and syntactical rules regarding their use. As many
of the affordances and constraints that these markup standards put onto ontologists and Web
developers are rooted in these technical grammars, this chapter pays close attention to the
details of syntax as they serve to create protocological control (Galloway 2004, 2006). The
consequence of this is that the ensuing discussions are by necessity, technical. Much of the
affordances and constraints discussed will reference specific artifacts of these markup
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standards that evade simple description and so each standard will be analyzed via reference to
empirical examples from figures in the text. Following a technical discussion of the standards,
this chapter introduces some of the specific ways that those technical features affected
Schema.org’s development and use, as well as some unintended consequences of those effects.
While there are three standards in use, much of my attention is paid to the two standards that
feature most frequently in the data and are most important to Schema.org, Microdata and
Javascript Object Notation for Linked Data (JSON-LD), the former being the previous preferred
markup syntax and the latter the current preference.

5.1 Microdata
Microdata is a syntax that allows machine-readable data to be embedded in Hypertext
Markup Language documents. It provides a way to annotate Web content with sets of namevalue pairs in sequence with the rest of the HTML document. This means that Web developers
can encode machine-readable data in the same segment of the HTML script as the nonsemantic content. They do not need to insert additional code or append documents in any way
beyond the Microdata markup. However, this implies that Microdata is being used at the onset
of page development, as already existing HTML script would need to be amended, sometimes
with significant difficulty, to include the machine-readable content. Even still, the machinereadable content can be added in parallel to the existing HTML script (Hickson 2013).
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Figure 6. Microdata Markup of a Government Permit
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

<div itemscope itemtype="http://schema.org/GovernmentPermit">
<span itemprop="name">NYC Food Service Establishment Permit</span>
<div itemprop="issuedBy" itemscope itemtype="http://schema.org/GovernmentOrganization">
<span itemprop="name">Department of Health and Mental Hygiene"</span>
</div>
<div itemprop="issuedThrough" itemscope itemtype="http://schema.org/GovernmentService">
<span itemprop="name">NYC Food Service Establishment Permit Service</span>
</div>
<div itemprop="validIn" itemscope itemtype="http://schema.org/AdministrativeArea">
<span itemprop="name">New York</span>
</div>
<time itemprop="validFor" datetime="P1Y">1 year</time>
</div>

Source: Schema.org (2017d)
Name-values pairs are akin to a set of tags that can be attached to Web content where a
group is referred to as an item, or itemtype in syntax, and where each name-value pair is a
property, or itemprop, and the context for the description is supplied by itemscope. The
empirical sample in Figure 6. provides an illustrative example. In Figure 6., Schema.org is being
used to describe “A New York City Food Service Establishment Permit” as issued by the
“Department of Health and Mental Hygiene” and in effect for one year. We can see the
itemscope and initial itemtype being set by “http://schema.org/GovernmentPermit” (Line 1),
which is being used to provide the markup’s context by specifying the ontology’s location, the
class, its supra-classes, its properties, its inherited properties, properties for which instances of
“GovernmentPermit” can appear, as well as relevant definitions, and the affordances and
constraints on value inputs among other things. This canonical IRI refers a computational agent
to “http://schema.org/GovernmentPermit” for the context in parsing the ensuing markup. The
entire ability for an agent to understand the marked information is delimited by what appears
in that context specification. In other words, the realm of possible understanding is bound by
the ontology specified. Here the assembling of the Microdata standard and the Schema.org
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ontology combine to enact the meaning space for food service permits, government permits,
administrative areas, etc.
The first name-value pair, “name – NYC Food Service Establishment Permit” (Line 2)
establishes a description of the permit in plain text. Note, that while a computational agent will
understand that the “name - NYC Food Service Establishment Permit” pair is referring to the
“http://schema.org/GovernmentPermit” IRI and all its associations, in this markup it does not
understand any of the content found in the description since it is just a text string, it merely
presents that as part of the HTML script. However, this description could itself be subset and
marked up to indicate things like “Food Service” and “New York City (NYC)” as further semantic
detail specifying the exact context and form of the permit issued, though only by a single
specified type and through a single specified context file. The decision to do so depends on the
aims and skill of the Web developer and the availability of coverage in the ontology.
Within the same itemscope and itemtype, a subset with a new itemprop “issuedBy” is
defined by a separate itemscope and itemtype “http://schema.org/GovernmentOrganization”
(Line 3), which itself has a new property, “name”, establishing that the government permit of
the previously established name was issued by the government organization “Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene” (Line 4). The markup then begins a new code loop under the
original itemscope and itemtype to establish the property “issuedThrough” with yet another
new subset scope and type “http://schema.org/GovernmentService” (Line 6) with the property
“name” and the value “NYC Food Service Establishment Permit Service” (Line 7). This process is
further repeated to describe the valid administrative area (Line 9) of New York (Line 10) and the
one-year validity (Line 12). This process can be repeated and further elaborated on for any
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content that has corresponding coverage in the ontology. Problematically for Microdata, as
discussed more below, this process can only be done within the bounds of a single ontology and
type specification.
Microdata was created for human readability and webmaster usability and emerged as
a markup syntax aimed at providing structure to the World Wide Web. While not a W3C
recommendation, meaning it lacks the institutional support and development of other
standards, Microdata is part of the HTML5 specification so that any parser that can understand
HTML5 can understand Microdata markup, making it broadly applicable. Additionally, its
embedding in HTML5 increases the likelihood of Web developers being familiar with its basic
structure, adding to the chances that they apply markup to their content. Indeed, this is one of
the stated reasons for Schema.org’s initial support for Microdata, and likely to be a significant
part of the reason for its continued popularity despite its often bemoaned limitations (Guha et
al. 2015, Schema.org 2017c).
Microdata benefits from its similarity to HTML, its human readability, simplicity, and
broad support by browsers and Web content consumers, however, it has a number of
limitations for creating semantic data. First, Microdata can only be used in HTML5, which
precludes its use in any other computer languages, such as Javascript, which commonly used to
add interactivity to websites or browser specific functionality. This is significant because it limits
the applicability of ontologies, restricts the possible amount of semantic data, and blunts a
machine’s understanding of the Web domain. Additionally, Microdata was specifically designed
so that content is structured using the context of a single ontology, making it difficult to
integrate different ontologies. While workarounds exist, their use is rare and they add
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substantial complexity and run the risk of creating competing sets of data for different
consumers, as some may not be compatible or able to read the content included in the
workaround. This limitation creates the issue where a Web developer has the choice between
semantic consistency and semantic hegemony. Drawing on a single ontology has the benefit
that its class/type/property configurations will likely be in agreement. In the other case, a
developer is bound by the specific construction of the world as found in the adopted ontology.
So, while you may consistently describe your domain, the limits of how that human-machine
translation occurs is bound by the chosen ontology. Relatedly, Microdata does not accept
multiple types for a single object across ontologies, or trans property use across types in a
single ontology, further restricting its classification within a single class/type/property matrix.
This means that an artifact with ambiguous, but equally valid, semantics will be ontologically
over-determined in Microdata markup (W3C 2011, WHATWG 2016). As the example above
indicates, each listed itemscope is bound and determined by the single deployed itemtype.
Another limitation is that the Microdata specification does not support inverse
properties. Not being able to natively reverse property relations means that an agent’s ability
to capture relationships is constrained to only one direction. In the example from chapter two,
an agent would not be able to understand that Barack Obama was Donald Trump’s
predecessor, only that Trump was Obama’s successor. To create inverse data for use in the
Microdata syntax, ontologies must be specifically designed with pairs of properties to capture
reverse relationships creating additional problems for Web developers and ontologists alike.
Generally speaking, such additions and modifications run counter to the ontologists’
preferences, as they do not like adding extra complications to the ontology. However, such
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inverses can be important signals of directionality and intent. They currently advocate for using
alternate markup standards or the experimental @itemprop-reverse syntax, though there are
disagreements in the Microdata community about using syntax that is not a part of the official
specification. Not only do these affordances and constraints affect the development of
ontologies and the in-situ markup, but they also contribute to forms of semantic hegemony
whereby ontological states are applied to semantic data in the form of a single context file
and/or Web content is constrained to a single type despite having an indeterminate nature.
These types of semantic hegemony detailed above can include the two forces of ontological
over-determination and ontic occlusion outlined in earlier chapters.

5.2 RDFa
The Resource for Description Framework in Attributes (RDFa) is similar to Microdata in
that it is a markup syntax designed to convert a Web environment initially designed for human
consumption into one consumed by machines (Herman et al. 2015). Much like Microdata, RDFa
can be implemented in parallel with HTML scripts to provide structured semantic data to Web
content, only it does so with different sets of values to designate attributes. Schema.org
supports RDFa but only a limited version called RDFa Lite. This is due to the level of complexity
the RDFa Core standard has for developers, as it would run counter to the stated approach of
the Schema.org developers.
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Figure 7. RDFa Markup of a University Alumnus
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

<div vocab="http://schema.org/" typeof="Person">
<span property="name">Delia Derbyshire</span>
<link property="sameAs" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delia_Derbyshire"/>
<div property="alumniOf" typeof="OrganizationRole">
<div property="alumniOf" typeof="CollegeOrUniversity">
<span property="name">University of Cambridge</span>
<link property="sameAs" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Cambridge"/>
</div>
<span property="startDate">1959</span>
</div>

Source: Schema.org (2017e)
Figure 8. RDFa Markup of a Government Permit
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

<div vocab="http://schema.org/" typeof="GovernmentPermit">
<span property="name">NYC Food Service Establishment Permit</span>
<div property="issuedBy" typeof="GovernmentOrganization">
<span property="name">Department of Health and Mental Hygiene"</span>
</div>
<div property="issuedThrough" typeof="GovernmentService">
<span property="name">NYC Food Service Establishment Permit Service</span>
</div>
<div property="validIn" typeof="AdministrativeArea">
<span property="name">New York</span>
</div>
<time property="validFor" datetime="P1Y">1 year</time>
</div>

Source: Schema.org (2017d)
Figure 7. and Figure 8. show two examples of RDFa markup. Much like the Microdata
example in Figure 4., both RDFa examples begin by specifying the context from which each
object draws its information. Note that in both figures the markup draws on
“http://schema.org/” for this context. Figure 7. describes a type of person (Line 1) named “Delia
Derbyshire” (Line 2) who is the sameAs the person referenced in the Wikipedia entry at the
given URL (Line 3). This person is an alumniOf, which is defined as a type of organizaitonRole
(Line 4), with the specific designation that Delia is an alumniOf a specific form of organization
“CollegeOrUniversity” (Line 5) that has the specific name “University of Cambridge” (Line 6)
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which is the sameAs the referenced Wikipedia entry (Line 7). And finally, it specifies that Delia
was an alumnus of Cambridge in 1959 (Line 9).

Figure 9. RDFa Markup Using Multiple Ontologies
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

<p vocab="http://schema.org/" prefix="ov: http://open.vocab.org/terms/" resource="#manu"
typeof="Person">
My name is
<span property="name">Manu Sporny</span>
and you can give me a ring via
<span property="telephone">1-800-555-0199</span>.
<img property="image" src="http://manu.sporny.org/images/manu.png" />
My favorite animal is the <span property="ov:preferredAnimal">Liger</span>.
</p>

Source: Sporny (2015)
Interpreting this markup is a straight forward affair, but an important one to discuss
because of the underlying difference in the data model used by RDFa and Microdata. Microdata
creates semantic data by simply structuring information through attaching specific points of
relationships via reference to the Schema.org vocabulary. It does not use the RDF data model to
create semantic data. RDFa, on the other hand, is a specification of the RDF data model and
thus applies the full subject – object – predicate format to content. In doing so, RDFa provides a
direct format for linking data and supplying additional context in the form of referenceable
subjects, objects, and properties all with attendant relationship sets as defined by the
contextual ontology. In Figure 7., semantic data is created by supplying not only the set of
formal relationship as determined by Schema.org, but also by linking the content being marked
up with information found in the Wikipedia entries for Delia Derbyshire and the University of
Cambridge, each with a unique identifier. Recall that each component of the RDF data model
needs to be uniquely referenced by IRI or literal values. In this case the “name”, “sameAs”,
“organizationRole”, etc. predicates and objects are referenced implicitly by their associated IRIs
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within Schema.org – “http://schema.org/name” or “http://schema.org/GovernmentPermit“
(Figure 8.), but do not require the individual specification of the root namespace each time, as
Microdata does. One can specify context at the onset, and all of the following code will draw
from that specified root to determine context and set the boundaries of the meaning space.
Figure 9. makes a deviation from the models supposed this far (Figure 7. and Figure 8.) by
integrating a second ontology (Line 1). The interpretation is the same as the one from Figures 7.
and 8., but for the added caveat that predicates and objects that begin with the prefix “ov”
reference the Open Vocab ontology for their sets of relationships. This is a significant departure
from the Microdata specification, as it allows the RDFa syntax, and the Schema.org ontology to
enter into connections with other data assemblages, in this case the Open Vocab ontology.
When unspecified by a prefix, the parser reverts back to Schema.org in this case since it is predefined in the standard itself. In practice, this can become very complex as managing
compatibility and working across ontologies can lead to the issues discussed in earlier sections,
where types, classes, and definitions are treated or understood differently.
While compatible, RDFa is not built into the HTML5 specification as is Microdata. It
works in a far wider variety of languages and situated contexts, but it relies on a parser being
able to decode the RDF data model, not just HTML5. Additionally, since it is not directly
integrated into HTML, one of the most widely used Web standards, one can reasonably expect
that it will be less familiar to Web developers, as they would need some additional training in
building semantic Web architecture. Indeed, the data seem to indicate that developers are
more familiar with Microdata than RDFa. However, RDFa does not suffer from the same
problem with modeling reverse relationships and so does not constrain ontology development
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and use in the same way. Similarly, RDFa can support multiple types for a single object and so
some of the problems of semantic hegemony discussed above are mitigated with regards to
markup standards.

5.3 JSON-LD
Javascript Object Notation (JSON) is a lightweight and human readable syntax for
sending, receiving, and storing data on the Web. Since data transmission between servers and
browsers is limited to text only, JSON provides a compact means for transmission between
Javascript objects on the server and a browser which can then be embedded into HTML and
other formats and languages (W3C 2017). JSON-LD is a W3C linked data specification of the
JSON syntax. Being JSON based, JSON-LD can be parsed by any agent that reads the JSON
syntax, not strictly those that read HTML such as Microdata, or those that can parse the RDF
data model such as RDFa. Moreover, JSON-LD is more compact and easier to code than the
other two syntaxes. Rather than revising the HTML markup in Web content, JSON-LD markup
can be embedded into HTML or application environments as discrete objects making it easier
for content developers to adopt semantic technologies (Sporny et al. 2014). JSON-LD is also
developed openly, and so anyone with the inclination and ability to contribute to its
development and modification, can. However, that openness can result in its own set of
problems and complications. Furthermore, JSON-LD is a good mechanism for adding semantic
markup to content when the information environment and vocabulary is changing, as it is
relatively easy to update. However, there are limitations here that are discussed below.
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Figure 10. JSON-LD Markup of a Government Permit
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

<script type="application/ld+json">
{
"@context": "http://schema.org",
"@type": "GovernmentPermit",
"issuedBy": {
"@type": "GovernmentOrganization",
"name": "Department of Health and Mental Hygiene\""
},
"issuedThrough": {
"@type": "GovernmentService",
"name": "NYC Food Service Establishment Permit Service"
},
"name": "NYC Food Service Establishment Permit",
"validFor": "",
"validIn": {
"@type": "AdministrativeArea",
"name": "New York"
}
}
</script>

Source: Schema.org (2017d)
Figure 10. shows the same original markup from the Microdata example (Figure 6.) and
the RDFa example (Figure 8.), only in JSON-LD. Of immediate note is the parsimony in the actual
markup. This snippet of code would be embedded in a standard HTML document or other code
script, as offset by the specification of the script type and curled brackets (lines 1-2). As with
the other markup standards, we see that context is initially supplied by Schema.org (Line 3).
Furthermore, each ensuing part of the initial markup example is clearly and cleanly encoded by
the appropriate Schema.org types, classes, and properties. In JSON-LD the ampersand indicates
to a parser to deference the contextual IRI followed by the specific add-on in the ensuing
quotations. These code forms following each ampersand are digital objects that enact a sort of
protocological control that specifies and permits only certain expected values (Galloway 2004,
2006). The specified IRI is then used to establish the rest of the semantic string. For example,
"@type": "GovernmentOrganization", indicates that the agent should parse
“http://schema.org/GovernmentOrganization” to establish is subject, object, predicate relation
set. The “GovernmentOrganizaiton” subject, has the expected property, or predicate, “name”
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which expects a literal value, in this case “Department of Health and Mental Hygiene”. This
simulates the general RDF data model used in the semantic web, without actually being the
formal RDF model. Of note, however, is that one could add an additional property to the string
by adding the expected property, “URL”, with an appropriate value. This would effectively
create an RDF triple where each subject, object, and predicate was uniquely referenced by an
IRI. As we will see below, however, simply adding additional properties that deference IRIs, can
conflict with the context file and invalidate markup.

Figure 11. JSON-LD Markup Using Multiple Ontologies
1. [
2.
{
3.
"@context": "http://example.org/contexts/person.jsonld",
4.
"name": "Manu Sporny",
5.
"homepage": "http://manu.sporny.org/",
6.
"depiction": "http://twitter.com/account/profile_image/manusporny"
7.
},
8.
{
9.
"@context": "http://example.org/contexts/place.jsonld",
10.
"name": "The Empire State Building",
11.
"description": "The Empire State Building is a 102-story landmark in New York City.",
12.
"geo": {
13.
"latitude": "40.75",
14.
"longitude": "73.98"
15.
}
16.
}
17. ]

Source: Sporny (2014)
Like RDFa, JSON-LD is mobile and can also be used with multiple vocabularies. Figure 11.
shows an illustrative example where the context for “name”, “homepage”, and “depiction” are
supplied by the fictional IRI specified in the initial @context declaration (Lines 3-6). It shows a
second context used to supply “name”, “description”, “geo”, “latitude”, and “longitude” from
the second specified @context declaration (lines 9-14). This would likely be done to remedy
gaps in semantic coverage from the first contextual ontology. This ontology about “persons”,
would be unlikely to cover locations, their descriptions, or their geographic coordinates.
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Likewise, the second contextual vocabulary about place, would be unlikely to cover people and
their descriptions. Where semantic ontologies are very limited in scope this can be useful
strategy, made all the easier with JSON-LD, as it allows context to be defined local to the syntax
and from multiple namespaces. However, in this example, there are overlaps between the
“name” property. While in this fabricated example drawn from the W3C specification
document, “name” would not likely be defined in drastically different ways across the two
ontologies, it sets up a point of potential conflict in the markup strategy. For instance, “name”
in the place vocabulary, may specifically indicate that it is looking for the name of a location as
defined by a standards organization or it may expect an IRI or set of G.P.S. coordinates as a
value, not a simple text string. Moreover, recall that the @syntax, while a mechanism for
establishing IRI indication, is also a control protocol that establishes acceptable conditions.
These protocols must be in alignment with the expectations of each ontology separately and
each ontology combined for the multiple semantic data assemblages to successfully connect.
These differences can, and sometimes do, invalidate markup and create representations that
deviate from their modeled reality. In the JSON-LD specification, when item overlap occurs, the
parser defaults to a “last in” override. In this case, a parser would not use the context file from
“person” to define “name” (Lines 3-4), but would instead use the context file from “place” (Line
9) to define both “name” specifications (Lines 4 & 10). This means that a developer must
account for the full coverage, the structural relationships, expected values, and underlying
semantics of any ontology that they include in their markup. This complication increases in its
affect as ontologies consolidate, become broader based, and grow larger. Of further note, this
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context specification (Lines 3 & 9) can all occur on the same initial line, i.e. both person and
place context files could appear on line 3.
Of course, JSON-LD, while the preferred markup standard by Schema.org, contains
additional limitations that constrain the development and use of the vocabulary. Embedded
JSON objects add extra file size for each page, and this makes parsing it more computationally
expensive. This added expense can create performance problems for smaller and older
processors, or internet connections with lower bandwidth. This added expense is another
factor that can contribute to Schema.org’s de facto status as the standard semantic web
ontology. Not only is it easier to ensure semantic coherence when one is drawing on a single
vocabulary, but it is also less computationally expensive to only have to download one context
file each time a webpage is parsed.

5.4 Effects on Ontology Development
Schema.org’s ontologists must continuously grapple with the affordances and
constraints provided by the three markup standards. Moreover, they also must balance these
affordances and constraints against their approach to ontology development and their specific
data model. These conflicts and limitations most often rest in the background and do not visibly
affect development and use. However, sometimes, these affordances and constraints work
against their modus operendi, their applied data model, their ability to make the world
machine-readable, and ultimately their ability to construct a world of semantic data.
Until somewhat recently, Schema.org over-determined all service provision, operation,
production, and performance in explicitly commercial terms. Their way of representing the
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provision of services, goods, performances, and the production of creative works, among other
things, was to subsume these types under the seller property. As mentioned, this had the
unintended effect of capturing non-commercial activities under a commercial rubric, with all of
the attendant assumptions and properties that the seller property brings to those semantics. As
a solution, one of the steering group members proposed that they adapt the provider property
to cover non-commercial relations, notably, for this example was coverage for library holdings.
Problematically, this change would alter the inheritance paths for some other existing
properties and markup, as well as increasing the complexity of adopting the markup in further
use cases. Ultimately, the group settled on another steering group member’s suggestion that
they recycle the existing property makesOffer as a property type between the types person
and/or organization, redefining it as “a pointer to products or services offered by the
organization or person.”
There are three substantial issues that arise from this change. The first issue relates to
the application of the Schema.org data model and increased complexity, while the second issue
is a complication stemming from the first. Both of these two issues will be discussed in the next
chapter. The issue most relevant here, however, is in the directionality of the makesOffer
property. As a solution, makesOffer was an elegant way to resolve the initial problem, as the
ontologists only needed to encourage its use by developers and to modify the
recommendations and wording on the property’s page to fit the new use context. However,
makesOffer is unidirectional. A person or organization can make an offer of type offer of any
large number of types, products, services, etc. each with their own modifying terms and
properties. An agent might interpret this and display a list of associated services and functions
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but have no ability to see the inverse relationship unless an inverse were allowed or specifically
specified. This means that if an agent were to parse the thing offered, it would not be able to
traverse the relationship graph to determine that it was an offer and who or what was making
the offer. Potential use cases include severing the link between outpatient services and the
hospital that offers those services, as well as searching for a book title but not being able to
connect the search to the library in which the title was located, among many others, as this
property has between 10,000 and 50,000 use domains.
As discussed earlier, RDFa and JSON-LD both natively contain the ability to represent
inverse properties. This means that an agent can parse any content in any direction when that
content is marked up with either one of the two standards, providing that the agent can parse
those syntaxes. Microdata, on the other hand, does not include that ability. Microdata’s
inability to encode reverse properties comes with a good deal of consternation among the
ontologists, as two contributors note, “I'm all for reverse property mechanisms but as far as I'm
aware @itemprop-reverse isn't part of the html5 specs… [m]eaning microdata is left behind
with this solution” and “well, RDFa defines @rev and JSON-LD defines @reverse so it's really
only microdata hanging out there”. While some contributors echoed familiar refrains about
beginning the process of deprecating Microdata like, “and anyway, JSON-LD is the new king in
town. RDFa will retire and go to the Guggenheim Foundation for its abstract beauty and
Microdata to NASA's Houston Space Center for its practical impact”, others make note of its
seemingly unfortunate continued relevance to their work, despite its limitations. Microdata is
the most frequently used of the markup standards, a fact that some contributors point to as a
counter to deprecation noting, “[u]nfortunately, no matter how much we denigrate other
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serialization approaches, a significant proportion of the adopters of Schema.org are wedded to
Microdata” and “I should check with [name] or [name] before claiming Yandex is satisfied,
given the relatively high amount of microdata in [R]unet”.
Here, we can see the frustration that ontologists have over the constraints that markup
standards place on their work, in this particular case, Microdata. To resolve this issue,
ontologists had to break with their design principles and data model to create an additional and
separate reverse property, offeredBy. This same problem pervades much vocabulary
development where the ontologists are trying to model inverse relationships. Additionally, by
simplifying the markup to the Organization or Person -> makesOffer -> Offer -> itemOffered ->
Product pathway, they are creating added markup for Web developers that use Microdata. Not
only will Web developers need to add a separate property to model the inverse relationship,
they will also need to specify a new itemtype, “href”, and their associated unique IRIs since each
offer would now require the code to model the inverse as a separate feature of the markup.
The impact of this constraint is potentially severe, as the data indicates that not only is
Microdata the most common markup standard, but it also generates the most questions from
Web developers. In each case, they are confronted by three options. They can create an
additional property, breaking with their stated desire for simplicity and parsimony. They can
refer Web developers to alternate markup standards, a complication discussed later.
Alternatively, they can refer users to the experimental @itemprop-reverse syntax.
This last option deserves additional discussion. Recently, advice has been to use the
experimental syntax, rather than encoding reverse properties in the ontology. This
experimental syntax is not a part of the official specification and thus sees more limited use
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across the Web. Presented with the continual problem of encoding reverse relationships in
markup, some of Schema.org’s ontologists worked through the limitation and enacted an
unofficial change in the markup standard to suit the designs of the ontology. If and when this
syntactical change occurs at the official level, the already developed reverse properties will
eventually be deprecated, invalidating existing markup. While this change would be in the best
interests of both users and ontologists alike, it is a complication for enacting machine
readability. It also makes a questionable assumption that Web developers keep up with the
latest Microdata specifications.
Another major issue mentioned to earlier, is that Microdata does not allow for multiple
types for a single object where that object exists across ontologies or when property use is not
the same for each type in the multiple type entity. This adds a major constraint to both
ontologists and Web developers alike, ultimately leading to both ontological overdetermination and ontic occlusion. For example, in Schema.org, many classes are listed as
subclasses of product – any class that could be viewed as a product to be offered, sold,
performed – even though they may also be represented in non-product contexts. This limitation
is significant because the inheritances, expected types, properties, and values of the product
class do not include the same ones relevant to other classes and will cause validation issues
when the expected classes, which are not applicable or available in a non-product context, are
not satisfied. That is, the real-world characteristics of non-products are not necessarily the
same as those of products, and cannot legitimately be coerced to be so in the markup. In one
broadly applicable and often cited issue relating to the problem of commercial over-
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determination and multiple types, the Schema.org ontologists indicated the following needed
changes to completely address the issue:
•

We must establish it as a standard that products are multi-typed entities in
examples etc.

•
•
•

All major consumers of schema.org markup can process multi-typed entities.
Move all subtypes of Product up to Thing or a branch thereof.
Move up all properties of Product that are not tied to the Product role up to that
subtype(s) of Thing (e.g. weight).
Update descriptions and examples.

•

This solution requires that the ontologists move all of the subtypes and properties of Product to
the level of Thing. This seemingly simple solution is actually a fundamental reorganization of
the way that the ontology is ordered. The Thing class is the root level of the ontology, it is the
most basic class with the most basic set of types and properties. All artifacts in the ontology
inherit the types and properties of the Thing class. Moving these product subtypes to this level
would not only invalidate a large amount of existing markup, but it would also either overdetermine content as a product and in the Microdata contexts, occlude all other possible types,
or require that all subtypes contain the same set of product related properties, even in nonproduct contexts. Unsurprisingly this potential solution to the multiple types problem was met
with resistance and lament for Microdata’s continuous effect on development, with some
finding “it very unfortunate that we seem to keep struggling with limitations of Microdata.” In
this example, markup standards are directly inhibiting the ability to semantically encode
information. Using the Microdata standard, one is left with the options of over-determining
content as a product, thus occluding other more accurate data or not creating semantic
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content, and where all search is now semantic search, this creates an entirely new set of
problems for a Web developer.
There are times where seemingly small constraints imposed by markup standards have
major reverberations throughout ontology development. In one issue, a steering group
member noted a general guidance problem with respect to encoding languages in markup. The
problem is that, in some cases, guidance directed users to use the formal language and in
others informal abbreviations, a problem complicated by the diverse understanding of language
that Schema.org needs to attend to (addressed in the next chapter). Another steering group
member made the following proposal:
To be frank, I think the handling of language information was much better in the strict
RDF worlds where any plain literal could have a language tag, so it was straight forward
to represent alternative texts for the same property depending on the language. Of all
relevant syntaxes for schema.org, only Microdata lacks this feature AFAIK. Why don't we
simply recommend RDFa or JSON-LD for use-cases that require language meta-data?
That seems much better to me that introducing a mechanism at the level of the
vocabulary.
Here, this member notes the limitations of the Microdata standard in adding meta tags to tell
the parser what language a given set of content is in. Rather than hard coding complexity and,
perhaps more importantly, constraints into the ontology, this member proposes that the
ontologists shift the responsibility for language tagging to the users. For this particular
suggestion, that responsibility shift is substantial. The data indicates that using semantic
markup is challenging and fraught with confusion. While selection bias and other issues of
representation in the data do not allow me to generalize, certain standards seem to be more
confusing than others. The challenges of markup, and drawing on semantic ontologies in
general, are often noted in the data for reasons of understanding the underlying application of
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the RDF data model, the depth of class-type-property hierarchies, differences in expected
values, and the affordances and constraints imposed by markup standards. So, a suggestion for
a shift in responsibility to the user is an uncommon occurrence, one that actually goes against
Schema.org’s collective development philosophy of making the ontology as simple as possible
for Web developers. Moreover, suggesting that in particular use cases, users work around the
problem and adopt different markup standards in different use cases is problematic.
Technically speaking, there is nothing the prohibits a developer from using all of the
syntaxes on the same page or even to describe the same thing. However, differences and the
cross-compatibility issues described earlier, mean that there will likely be information loss or
confusion on the part of whatever parser is looking at the markup. This is particularly the case if
one were to use multiple syntaxes to mark a single piece of content. In fact, both Google and
Microsoft’s documentation for building semantic data into a webpage is very clear about this
(Bing 2017; Google 2017). Moreover, the added time, knowledge requirements, and complexity
means that the likelihood of error is increased and the ability of a given computational agent to
parse the content is reduced. So, assuming that one needs to mark their content, in this
example the constraints imposed by Microdata make it so that one either shifts their usage
patterns, which is difficult and time-consuming or adopt a second standard, which can create
compatibility issues and information loss. Alternatively, the ontologists can restructure the
ontology around the combined affordances of the standards or operate with those known
restrictions. I find that the ontologists most often either try to negotiate with those restrictions
by either developing around the constraints and allowing generalized and bricolage type
approaches to markup, or by allowing the issue to persist pending further work.
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In this particular case, the constrains imposed by Microdata opened up further issues
relating to the encoding languages. As one steering group member notes,
[Y]ou're missing the leading use case for the Language type: the many other contexts in
which it is useful to mention and name languages, beyond annotation of sections of
textual markup. For examples see the incoming properties section at bottom
of http://schema.org/Language:
• http://schema.org/availableLanguage (of a ServiceChannel, ContactPoint)
• http://schema.org/inLanguage (of a CreativeWork, Event, etc.)
• http://schema.org/programmingLanguage (on SoftwareSourceCode)
• http://schema.org/subtitleLanguage (Movie, ScreeningEvent, TVEpisode)
In all these cases we might have an informal name for a language, or (for human
languages) a code from https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp47 or perhaps a Wikipedia
link.
While using different markup standards to encode language metadata will solve the original
issue, this member is noting that the suggestion to simply advise users to use alternate markup
standards does not fully solve the problems of language. They point to the leading use case of
language markup as being relevant to a wide subset of different usage domains, not simply
marking the natural human language of a given set of content. Here, it is evident that language
markup can refer to that language used on a webpage, that language a service or content is
available in, the language used in a creative work or event, the computer language used in a
piece of software, or the language used or available for subtitles, among other language uses
that are in development.
While many of these differences can be resolved by specifying best practices and
clarifying guidance, some cannot. One member summarizes the issue thusly,
Regarding programmingLanguage, which has as its expected type Language, I believe
this is an awkward conflation of "language" in the conventional sense of "conventional
human languages" with computer programming "language", "a system of signs for
encoding and decoding information". They're clearly quite different things, which is why
one won't find C++ in BCP 47… IMO the expected type for programmingLanguage
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should not be Language, but Text. (Absent, say, an enumerated value or code for
programmingLanguage - but the former is unwieldy and has extensibility issues, and for
the latter no standard, AFAIK, exists. This is not the case for human languages, which are
unlikely to be extended and are supported by standards like BCP 47).
This member is drawing attention to the fact that programmingLanguage expects a language
type as allowed by the adopted standard, which is a problem where the ontology expects a link
to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) BCP 47 standard in order to be compliant. As the
community member notes, C++ and other computer languages are not included in natural
language standards like IETF BCP 47. Relatedly encoding programming language either
overcodes differences in things like HTML which are not really considered programming
languages, but rather a representational script, or omits them from the ontology altogether. At
the moment those pseudo-computer languages are omitted from markup coverage due to the
complexity of modeling the distinguishing between representational script and programming
languages. Here such differences are occluded.
The problems ontologists and Web developers encounter are not limited to Microdata,
as another limitation to resolving this issue is that JSON-LD does not permit language to be
declared by an IRI, as would be common practice in semantic web markup. Instead, JSON-LD’s
@language specification expects text only. This means that the @language type could not be
meaningfully used for something like computer language or programming language as declared
in the Schema.org ontology, as those are links to both ontology contexts, and to specific use
cases. This also means that language for JSON-LD has limited machine understanding since a
parser cannot use JSON-LD markup to point to a relevant or equivalent case as defined by an
IRI. In the Schema.org context, the @language feature of the JSON-LD specification prohibits
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translating the variety of languages in a way that is machine-readable if one is trying to declare
a language specification.
To negotiate these limitations, ontologists created a new language type called
computerLanguage, updated the language term in the ontology to note that former uses may
have included programmingLanguage (in effect requiring old markup to be corrected), updated
the programmingLanguage to expect both the new computerLanguage link and text strings (to
account for JSON-LD’s limitations), and added the IETF BCP 47 standard to the expected natural
language types with the added property value alternateName to include deviations from the
IETF BCP 47 standard. This works around the limitation by creating a new type to avoid the
association of parsed language in use, indicated by @language, and language used by marked
content. Some of these changes are significant in that using markup to indicate text strings is
not creating semantic data. It merely creates a structured presentation mechanism for a parser.
The computational agent has no understanding or reference for that content.
While many semantic web standards allow for the bricolage of different vocabularies,
they have trouble when terms overlap. As mentioned earlier, in JSON-LD you can supply
multiple namespaces for vocabulary context. However, it uses a “last in, first out” method of
handing cases of term overlap. This means that if a publisher were to mark content with the
specific semantics of the first namespace and other content with the second if that second
namespace contained the type or property used to mark the instance from the first namespace,
it would overwrite the markup that was originally declared using the first namespace. This
would happen regardless of the semantic differences between uses in the two vocabularies.
While in some instances, this is a non-issue, in other cases this might result in more serious
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problems. In either case, however, the standard puts the interoperability between ontologies at
risk, and thus endangers a major feature of the semantic web. It also risks reducing the
semantic coherence between a user’s intent and computational agent’s interpretation. The risk
is furthered where deep understandings of JSON-LD are missing, and/or sophisticated
knowledge of the various ontologies is lacking. While the data is likely to have some bias
towards misunderstanding, given that those who understand are less likely to ask questions,
queries about markup standards and ontology details are commonplace, and the ontologists
frequently discuss the problems that the complexity of ontologies and markup standards bring
to their proper use. Data also indicates that in many cases, even sophisticated core community
members have trouble understanding proper class type usage and inheritance paths.
While the standards implicated here, particularly RDFa and JSON-LD, are linked data
standards, their specific implementations and promotions through Schema.org obscure that
ability. My investigation revealed almost no mention of linking to other ontologies, no examples
of best practices for interlinking, or in the advice to that effect on the community board. The
main exceptions were when linking to directly associated extensions. This includes the various
internally developed and hosted extensions, the externally hosted, but compatible GS1
extension, which was developed with input from the Schema.org community. The other
exception was when linking to the Wikidata database, which is externally hosted and developed
but is in the process of being mapped for cross compatibility with Schema.org.
It is important to note at point that this is not attributing any form of intent on the part
of the ontologists or their associated organizations, but that certain unintended consequences
can emerge from the limitations these markup standards contain especially when those
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standards are used across large scale ontologies that are likely to have a large amount of
overlapping coverage. One consequence for users is that one can either stay strictly within the
approved Schema.org universe or manage the potential complexity and incompatibility of
multiple vocabularies. This also means that ontologists looking to extend or map their existing
vocabularies to Schema.org need to do so nearly exactly. Furthermore, any of these
compatibility mappings need to harmonize across external extensions, internal extensions, and
the core vocabulary. This all makes creating and using ontologies very difficult and in many
ways, counter to the original aims of the semantic web (Berners-Lee at al. 2001).
Recall that markup standards either directly deference an IRI for each individual subject,
object, and predicate, or set an initial context(s) through which they establish the definition of
terms, properties, and relationships. Particularly for JSON-LD, that means that all context needs
to be supplied in each case, or available from a publicly hosted server requiring that any
ontology have the ability to host a file in a way that can sustain potentially significant levels of
Web traffic, as each time a piece of markup was parsed, the computational agent would
request the hosting page. Indeed, this was an early concern among some of the Schema.org
developers while JSON-LD was being created. As it stands now, Schema.org does host a context
document. This context file also includes the entire range of other vocabularies that have
compatibility with Schema.org. This effectively gives Web developers two choices: provide IRIs
for each context file, dealing with the added complexity and room for error that such an
approach entails, or use Schema.org’s context file and associated vocabularies. This can have
the unintended effect of implicitly forcing the semantic web community of users to abandon
the more complicated, but potentially more expressive, and diverse set of ontologies in favor of
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a smaller set that have become a de facto standard. This also has the effect of forcing
ontologists to contribute to Schema.org’s set of ontologies, develop their own in accordance
with Schema.org’s extension guidelines, or risk disuse and conflict with one of the most widely
used and supported platforms. As the de facto semantic web standard, their choices become
everyone’s choices providing that a Web or application developer wants search engine
exposure or the ability to parse the largest set of semantic data. As one community member
put it “for me and my coworkers, Schema.org is the semantic web.”
Ontologists and developers alike use validation tools to ensure that their markup
conforms to the dictates of the relevant standards and will be legible to content consumers.
Problematically, however, these validation tools can come to disagreements in how they parse
content. This issue is most relevant to JSON-LD markup. The underlying problem is not
specifically a problem of the standard, the parser, or the ontology, but emerges from the
interaction of the three. The parser downloads and interprets the relevant context file at the
first stage of the JSON-LD syntax. From there it uses the context file to interpret the terms,
objects, and values given by the JSON-LD markup. These items are the ones in the syntax with
ampersands preceding them. They indicate to the parser what to expect as an input based on
the dictates of both the context file, which dereferences the ontology, and the syntax rules of
JSON-LD. A steering group member explains one problem as such,
Currently the context file… has this: "namedPosition": { "@type": "@id" } ... because an
URL is a possible value. However, text is also a possible value, and currently more likely.
The problem is that the JSON-LD context forces the property value to be interpreted as
a (possible relative) URI reference, hence in http://json-ld.org/playground/ the value
shows up relative to the site the data's on: We could over-ride this, e.g. using:
"namedPosition": { "@value": "Quarterback" } Or we could change the context for this
property (and others?), so that literal values are the default. But then we'd need to use
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(something like) this notation for controlled values: "namedPosition": { "@id":
"http://sport-vocabs.example.org/Quarterback" }
This steering group member is explaining that in the context file for the given property (there
are many more affected than indicated in this excerpt), the @type tag is expecting an IRI
preceded by the @id tag. In JSON-LD, the @id in @type objects must always be an IRI or a term
from the ontology that is implicitly expanded to an IRI via the function of the ampersand in
JSON-LD syntax. However, to create maximal coverage, Schema.org allows many properties to
expect both IRIs and text. Problematically, neither the context file nor the @id tag permits text
strings for these properties. As this member mentions, the group could change the context file
so that the default expectation is @value rather than @id so as to indicate that a parser should
expect a text string as opposed to an IRI. However, to keep the value as semantic data, users
would have to add additional separate notation to point to a specific IRI. Currently, this issue is
still unresolved because the two solutions presented above create different additional
complications. First, overriding the context file is both unintuitive and creates complicated
added markup for developers. Second, these specific overrides fail validation on two of the
three primary validation tools, notably the widely used Google Structured Data Testing Tool
(SDTT). This means that not only will Web developers be unable to see if their markup actually
works, but also they will be told by the SDTT that it is not compliant for Google’s parsers. Third,
by changing the context file, ontologists potentially invalidate markup that already uses IRIs
instead of text strings. This data would then be lost until Web developers recoded their
content. At present, the current guidance is to override the context file by being specific about
both @value and @id where applicable.
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This issue is significant because it shows how markup standards interact with other
components of the data assemblage to enact data in specific ways. Ontologists develop
ontologies in specific ways that categorize and classify the world and its relationships to create
semantic data. This involves complex negotiations with how and why to represent things. These
decisions are bound by the affordances and constraints of the markup standards adopted.
These standards impose constraints on the ways the data assemblage can be enacted, but they
do not do so absolutely. The ontologists and Web developers negotiate these affordances and
constraints to both work around, through, and with the markup standards. Problematically,
these negotiations occur within other contexts, levels of expertise, and means for validation
that bear upon data creation.

5.7 Conclusion
This chapter detailed the general ways that markup standards shape the development
and use of the semantic web and the specific ways that they condition Schema.org and its use.
Enacting semantic translations is not just a matter of classification. Classification work tells us
that representation necessarily leads to forms of over-determination and occlusion
complexities are blunted and marginal cases are made to fit into the classification schema at
hand. Schema.org and semantic ontologies are no exception here. The process of translation
from human to machine is also one of translating through code standards. At times markup
standards block these translations as they prohibit certain directionality, plurality, and
representational forms among other things. The Web content to be encoded may be of a
certain static type, but ultimately, the particular markup standard that one deploys is actually

126

what calls the semantic data into existence, and it does so in potentially different ways as it
translates between the work of ontologists, Web developers, and computational agents. At
times the standards force ontologists to cater to their constraints, while in other times
ontologists and users both, create work arounds where they avoid direct engagement with the
standard and those constraints. Sometimes this means that they deploy a different standard to
account for one’s limiting features. In others, they adjust their approach to modeling and
encoding content to better match the dictates of the standard. However, these actors also work
with and through these markup standards, engaging directly with the standard itself. They work
with the standard by accepting its limitations and making subtler modifications to their practice
to enable other parts of the markup standard to function in ways other than the standard’s and
ontology’s original intent. Here there the negotiation with standards is one of strategic
compromise where the affordances and constraints of practices and standards shift to enact
the translation. However, at times practitioners work through the standards, changing the
standard to fit the needs of practice, even if in unofficial, or not yet sanctioned ways.
The resulting situated markup for a given part of the environment will potentially differ
in both form and function for different markup standards depending on the content to be
encoded and the way affordances and constraints are handled. This has an effect such that the
specific ways that ontologies and standards are adapted to fit their respective allowances and
prohibitions can result in the differential enactment of semantic web assemblages and the
semantic data the enable. This is especially the case as ontologies grow in scope and size and
themselves take on the role of a standard (Waller 2016).
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In addition to affirming past work attesting to standards’ jussive power, this chapter
begins to address the lacuna in the literature on standards by showing the ways that these
standards sometimes work against the very stability and interoperability that they are
supposed to enable. Furthermore, I situated the standards in the communities of practice that
negotiate those restrictions, showing that contrary to the divergent claims of prior work,
practitioners work around, with, and through standards to negotiate their failings (Halpin 2016;
Whooley 2010, 2014; Whooley and Horwitz 2013). However, I conclude that most often
practitioners worked with and through the markup standards. Here that took the form of
adapting the ontology to better accommodate the strategic use of the standard, overriding
context files, or deploying markup in ways that over-determines contextual content. These
practitioners negotiate the limitations of different standards differently depending on the
standard implicated, the possibility of affecting large amounts of markup, the complexity of the
solution for the ontology, and the added complication of a fix for users. Lastly, I detailed some
of the unintended consequences of those negotiations and how they can serve to overdetermine and occlude certain understandings of the world.
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6. Practices, Rationalities, and Communities
As noted earlier, the shapes that data assemblages take are dependent on the
interactions between the assemblage’s components. Thus, the study of semantic data must
necessarily engage with the questions relating to processes of creation and the interactions
between the various components. Here I am concerned with the specific apparatuses that
include, systems of thought, practices, and communities that work together to enact the
ontology (Kitchin 2014b; Lynch 2013; Woolgar and Lezuan 2013, 2015; Sismondo 2015). Within
these apparatuses are the conceptual models, rationalities, techniques, conventions, and the
communities involved in applying those systems of thinking and forms of practice to the
process of human-machine translation (Kitchin 2014b:25). As such, this chapter examines the
interactions between those various elements of the Schema.org data assemblage. In this
section I concentrate on the two main communities of practice relevant to Schema.org and the
design philosophies, habits of logic, and rationales they deploy. These two groups are the
ontologists charged with the vocabulary’s creation and maintenance, and the Web developers
who deploy the vocabulary to convert their content into semantic data. This examination will
reveal the ways that Schema.org ontologists adapt the RDF data model to their specific needs,
their underlying philosophical approach to modeling semantic data, the problems they
encounter in doing so, and the consequences of the ways in which they negotiate those
problems. Additionally, it will show how interactions with the user base affect those issues and
negotiations.
This chapter contributes to gaps that exist in our understanding of AI systems. I fill the
gap left by past work that ignores translations between humans and machines in its focus on
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the translation between different experts, and the interpretations of machine output by users
(Agre 1995; Collins 1990; Forsythe 1993; Ribes and Bowker 2009; Suchman 1987). Rather than
seeing knowledge as something easily extracted or converted to machine understanding, the
Schema.org ontologists recognize the difficulty their task. While the knowledge engineers in
past work see the problem as simply one of managing human description errors and extracting
the “correct” knowledge, these ontologists see the problem as a matter of pragmatics. They
understand that they are choosing the terms and relations, and understand that a trade-off
between precision and practicality is usually inevitable. Thus their approach to development
reflects their interpretations of the state of users, consumers, the state of the Web, and the
current state of the ontology.
In line with past work in assemblage theory (Delanda 2006; Deleuze and Guattari 1987;
Galloway 2012; McCarthy 2017), I find that as attempts to capture meaning are increased and
their complexities more accurately mapped, those attempts only ever create more complexity.
Thus, development and use of Schema.org occurs at high levels of granularity, making those
additional complexities largely invisible. I will argue that their pragmatic, generalized, and
a/contextual approach to development can lead to problems of path dependence and
indeterminacy. While, these approaches are not empirically distinct, their analytic distinction
helps to show the way each contributes to the problems listed. Furthermore, I argue that the
specific ways the ontologists and users navigate these problems can have unintended
consequences that stem from issues of complexity and imprecision. Lastly, I argue, that this
tension between precision and practical deployment is largely unresolvable, as it either overdetermines a domain area or offers little in the way of coverage.
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6.1 The Community
The Schema.org project is overwhelmingly dominated by a limited number of
individuals, companies, and other organizations. However, Schema.org is openly available to
anyone able and willing to contribute or that has cause to use its markup in creating semantic
data. It is also worth noting that despite this central dominating cluster, modifications to the
ontology have originated and continue to originate from marginal collaborators, and that
Schema.org’s explicit operating principle is to make contributions, changes, and extensions as
simple and as free as possible. While the evidence is in line with other work that suggests
perceived prestige and meritocracy serve as the differentiators of soft organizational power,
contributions by competent and able community members are welcomed (Coleman 2004;
Halupka and Star 2011). Steering group members often encourage users and members with
proposals to establish working groups to expand the ontology’s reach and scope. While, the
project is shepherded by the steering group, which ultimately decides courses of action, their
communications and directions are largely transparent. Additionally, it is the general practice of
steering group members to establish rough community consensus on additions, changes, and
other courses of action20. Furthermore, while debate and disagreement are common,
particularly on complicated issues, the general timbre of discussion is professional and collegial.
Moreover, despite the large differences in understanding and mastery of both the semantic
web and Schema.org, those community members who are more knowledgeable and
experienced are polite and helpful to those who are less well informed.

20

Rough consensus here means that they informally poll the people involved or working on a
specific issue. Involvement can range from two to fifteen participants and agreement is
denoted by a +1 or a “thumbs up” emoji.
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6.2 Pragmatism
The Schema.org ontologists take a pragmatic approach to development and they
encourage a pragmatic approach to use. Developers and users alike opt for what works over
what could work best. For the ontologists, this means grounding their development in existing
use cases and empirical evaluation of their environment – the Web. For users, this means
mimicking examples found on Schema.org’s main website, Stack Overflow21, and examples of
other similar from the community message boards, despite perhaps not being perfectly
accurate semantics. There are many moments in the development process where a community
member, or a potential user initiates a proposal to cover a domain, specify an existing one, or
clarify an area with vague or ambiguous semantics, only to face a question from steering group
members, or other central contributors, regarding potential or already existing use cases. This
is not in and of itself surprising since, as a commercial product, it makes sense to have work
flow decisions be guided by such practical considerations. However, the value of practicality
and the benefits that pragmatism in decision making have are not necessarily evenly distributed
among the potential actors involved or affected by those decisions, as smaller proposals backed
by the sponsor companies are adopted with little disagreement.
A somewhat recent example is with the claimsReview addition. Recently, Google, as well
as a small collection of fact checking sites, wanted to add a way for their checked content to
automatically appear in Google’s news aggregator next to relevant articles. To do so, it had

21

Stack Overflow is a question and answer forum for programmers to ask for and give coding
advice.
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Schema.org ontologists create the claimsReview class with which a fact checking site, or other
content provider, can use to encode their content to say that they are reviewing a given a
claim, by a given article or outlet, all with the attendant semantic markup for Google news to
interpret. Google has its own undisclosed mechanisms for determining the improper use of the
claimsReview markup, but its existence feasibly opens up complications that come along with
automatically presenting anything claiming to be a fact check and the publicly uncertain means
to verify and police improper use. This addition to the ontology was included for release despite
having fewer than ten use domains, and without any real discussion. However, it was
introduced to the community in the same way as all issues are entered into the project. With
Google’s support for the proposal It is not surprising that the there was little push back. I see
that as relatively unproblematic, but it does mean that things of alternate interest and long tail
domains don’t receive the attention that they could, or perhaps should. There is a limited
number of people involved with the actual work in Schema.org, and a smaller number still with
the sophistication to complete the growing workload. When those people are overburdened as
they currently attest to being, they are not likely to have the time, energy, or inclination to do
extra work to cover domains that may have only small numbers of actual uses.
In most cases the concerns of covering use cases weighs heavily on decision making. The
data are rife with examples and instances where core community members question requests
for coverage and/or new proposals. One member asks, “are you aware of publishers who are
putting relevant structured information into HTML sites already that would be candidates for
adoption? Or that are doing other kinds of Web-based data sharing?” and in a separate case,
“are there tools looking for religious events specifically to justify this addition?” In each excerpt,
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this core member is inquiring about the potential demand for two different vocabulary addition
issues. These particular cases were formal proposals made on GitHub. However, the most
common place where use is questioned is on the W3C message boards, where proposals are
most often less well developed than they tend to be on GitHub. Members have similar
questions in this forum, such as, “I know of a lot of useful things we could do with the
information. The question is whether there is someone who is going to do something, because
until that point I am reluctant to support adding the terms” and “But before we get too far,
what is the actual use case for this data? Who is going to process it and present it?” In many
cases these fledgling proposals are just simple requests for coverage and are informally vetted
before reaching the GitHub stage. This vetting process is not required to introduce a proposal
to GitHub, but is instead a less visible means for participating. To paraphrase a conversation I
had with a steering group member, the GitHub repository is akin to the main stage and many
community members have expressed anxiety about participating at that level of visibility.
Use case driven pragmatism does not just concern new creation. Schema.org is a form
of living document, as term definitions and expected values change overtime as novel
applications of the existing vocabulary are introduced by the community of users or uncovered
by the ontologists. Many frequent changes are of the following nature,
A common change is for a property to be marked as applicable to some previously
unrelated type, or to expect to take values of a new type. When this happens the textual
definitions are often adjusted slightly too. This is either by listing the new types
explicitly, or through the use of a more general term like "item", "entity" or "thing".
Schema.org’s ontologists reflect on usage and adjust the ontology in a way the seeks to avoid
adding constraints. The steering group, as representative of the project itself, does not want to
“define or dictate… and notion of ‘mandatory’ property”. The ontologists expect that users will
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have different amounts of available information to encode and that those amounts or types
cannot be determined a priori. They also know that the needs and abilities of consuming
services vary. This means that they attempt to satisfy the broadest possible set of users and
consumers, as their driving goal is creating coverage. The practical implications are that when
they see or hear of a use driven result that they were initially unaware of, they implement it if it
is easy, compatible, and does not invalidate markup. Also, it means that they operate under the
assumption that some markup is better than no markup. Regarding this last point, the
ontologists reflexively adapt guidance on the vocabulary to be more inclusive in order to
accommodate less detailed or less sophisticated usage. This was particularly evident in the
ability of the listItem and recipe types to both include any things that have steps and any things
that have both ingredients (broadly construed) and steps, respectively. While the property
values of these types would coerce a “how to”, or instructional, guide’s semantics, particularly
in a non-culinary context, simply omitting property markup would allow the steps to be
displayed, only absent the rich descriptive detail enabled by properties that allow for formally
correct semantics and cross instance mapping.
This use driven approach often even supersedes precision in content markup. In one
example, discussed in greater detail below, the community debated the most appropriate way
to code recurrence into the vocabulary. One of the steering group members, who is often
reluctant to add precision for precision’s sake, makes the following argument,
I agree that we might need to improve the wording for schema:Event, but I hesitate to
add a new type for this. I would not fight against EventSeries, but I do not see any actual
benefit for neither publishers nor consumers of data. In the end, what matters is not
whether you can disambiguate a concept by a philosophical analysis but whether the
distinction brings any benefits for automated data processing.
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The basic argument, which is often repeated in cases where the drives for complexity,
precision, and practicality conflict, is that if an instance can be modeled by drawing on other
parts of the existing vocabulary, in this case date specification, then a computational agent
does not need to understand that the instance is of a certain different type. This is especially
the case, where the agent is only required to represent the instance according to generalized
context. Here, that means showing an event series as an event that occurs at different times.
However, as I discuss below, that over-determines a Web developer or consumer’s intent, and
the underlying state of the instance.
The data indicate that the drive for semantic precision most often prevails when
simplicity and practicality agree with it. This agreement in most commonly found where
proposals are small, clear, less detailed, and introduce novel and/or superficial coverage to the
vocabulary. A noted example was when the community added Exhibition to the vocabulary and
then further marked the distinction between exhibition as creativeWork and exhibition as
event. In this example there was consensus about ease of use, ease of implementation, and
semantic accuracy. Thus, there was alignment between the forces that push increased
precision, coverage, and ease of use (McCarthy 2017). Though this is not exclusively the case, as
major semantic gaps prompt majority agreement for the need to modify or complicate the
ontology, especially where modification is use driven. However, as with the recurring events
case above, those issues that are subject to significant levels of debate are often longer term
problems and remain complicated and unresolved as the community weighs the impact across
other sections of the vocabulary.

136

Breakdown in semantic accuracy occurs when specifications are made to existing
domains or when new domain proposals involve a high degree of semantic complexity. As one
member remarks about a proposal for integrating legal decisions and terminology,
The problem is that internationally there are SO many different vocabularies—I'm not
just talking about language differences, I'm talking about the way legal concepts are
referred to and thought of in different jurisdictions. Not to mention at all levels from
international… to national to regional (state, province) to municipal and other local
levels. So trying to include all those existing vocabularies is not only monumental but
probably unworkable. In a situation like this it is actually more helpful to… come up with
high level generic terms to which individual vocabularies can be mapped.
In this example, semantic complexity is simply too great to manage, let alone integrate in a way
that developers could easily use. The trade-off in this case was a proposal to use generic legal
terms, but even those terms ran into semantic difficulties because they were based on the U.S.
legal system and were not sensitive to the differences in other local regional, and global legal
systems. This follows the pragmatic approach described in one member’s explanation as to why
Schema.org does not code detailed data provenance information into its vocabulary, “the world
is too rich, complex and interesting for a single schema to describe fully on its own. With
schema.org we aim to find a balance, by providing a core schema that covers lots of situations,
alongside extension mechanisms for extra detail.”
Thus, my data suggests the opposite of the work by Agre (1995), Collins (1990), and
Forsythe (1993). Rather than seeing knowledge as something easily extracted or converted to
machine understanding, the Schema.org ontologists recognize the difficulty of such a task.
While social scientists see the problem as intractable, and knowledge engineers see the
problem as simply one of managing human description errors, these ontologists see the
problem as a matter of pragmatism. They understand that they are choosing the terms and
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relations, and understand that there is a measure of “semantic violence” that occurs (Agre
1995). However, they are tasked with implementing the semantic web, and so they prefer to
approach modeling in a way that is based on empirical use and compatibility, unlike Forsythe’s
(1993) knowledge engineers. If a declared term or relationship causes little disturbance and
resonates with the existing set of terms and relationships, they tend to accept that it is a good
declaration. They do not, however, see themselves as building worlds, but rather representing
them. They resolutely believe that they can approach an adequate representation of the world
though discussion and consensus. As one steering group member put it,
The problem that any knowledge representation system has is fully describing its system
so that all users across all cultures and languages will understand it and have the
capacity to expand upon that system while maintaining agreement across all cultures
and languages. 'Negotiating the limits' often times just means that folks have to simply
"talk it out", in email, GitHub issues, or meetups, until a consensus is formed.
6.3 Generalizability
Related to their pragmatic approach the Schema.org ontologists prefer to adopt a
generalized application of the RDF model. This is in some ways inseparable from the use case
driven approach and is arguably an improvement over the patchwork open approach of the pre
Schema.org semantic web, at least in terms of operating at Web scale. Simply put, if the
ontology is too complex, either no one will use it or they will use it incorrectly. A survey from
one of the pioneering members of Schema.org, and the semantic web more generally, found
that nearly 60% of all semantic markup on the Web was incorrect (Guha 2014). This leads
Schema.org’s ontologists to advocate for restraint when it comes to adding to the existing
vocabulary. Among many other places, this approach is evident in the long standing debates
surrounding recurrence. In these debates, the fundamental issue for data modeling is whether
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to materialize facts individually or encode decision rules into the vocabulary. This dilemma
reflects two opposing positions within the Schema.org community. The debate revolves around
forcing users to mark their content for each possible occurrence in each possible place, or allow
for a recurrence rule that defines a repeating pattern of events, times, or definitions.
This debate exposed two different but related debates about recurrence. The first has to
do with repeating dates, while the second has to do with recurring events. Adding markup for
repeating dates would be broadly applicable across Schema.org. One steering group member
notes,
Recurring dates will be relevant for many branches of schema.org, namely for opening
hours, but also offer validity and prices specifications, so I prefer a generic solution.
Once we have this, there is IMO no need for a specific mechanism for recurring events,
because we can simply use the recurring dates mechanism to specify the dates of the
event
The member is arguing for a generalized approach to recurrence so that the underlying
grammar of the ontology can model across contexts. At issue is that Schema.org has no ability
to model change. While mutable, the world that Schema.org creates is not dynamic. That is,
pursuant to the materialization approach, a user would need to encode all parts of a process in
which change or differing states occurred individually as discrete artifacts. Working from the
preceding excerpt, hours would need to be specified for each individual day with each
exception marked at every instance. For offer and price validity, all fluctuations and price
differences would likewise need to be changed manually at each instance depending on the
markup syntax in use. Since prices are often generated algorithmically on many of the major ecommerce sites that use Schema.org markup, this materialization approach can create a
mismatch between how price is modeled and how pricing occurs in actuality.
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In a rule based approach, recurrence is modeled and the exceptions to the recurrence
rules are materialized ad hoc. Adopting a decision rule approach is more complicated, but
allows for the easier coverage of change so long as that change is predictable. Such an
approach would require that the rule system be simple to adopt, specific enough to be of
practical benefit to users, and also be general enough for use across contexts. However, as one
member notes,
The problem with recurrence rules is that no-one ever thinks to put an end-date on
them (even if only a tentative one that can be extended later), so you end up with
meetings/events with rules like "10-11am every Tuesday" and then look at your
calendar a few years into the future and see it full of events that will almost certainly
never happen.
Here, a member highlights one pragmatic problem associated with the specific proposal to
integrate a recurrence rule into the ontology. The dilemma is that ontologists can either model
change, thereby increasing the applicability of the ontology and reducing the potential error of
users having to add markup for each and every possible point of change in an ad hoc basis, or
run the risk of implementing a complex rule that produces user error and/or negligence.
There is a similar tension evident in the proposal to add compositional data modeling to
the ontology. Compositional data modeling is an approach that algorithmically combines preexisting parts of the ontology to model more complex concepts. One steering group member
puts it thusly,
We often have the same underlying concepts appear in several places in the hierarchy,
as part of more complex concepts. So for example we might have GolfCourse (which
combines the idea of a place where you do a sport i.e. a SportsActivityLocation with
some specific sport, Golf). But we might also have a (something like...) GolfSportsMatch,
which combines that same sport - Golf - with a different concept - the idea of being a
kind of SportsEvent devoted to a particular sport.
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As schema.org grows, we get more and more of these situations. It becomes a burden
to keep track of the different ways in which we've built terms that combine simpler
underlying ideas (like specific sports). We don't want to clutter schema.org with every
possible sensible combination of these ideas e.g. a GolfingTutorial or a
CricketSportsEvent or a CyclingCompetition or a CricketTutorial or a GolfingSportsEvent
or a GolfingCompetition or a CyclingTutorial. The combinations soon become
unmanageable.
In keeping with their approach to not add highly granular subtypes into the ontology, a steering
group member made a proposal to replace the input of a name-value pair linked to a specific
Schema.org IRI with a function set that mimics an IRI with a series of arguments that reference
type, property, and class variables in the ontology. In JSON-LD this turns an @id string from
something like, “@id: http://schema.org/about” to the much more complex string, “@id:
http://schema.org/<Function>arg1name=arg1value&arg2name=arg2value". Ostensibly, this will
make the ontology much more expressive with little added complication to the ontology itself.
It adds an intra-ontological reference system whereby the vocabulary can be broadened and
types can be added as acceptable values where they may not be predefined or otherwise
allowed. Problematically, this proposal adds substantial complexity to an already complex set of
technologies, unsurprisingly leading to a number of the core community members to question
the applicability of the compositional model. They state,
Yes, the approach is structured but the implementation pattern would be so unlike the
rest of Schema.org the result would be as unnatural as a shotgun marriage between
SOAP and REST. Both pushing the same direction but a union incomprehensible to the
outside world
trying to understand it makes my brain hurt because of the - for me - too abstract
description, thus making me skeptical about the practicality of the proposal for everyday
webmasters… About that, first off, I've literally lost count of the amount of times I've
seen theme developers utterly destroy graphs because they don't really understand
how Drupal (and/or markup) works (and/or aren't aware that structured data is part of
its core). Often leading to developers either letting broken markup get published or
disabling those parts of Drupal that add structured data to a page. So unless [name] gets
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involved in the gazillion custom templates out there I wouldn't get your hopes up about
seeing a lot of proper implementations.
These critical voices are not only experts in semantic web technologies, but are also experts in,
and founding community members of, Schema.org. Furthermore, this proposal brings up
important questions for the markup standards as there is some uncertainty about if and how
they can encode such functional strings. Ultimately, the proposal is on hold and not attached to
a major version update target as concerns about the proposal’s usability and empirical value
remain.
That tension between usability, generalizability, and specificity is a frequent issue for
ontologists, who often argue that, “we need to find a sweet spot that covers 80 - 90 % of the
cases. A formally proven perfect solution for the underlying problems is IMO beyond what
Schema.org can achieve.” Thus, their approach to data modeling is one where simplicity and
generalizability prevail over complexity and specificity. Ontologists often shy away from adding
types and properties to existing parts of the ontology, preferring instead to allow markup to be
used in the broadest possible ways working with markup standards to strategically leverage the
flexibilities that they offer. This often occurs despite potential problems with semantic accuracy
and the unintended consequences of ontic occlusion and over-determination that can result.
The potential for over-determination is evident in this generalized approach.
Surrounding these attempts to model change, is a large and diverse series of issues attempting
to model things in series. In one example the community was trying to add conceptual
clarification to events that have separate and distinct, or specific, events within them.
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By way of example, they were discussing both the Salzburg Festival and the Olympics for use
cases where there is a super event with many sub events that occur within it. The semantic
problem that occurs, particularly if a simple recurring dates model is applied to the event
designation, is captured in the following two descriptions of the problem by two steering group
members,
An EventSeries is a collection of events that share some unifying characteristic. For
example, "The Olympic Games" is a series, which is repeated regularly. The "2012
London Olympics" can be presented both as an Event in the series "Olympic Games",
and as an EventSeries that included a number of sporting competitions as Events
(member 1).
"The Ashes" (cricket contest between Australia and England) is repeated frequently, but
not according to any long-term stable schedule. The course "Beowulf: the manuscript
and the man" can be an EventSeries consisting of individual seminars with the same
participants, and an EventSeries of the course being held repeatedly over a decade
(member 1).
For example consider if there is a 2016 seminar series (e.g. each of 6 x 1h sessions on
successive weeks), and then later the course is re-run as a 2017 series with the same
structure and topic, but different people. This also relates to whether we want to say
that EventSeries is a subtype of Event (or at least carries Event-like properties).
[member 1] outlines two views. One is to see the 6 sessions in 2016 as an EventSeries
i.e. '2016 Beowulf course', the other is to see the sequence of annual runs of the course
- i.e. 'Beowulf: the manuscript and the man' - as an EventSeries. Either way, superEvent
would point up the hierarchy, from e.g. '2017 session 3' (an Event) to '2017 Beowulf
course' (an Event or an EventSeries) and from there to the top level 'Beowulf: the
manuscript and the man' which is presumably an EventSeries but not an Event since it
represents just the high level notion of the series rather than something that you can
say is happening at a particular place and time.
The mid-level is the most awkward. Intuition pulls it towards being both Event ("An
event happening at a certain time and location" e.g. summer 2016, Madrid) and also an
EventSeries (approximately "a collection of events that share some unifying
characteristic e.g. relationship") (member 2).
Here, the problem is as follows. A given instance is ontologically indeterminate, meaning that it
can legitimately and empirically occupy two or more ontological states simultaneously. As
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member 1 notes, the 2012 London Olympics can be both an event in a series and an event
series. Likewise, the Beowulf course can be two different types of event series, depending on
perspective, or an event in a series of events relating to an organization’s course offerings. So,
depending on the particular context under consideration, event and eventSeries could both be
considered super types and subtypes. This means that marking the order of relationships and
inheritances will necessarily over-determine the semantics of both event and eventSeries while
occluding the alternate meaning.
By way of example, omitting such a distinction would mean the difference between
marking the something like the World Trade Organization meetings (WTO) as an event with the
relevant description and associated semantic properties that surround it, and modeling the
WTO as an event series, with the 1999 Seattle WTO as a specific event in that series. One
completely occludes the possibility of representing specific and important information relating
to an event, the other enables a specific case to be represented and allows for the possibility of
supplementary information to be included and linked to both the overarching super-event and
the subject of that event, in this example the famed protests of the 1999 WTO meeting.
Marking such distinctions is beneficial and relevant to consumers of information whose
interpretations and intentions cannot be specified a priori. This issue also bears upon issues of
reversibility and the constraints of standards discussed in the previous chapter, as well as,
potential cross compatibility problems with other ontologies. This problem of precision,
complexity, and usability is not fully resolvable.
This general approach to organization can also lead to problems of path dependency
within the vocabulary. Consider the following example,
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In the previous medical/health additions we made the mistake of including terms whose
name was implicitly contextualized to medical/health scenarios. So we “used up” the
word “action” on a property that we now call… muscleAction and so on… every change
needs to make sense [a]cross domain, since schema.org is a cross domain vocabulary.
In this situation, prior to the development of the hosted medical extension, ontologists created
a general set of terms to cover a nascent medial domain, the problem was that this general
term, along with its very large set of inheritances, was then used in a large number of use cases.
Here a member points out that a previous vocabulary specification came into conflict with the
development of an ontology extension because when the ontologists added specificity to a type
of action they precluded its use for the extension to which it was eventually most relevant. This
forced them to encode additional complexities into the extension that have caused misuse and
conceptual confusion in modeling. Thus, we see their general affinity for broad or generic types
and properties. This affinity however created problems as the ontology grows. Another
member notes, “As Schema.org grows, generic names for types and properties leads to
unfortunate collisions.” Here, one of the steering group members brings up a long list of
general terms and properties that at the time constrained the possible ranges of use and
interpretation. For example, season was artificially limited to references to seasons of TV
shows, precluding mention of any other interpretations. Likewise, code referenced software
code omitting other potentially serious code types, like medical or legal codes which are both
immediately relevant to Schema.org’s internally hosted extensions.
Adding new subtypes and filling in additional context specific details would seem like
the easy solution, but doing so forces the inheritance of an entire range of additional subtypes
and properties, many of which might be inappropriate to the newly specified types.
Alternatively, depending on how the developers code the new specification, it could mean the
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displacement of properties and subtypes already deployed in a given publisher’s markup. There
are no one size fits all approaches to deal with the problem of path dependence. The
ontologists, especially the steering group members, carefully weigh the consequences of
updates. In some rare cases they deprecate the original term or relocate property inheritances
under the new subtypes, but both solution occur at the expense of existing use cases. In most
other cases the developers broaden the expected set of inputs and make use of flexibilities
within the markup standards, though at the cost of further dulling semantic precision and
reducing domain specific context.

6.4 a/Contextuality
Context in Schema.org, and in the semantic web more generally, is complicated. As
noted in an earlier chapter, semantic web ontologies are constructed acontexually (Waller
2016). Purportedly, this allows them to be applied across contexts, but as Ginsberg’s (2008)
research shows, this can lead to serious complications including ontological over-determination
and occlusion, as the context where markup is applied defines the socio-cultural range of
interpretations (Agre 1995; Collins 1990; Knobel 2010). However, past work on meaning and
context shows that the actual deployment of, and meanings surrounding, technologies never
occurs outside of a specified context. Much of this past work shows that the definitions of
concepts and their attachments to properties always necessarily rely on social context for their
provision. That is, all claims are inextricably embedded in specific contexts (Bakhtin 1981;
Heidegger 1973; Lakoff 1987; Waller 2016). For the semantic web, context is stripped from
factors of its creation and then imputed to the individual instance. This resonates with Seaver’s
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(2015) claim that context is everywhere and at all times a matter of making decisions and
statements about the state of the world. However, this re-imputed context is determined
entirely by the boundaries set in the ontology and it unavailable to consumers in the way that
past work stipulates (Agre 1995, 2003; Collins 1990; Ford and Graham 2016; Waller 2016).
While my investigation does not reveal that ontologists assume a single correct
definition or context for every concept, as does other work (Forsythe 1993; Ginsberg 2008;
Ribes and Bowker 2009; Waller 2016), ontologists have no method to address intentionality
regarding use context and so are constrained in their ability to model context. I attribute this as
one of significant reasons for adopting a pragmatic and generalized approach to modeling.
Since by allowing term reuse, you obviate the need to account for context. Further, this
superficially appears to eliminate the problem of imputing contexts to instances. However, I
argue that while imputing context seems to be avoided at the local level of the instance,
context is entirely determined at the level of the ontology. So far as semantic data is concerned,
the ontology entirely determines an instance’s ontological state, as it sets the boundaries of
what can and cannot be.
The approach to modeling data inherent to ontologies necessarily over-determines
relationships and their inheritance paths as they are defined within a specific domain that
cannot be context agnostic. The alleged agnosticism is evident in the approach detailed earlier.
Recall the previous discussion on how Schema.org over-determines service provision or agency
by organizations in commercial contexts. The decisions to model types and properties relating
to services as a commercial offer of a product was a pragmatic decision to cover an assumed
significant majority of their use cases, but it has the problem of imputing commercial contexts
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to things like volunteering, aid, pro-bono work, and other similar actions by organizations and
individuals. Waller (2016:8) notes similar patterns with the actions afforded to the vocabulary
type Person, where whether “‘alive, dead, undead or fictional’, are focused on involvement in
movies, videogames, TV series, radio and sport and buying and selling.”. This problem of
context is not necessarily a fault of ontologists, but the fault of ontologies in particular, and the
modeling of the world in simple terms of objects and their relations, in general. In this system
of thinking, context is not locally determined by the characteristics and peculiarities of
situations, but rather determined globally by the declaration of a canonical reference point, in
this case, a context file or ontology.
In terms of context, Schema.org’s enactment of data is captured well by one steering
group member,
We very often have the following workflow:
someone suggests a new property + textual definition
someone else says, "hey what about re-using property such-and-so?"
they agree to re-use an existing property, perhaps tweaking its definition to mention or
permit this new usecase.
result: the original more contextualized definition gets lost.
and a Web developer who notes that, “Schema.org does seem to encourage reuse of terms
that have the same semantics in different contexts.” Ontologists call this boundary traversal
“scope creep”. However, these understandings of context display an understanding of context
that fits within the paradigm noted in earlier work on AI, namely a context that ignores some
level of constructivism implied in ontology development. While these community members are
correct in that Schema.org encourages the pragmatic and generalized application of terms
across contexts, as discussed above, this implies that context is somehow erased, rather than
displaced and enacted in every instance. Much as Seaver (2015) argues that rather than the
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analysis of big data stripping context from data points, it instead recreates it, the cross
contextual application of Schema.org enacts contexts in the process of selecting the markup
syntax, type and property usage, and underlying content to be created as data. Here, context is
precisely the thing in question.
Moreover, this application obscures the way that context informs a vocabulary’s
creation. In every instance, vocabulary proposals are made with a specific single or set of use
cases in mind. The proposer may be a Web developer, community member, steering group
member, industry group, or sponsor company. While each different group comes to the
community with different levels of sophistication and knowledge of the domain, the ensuring
process is relatively similar. First, a proposal is made. As discussed previously, this includes the
range of potential use domains, clarification of why it is needed, and what additions or
modifications might be required, among other details that fit the particular proposal. Second,
the community evaluates the need for the proposal and the potential for use in related
contexts. This measurement of scope creep is the first stage in the abstraction of context from
the initial proposal. Third, the best approach to model that use context is debated and
measured for its fit into the existing ontology and its ability to be modeled appropriately with
the three markup syntaxes. This is a next step in deconstructing context, as the community
evaluates the amount and extent to which the proposed extension or addition can be satisfied
with existing terminology. This has the effect of removing context specificity from a domain.
Interestingly, this new domain proposal only happens because a user determines that the
existing ontology does not fit the domain specific context required. The last stages are where
the ontologists, often with the domain expertise of the users, set implementation details and
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timelines to integrate the proposal into the core vocabulary or as an extension of it. The
cumulative process of moving from the proposal stage to the implementation stage is one
where small and compatible additions and modifications are stripped of their particular context
to fit into the core vocabulary and hosted extensions in way that minimizes the impact to the
existing ontology. As noted, this means reusing or adapting existing terminology wherever
possible, abstracting meaning from its origin and set up as a standing reserve from which new
contexts and new meanings can be imputed. The new terms are then put to use in markup
recreating and imputing a new set of contexts, that may or may not be aligned with the ones
contributing to their genesis.
To sum up, context informs creation, context is then removed as the new creation is
integrated with the older set of decontextualized relationships, and then context is newly
introduced at both local and global levels as the ontology is deployed by users. While this may
result in little actual change to the initial context, that matter depends on the potential impact
to the existing ontology, as well as the level of overall and the perceived value of the addition
as negotiated by the proposer and the steering group members. In some instances, context
bears some resemblance to the one initially supplied, but its use occurs in a diluted form, as
with proposed mapping of the pre-existing European Legislation Identifier Ontology (ELI)
ontology. In this case, integrating this vocabulary with Schema.org would alter the semantic
context of the original vocabulary, as Schema.org’s validFrom does not equal the ELI’s
dateInForce and applicableDate, and Schema.org’s basedOn is not the same as the ELI’s
madePossibleBy in legal contexts. These examples among others in this proposal highlight the
inadequacy of existing acontextualized Schema.org terms to encode nuanced understanding of
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how the legislative process works. This is something further complicated by property
directionality and its availability to be specifically modeled.
This case is additionally complicated by the fact that there is no single legislative process
to be modeled, but rather many different processes. Returning to the excerpt from page 137,
The problem is that internationally there are SO many different vocabularies—I'm not
just talking about language differences, I'm talking about the way legal concepts are
referred to and thought of in different jurisdictions. Not to mention at all levels from
international… to national to regional (state, province) to municipal and other local
levels. So trying to include all those existing vocabularies is not only monumental but
probably unworkable. In a situation like this it is actually more helpful to… come up with
high level generic terms.
We see that this user is responding to a proposal to add markup coverage for legal decisions
discussed earlier in the chapter. He correctly highlights the complete inadequacy of trying to
model variation in legal terminology across a wide feature set, as there is significant variation in
legal structure, terminology, publication, and process across all levels of jurisdiction. This
particular part of the problem is well discussed in the data, and can be seen as a unifying point
connecting frequent proposals to add legal and legislative proposals that cover a wide variety of
case types and jurisdictions. Currently, efforts to integrate the two largest and most detailed
legal proposals (E.U. and U.S. based) into a hosted legislation extension are ongoing. Users and
community members in this and related discussions, debated the differences in the European
and U.S. legal systems establishing the intractability of the problem they faced. While
establishing “high level generic terms” may be the best of a number of poor solutions, it is
actually only the best where those high level terms draw out the correct legal contexts. As one
user makes note,
My only concern is that some legal issues aren’t about the government-to-citizen
relationship (like civics would imply), but about family matters (divorce, child custody,
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child support, domestic violence — these are some of the most common-searched legal
help topics), corporate matters, contracts, property, etc.
Presently such concerns are not included in the pending extension. While these concerns have
been noted by users and emphasized by steering group members, making additions likely, they
will require careful consideration and preservation of existing real world context to have
meaning in this domain. Additionally, as this proposal remains underdevelopment, new interest
groups are advocating for coverage of other legal domains, structures, and jurisdictions, further
complicating the addition. In meaning spaces where precision is paramount, system-level overdetermination of legal concepts, options, and advice may have severe consequences for
information seekers.

6.5 Conclusion
Schema.org ontologists adopt a pragmatic, generalized, and a/contextual approach to
development. This empirically driven approach contrasts with the approaches detailed in earlier
work on knowledge engineering (Agre 1995; Forsythe 1993a, 1993b; Star 1995). Furthermore,
the ontologists and users recognize the semantic problems of their respective tasks and do not
believe that they are simply representing a stable worldview, but rather, take the pragmatic
view that if consensus based decision making can come to a developed representation that
aligns with the existing set of them, they can construct a more or less true vision of the world.
That is, they are acutely aware of the fact that they might be embedding certain cultural
understandings in their work. Again, this runs counter to existing work (Forsythe 1993a, 1993b).
Their pragmatic approach allows them to navigate between an entirely constructivist or realist
path to development. By basing their development decisions on actual use on the Web, the
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ontologists and Web developers can enact an ontology that while constructed, resonates with
the existing and agreed upon interpretations of their information environment. The assemblage
based approach allows us to uncover the ways that those states are exposed by attending to
the situated interactions of components. In this chapter, those components are the rationales,
strategies, modeling techniques, and communities of practice.
Problematically for this pragmatic approach is the tension between precision and
applicability. Following from their use-driven approach, ontologists and Web developers alike,
opt for applicability over precision, as that tension is not often able to be resolved. Relatedly,
ontologists and users try to make the ontology as generalizable as possible. This has the effect
of making it easier to use and more adaptable across domains. However, in addition to
suffering the similar consequences of pragmatism, generalizability tends to lead to both over
determining meaning, as it applies classes and types broadly across content domains, and to
creating a path dependency problem. Path dependency creates a problem where the ontology
faces two undesirable outcomes, invalidating existing markup or adding new coverage into the
ontology with the potential to create semantic problems relating to class and property
inheritance.
Finally, the ontology, far from being acontextual, determines contexts in two different
ways. First, it serves to impute a specific context to a particular application at the local level.
This removes markup from its original contextualized development and embeds it into a new
domain. As the ontology is developed to generalize, this acontextual mapping creates a degree
of indeterminacy, as both domains can make equal claims to legitimacy with the markup. This
has the effect of losing the ability to specify semantics in any precise manner at that micro, or

153

local, level. Second, the ontology determines context in ontological terms by constructing a
delimited state of semantic meaning at the that larger global level. Here, existence is
determined entirely through the specific construction of the ontology, in this case, Schema.org.
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7. Conclusion
In this concluding chapter it will be helpful to revisit my motiving questions and to
briefly return to the chapters where they were investigated both in order to explain how I came
to answer them, and to show how those answers address the literature that informed them.
Motivated by calls in the emerging field of data studies, I initially sought to understand how
data assemblages came to be. These calls stem from a lack of large scale studies about how
data assemblages come together to produce data. This question can only ever be answered in
part, as the semantic web is composed of many different assemblages, which themselves
include various components. It would be impossible to completely cover the scope and scale
that this question implies. Nonetheless, my investigation does explain how one major semantic
web assemblage is enacted. Answering this question required engaging with literatures
surround the various components of a given data assemblage. Major components addressed
here included standards, developers, users, design philosophies, and habits of logic (Kitchin
2014b).
Answering this question required that I first answer two other major questions. First
among them examined the way that ontological states are declared in the processes of
developing and using semantic web ontologies. At the onset of this study I wrote that this
question was primarily theoretical in that it attended to the particular delimiting of meaning
space. While I maintain that the question is primarily a theoretical one that deals with the
processes of ontological over-determination and occlusion that occur any time data
assemblages take shape, it is also an empirical question. Empirically, the question shifts to my
second subsidiary question which demanded that I understand how humans represent an
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indeterminate world to a deterministic machine. It was important in this particular case to
move past the long standing and intractable problem of accuracy in representation, to
acknowledge that representations are happening and to understand how. Approaching these
questions of ontology in terms of assemblage theory meant that I needed to understand how
components are implicated in the assemblage and how they interact to express it. This required
drawing on recent work in STS on empirical ontology and practice to remedy gaps in literatures
surrounding standards, expert systems and AI, as well as emerging work on the semantic web.
Chapter five detailed the ways that markup standards shape the semantic web in
general and Schema.org in particular. These markup standards translate the work of ontologists
and the work of Web developers in ways that alter the both sets of practices. Not only do the
standards force ontologists to cater to the dictates of the standards, but also the resulting
situated markup may differ in both form and function for different markup standards as they
offer different affordances and constraints on how semantics can be expressed and what forms
of markup are allowed. This section showed how Microdata forced ontologists to modify the
ontology to enable reverse properties and to allow for more permissive, though semantically
less accurate, markup rules to account for Microdata’s lack of reverse properties and multiple
types across contexts. These modifications result in over-determining semantic states and
ambiguous semantics. However, it also showed the ways that ontologists creatively work with
standards to enact compromise and/or modifications to the standards.
This chapter also showed the ways the markup standards create and exacerbate
problems with drawing on multiple ontologies. Using markup standards to encoded semantic
content is a complicated activity. This is made all the more complicated as Web developers
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need to have a deep understanding of the definitional and structural relationships between
ontologies if they are to interlink them. Absent those deeper understandings, the problems of
term override, namely ontological over-determination and occlusion, lead to problems where
the human intent does not translate to machine interpretation. Furthermore, where Web
developers lack an ability or motivation to draw on multiple ontologies, the space for semantics
is constrained. Ultimately, the ways that ontologies are adapted to fit the constraints and
affordances of markup standards can result in the differential enactment of the semantic web
as the ontologies are developed both through seeking to accurately model an environment and
through negotiations with the limits set forth by markup standards. The potential for
differential enactments of semantic data is especially significant as ontologies grow in scope
and size where they themselves take on the role of a standard.
My investigation into the interactions between communities of practice and markup
standards leads to the following conclusions. In line with past work on standards, the various
actors involved with Schema.org have a tenuous relationship with the markup standards used
to enact semantic data (Bowker and Star 1999; Epstein 2007, 2010; Heimer 2001; Whooley
2010, 2014; Whooley and Horwitz 2013). In part, I agree with this research, finding that while
standards do enable interoperability in many ways, they require users to work around their
limitations. Here this takes the form of deploying a different standard to circumvent an
imposed constraint. While workarounds exist, they were not the most common negotiation in
my data, particularly as development progresses. Ontologists do not like to advocate for using
multiple standards, and they prefer not to modify the ontology unless absolutely necessary.
Instead, I side with Halpin (2016) finding that rather than working around the limitations
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imposed by standards, actors usually act creatively to work with and through them. This
happens in a few main ways. I show that standards force ontologists to compromise by
modifying types and properties to fit into syntax rules that might otherwise not have been
appropriate to use in such circumstances, mitigating the standards’ limiting influence. I also
show that ontologists have some measure of control over the standards themselves, modifying
them to fit the ontology. Additionally, I show that users deploy the ontology in ways that while
semantically over-determine their content, provides some level of semantics. These
practitioners negotiate the limitations of different standards differently depending on the
standard implicated, the possibility of affecting large amounts of markup, the complexity of the
solution for the ontology, and the added complication of a fix for users. This affirms much of
the extant literature, attesting to standards’ jussive power. Additionally, it contributes to the
recent debate on how practitioners negotiate the limitations imposed by standards.
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the various markup standards work to
create multiple ontological states, as the unique affordances and constraints of each contribute
to the differential enactment of semantics. In the limited example in this study, we can see such
an effect with the differential abilities of Microdata, RDFa, and JSON-LD, particularly as they
pertain to allowing for multiple context files and property types for a single instance. Certain
markup standards are simply more expressive than others for a given ontology. While I have
not done additional empirical research on this matter, I would expect new work to support that
suspicion since there are many other markup standards that are not supported by Schema.org
and are used for other semantic web ontologies. Each with their own set of affordances and
constraints.

158

Chapter six discusses the underlying processes of development. It does so in two main
ways. First, it outlines the underlying design philosophies and systems of thought that
ontologists use to craft Schema.org. Second, it investigates the development and deployment
of the ontology in terms of the interactions between ontologists and users. I find that the
ontologists and users alike, adopt a pragmatic view of ontologies and their work. By basing
many of their development decisions on actual usage on the Web, they opt for an empirically
grounded approach to model world relations in a way that they believe best resonates with
their understanding of it. Furthermore, they do not assume that they have a necessarily correct
world image in the way that past work has portrayed knowledge engineers and ontologists
(Forsythe 1993, 2001; Ribes and Bowker 2009; Waller 2016). Instead, Schema.org’s ontologists
debate both the existing state of the world and the best way to represent it. They attempt to
arrive at consensus for both the world image and the way to best model that image. Central to
this view is that they recognize the problem inherent to their task. As a means to navigate the
tension between precision and applicability ontologists and users try to make the ontology as
generalizable as possible. This helps to make the ontology easier to use and more adaptable
across domains, as ontologists develop in a way that permits broad interpretation and users
deploy markup in creative ways, something particularly useful for navigating the limitations
discussed in chapter five.
By adopting this approach ontologists and users create a complication of context. While
ontologists use such design models to allow their ontologies to be deployed independent of
particular domain contexts, they actually determine context in both local and global ways.
Locally, contexts are removed from their initial development and the reasserted as terms and
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properties are used across domains. It serves to impute a specific context to a particular
application at that local level, despite the sometimes problematic imputation. Simultaneously,
the ontology determines global context by constructing a bounded meaning space. This
confirms the concern raised in recent work that an ontology constructs a world taken as a
whole (Ford and Graham 2016; Halford et al. 2013; McCarthy 2017; Waller 2016). Ontological
states are circumscribed at both levels of granularity. At each level, what can and cannot be
said or interpreted is dictated by the ontology. At the local level, what can be said in a domain is
limited to what domain specific knowledge is encoded in the ontology, or what is generalizable
from others. At the global level, what can be said in total, as well as where the localities sit in
relation to others, is defined and exposed by its existence in the ontology, or occluded by its
omission (Knobel 2010).
This contributes to, and extends recent work on practice in STS. Following this “turn to
ontology” (Lynch 2013; Woolgar and Lezuan 2013, 2015; Sismondo 2015). I do not make the
assumption that there is a picture of the world that ontologists are getting right or wrong.
Instead I add to this turn, by exploring how ontologists and users are engaged in negotiating
with the various situated components of the data assemblage. These engagements enact a
particular understanding of the world for machines, but are dependent on the ontology used,
the standards deployed, the way markup is performed, and the content that is encoded. Thus,
ontology in this respect can be said to be multiple, particularly as contexts are continually redetermined (Mol 2002; Sismondo 2015). However, while STS work on multiple ontologies
eventually converge to enact the thing in question, for the semantic web, ontologies remain
multiple. That is, their states do not converge to create a unified thing. Additionally, I add to

160

this work by showing precisely how “being” is premediated by the technological systems
(Aneesh 2017).
This also contributes to gaps that exist in our understanding of AI. In this study, I
attempt to reinvigorate long dormant work on AI and expert systems from the slumbers of the
AI winter22. Present day ontologists, and the knowledge engineers of early AI systems have
different views of what they are doing. My data suggests the opposite of the work by Agre
(1995), Collins (1987, 1990), Forsythe (1993a, 1993b), and Star (1995). Rather than seeing
knowledge as something easily extracted or converted for machine understanding, the
Schema.org ontologists recognize the difficulty of making these translations. While the
knowledge engineers in that work see the problem as simply one of managing human
description errors, these ontologists see the problem as a matter of pragmatic consensus
building. Where consensus is agreement amongst user, experts, ontologists, and the ontological
orderings of Schema.org. They understand that they are choosing the terms and relations, and
understand that a trade-off between precision and practicality is usually inevitable. Thus their
approach to development reflects their interpretations of the state of users, consumers, the
state of the Web, and the current state of the ontology. Furthermore, I fill the gap left by past
work that ignores translations between humans and machines (Agre 1995; Collins 1990;
Forsythe 1993a, 1993b; Ribes and Bowker 2009) through their specific focus on the translation
between different experts and cultural communities.

22

This term reflects the temporary abandonment of AI across governments, academics, popular
press, tech companies, and venture capital as computing power and actual applications could
not live up to the promises of artificial intelligence. See Wikipedia (2017) for further details.
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Where the space for expressing semantics is constrained by ontological consolidation
and frictions between human and machine translations, Web consumers are provided with
limited understandings of the world. Of course while humans have the capacity to exercise their
socio-cultural knowledge (Collins 1990) to interrogate and develop meaning from information,
they are limited where the provenance, methodology, and contexts of that information is
hidden. Overall, these questions contribute broadly to sociological concerns of information
asymmetries and access. As the AI winter thaws, and Web environments continually shift in
ways that make that contextual information less visible and answers more ready to hand,
understanding how systems like AI and semantic search are developed becomes more
important. While the semantic web and AI mediated search offer many promises for efficiency
and knowledge acquisition, a critical analytic eye must remain on their implementations.
This study is not without its limitations. I can identity at least two. First, this study only
examines one semantic web ontology. Ideally, a study that attempts to understand the multiple
ways that ontological states are determined for AI and other computational agents would be
able to examine the multiple ways that they are developed across ontologies. As I argue
throughout this work, the given state is a function of the complex interactions between
assemblage components. Thus a comparative study would have been illustrative on this front.
Problematically, I know of no such comparative site for research. There are relatively few
ontologies that are actively developed, and fewer still that are developed as openly and with as
much supporting evidence as Schema.org. Wikidata does offer some window into its
construction, but it is not as rich or comprehensive as Schema.org. Additionally, it does not
have the same type of community involvement, so there is not a similar level of exposure to the
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ontology’s user base. Despite this limitation, my research convincingly shows the ways that the
interactions between components produce a specific ontological state. I think that my work,
and the limited work on other ontologies, allows for the logical assumption that the specific
interactions in other ontological assemblages might produce other states.
A second limitation, noted in the methods chapter, is that I was not able to conduct indepth interviews with community members. While the data used contain all of the public
discussion on how to best alter and apply the ontology, it does not contain any backchannel
communications. My research indicated that backchannel communications happened regularly
between steering group members. Most of the time those discussions are disclosed to the
group with a summary of the results, but the actual content of some of those discussions is lost.
This may be fine for continued work on the project from the perspective of a developer, but
from an analytic perspective, there could be information important to my findings, for or
against. Additionally, since the data are entirely textual and interviews were not performed for
this study, there is no possibility for follow up or clarification questions that are not covered or
alluded to in the two main research sites. However, the vast majority of decisions and
rationales, as well as all modifications and development were public and so these limitations
seem negligible.
One final aspect of this research that is missing, but perhaps not a limitation per se, is
that there was no practicable way to investigate the actual displayed and final form of user’s
markup. Markup is available in source code, but the sheer volume of markup applied is beyond
the scope of even a team of researchers. However, a systematic survey of semantic markup in
use could allow for a discursive analysis similar to the type used by Ford and Graham (2016).
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While one could certainly interrogate sematic markup, problematically, its provenance is lost.
This is not a limitation of this study, as it is outside of the scope and scale here. Additionally,
because these systems are deterministic, one can fully comprehend the range of possibility by
understanding the standards and ontology coverage at a given time. However, it poses
interesting empirical questions about in situ deployment of Schema.org markup.
This study closes some questions, but doing so, opens others. Recent work in data and
code studies has been largely oriented towards critique. While my research certainly took a
critical eye towards the limitations of Schema.org and the semantic web more generally,
critique in a more critical theoretic tradition was not my aim. However, following from that
tradition an analysis of the power relationship that exist within and through the semantic web’s
development would be productive. Work in this area would do well to take critical feminist and
postcolonial approaches to the ways that the semantic web builds worlds to foreclose on
certain knowledges while expanding on others, such as the decidedly Western and commercial
orientation Schema.org has. Such analyses might adopt critical discourse analyses of the
coverage of ontologies by mapping out what different domains are covered by major
ontologies, what sort of equivalencies they establish, and how they reflect and reinforce
dominant power relationships that exist at large.
Additional work might look at other forms of bias that enter into technical systems. Such
critical approaches might also investigate the ways in which peer production creates its own set
of biases on technical systems. Conventionally, peer production would seem like a way to
mitigate the existence of bias in code based systems, but as other work has shown, biases that
exist at larger levels of social organization often manifest themselves in technical systems
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(Barocas and Selbst 2016; Friedman and Nissenbaum 1996; Noble 2013; Sweeny 2013). This is
particularly the case with AI systems that rely on deep neural networks which are unavailable
for even machine learning experts to scrutinize.
Currently, semantic technologies are developed manually by individual or teams of
ontologists. They debate the ways to define terms, relationships, and their domain contexts all
for users to apply to their content. The processes outlined by various scholars all involve the
situated practical activity of individuals to translate expertise and organize knowledge in a way
that is amenable to computer scientists (Collins 1990; Forsythe 1993; Khazaree and Khoo 2011;
McCarthy 2017; Millerand & Bowker 2009, Ribes and Bowker 2009, Ribes and Finholt 2009). In
this way, the process of constructing ontologies is still available for scrutiny. However, recent
advances in natural language processing and state of the art machine learning algorithms like
Word2vec promise to automate these processes. At the moment these famously black boxed
neural network algorithms are too computationally expensive to run at Web scale, but as
processing units become more powerful, smaller, and more efficient, we may soon see
Pandora’s box close for good.
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Appendix:
Glossary of Terms

Commits:

These are the specific changes to a repository.

Enumerations: A set of available categories and the set of values that rest within those
categories
Fork:

This is the process of marking a separate version of the master repository.
When one wants to make a change to the master repository, one creates a fork
from the master, makes a specific set of changes, and then uploads those
changes for approval.

Issues:

These are the main tasks that are created for specific work. On GitHub, they
take a threaded form, each with a hyperlinked number. Issues are varied and
can be for specific coding tasks, simple documentary changes, goal setting, etc.
They are linked to pull requests and commits when action is taken on them.
Issues can either be merged with other issues when substantially similar,
closed when completed, deemed irrelevant, unimportant, or open when still
actively being worked on.

Literals:

Specific string values that indicate a value precisely without IRIs

Pull Requests:

Pull requests are notifications sent to the working group indicating that a
developer has made changes on a project that are awaiting review.

Repository:

These are the stores of all versions, code, and metadata for a project.
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